



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

THE SPIRIT
OF DEMOCRACY

14 DAYS
BOOK

CHARLES F. DOLE

Gov 514.15
B




Harvard College Library

FROM

**THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL
OF ECONOMICS**





dhe
Karl.

②

THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY

BY


CHARLES FLETCHER DOLE

AUTHOR OF "THE COMING PEOPLE"

"THE RELIGION OF A GENTLEMAN"

ETC., ETC.

NEW YORK
THOMAS Y. CROWELL & CO.
PUBLISHERS



From the
Quarterly Journal
of Economics.

COPYRIGHT, 1906,
By CHARLES F. DOLE.

COPYRIGHT, 1906,
By THOMAS Y. CROWELL & CO.

PUBLISHED, SEPTEMBER, 1906.

Dedication

The Author begs leave to associate the publication of this book with his good friends in the Twentieth Century Club of Boston. The book, indeed, grew out of a Lecture, with the same title, which was given by the kind invitation of the Club at their rooms in May, 1904. The Twentieth Century Club was established "to promote a finer public spirit and a better social order." This book is sent forth in the hope that it may encourage its readers to believe in, and to work for, the practical realization of those great ideal ends which alone give dignity, worth, and significance to human life.



PREFACE

It is my purpose in this book to show what real democratic government is. People have studied the outside of the body of democracy; they have hardly begun to know what makes its life, or upon what its good health depends.

Democracy is on trial in the world, on a more colossal scale than ever before. Its friends perhaps never faced more difficult problems. Neither have they ever had so much reason to hope for success.

I have no easy panacea for the ills and grievances that disturb the world. I can venture no prophecy as to the exact form which a maturer civilization will take. What generation was ever able to lift even its most gifted leaders to see the details of the line of march of mankind? There is, however, a certain spirit of humanity or good will which all the clearest thinkers are coming to agree is the essential factor in civilization. This spirit is growing among men. All the signs of

the times go to show that the world is coming to demand this spirit, as the hungry body craves food. I hope to show that in the growth of this spirit we find the clew to understand and to work out the splendid experiment of democracy.

I may be thought to exaggerate certain evils; for example, the mischief of militarism and partisanship. I wish, however, to disclaim any narrow philosophy touching the problem of evil. I accept the facts of savagery and barbarism, as I accept the facts of a necessary period of childhood in the life of each individual. I quite sympathize with President David Starr Jordan's lines:—

“Jungle and town and reef and sea,
I loved God's earth and his earth loved me,
Taken for all in all.”

But I assume that we are here to carry highroads through the jungle and to mark the reefs by buoys and lighthouses. If the world on the whole is a good world, we shall find this out as fast and only as fast as we seek to make it better.

C. F. D.

NOTE.—The author wishes to acknowledge the friendly interest of the publishers of the Springfield *Republican*, who, with their characteristic willingness to encourage the discussion of public questions, printed the chapters of this book in a series, November, 1905—May, 1906.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	v
CHAPTER	
I. THE TEACHING OF HISTORY	I
II. NEW IDEAS IN POLITICS	14
III. DEMOCRACY AS A SOCIAL FORCE	21
IV. GOOD WILL: A MOTIVE PRINCIPLE	26
V. IDEALISM AND THE FACTS	35
VI. DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY: NEW MEAN- INGS	46
VII. WHAT IS GOVERNMENT?	62
VIII. LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY	78
IX. THE EXTENSION OF DEMOCRACY	87
X. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS: THE SUFFRAGE	103
XI. THE LAWS: THE LEGITIMATE USE OF FORCE	120
XII. THE TREATMENT OF CRIME	130
XIII. THE PROBLEM OF PAUPERISM	148
XIV. MAJORITY RULE	161
XV. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT	174
XVI. DEMOCRACY AND THE EXECUTIVE	184
XVII. THE PARTY SYSTEM	193
XVIII. THE RULE OF THE CITIES	216
XIX. THE PROBLEM OF WAR	233
XX. DEMOCRACY AND IMPERIALISM	248

CHAPTER		PAGE
XXI.	THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE GOLDEN RULE	262
XXII.	THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER	282
XXIII.	POPULAR TAXATION	293
XXIV.	DEMOCRATIC FORMS OF TAXATION	308
XXV.	LOCAL DEMOCRACY	319
XXVI.	THE NEW IMMIGRATION	329
XXVII.	THE LABOR UNIONS	349
XXVIII.	DEMOCRACY AND THE FAMILY	368
XXIX.	THE EDUCATION FOR A DEMOCRACY	379
XXX.	ANARCHY AND SOCIALISM	393
XXXI.	THE RELIGION IN DEMOCRACY	410
XXXII.	THE PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRACY	422

THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRACY

I

THE TEACHING OF HISTORY

THE name "democracy," of Greek origin, describes a form of government already in familiar use when Aristotle, the tutor of Alexander the Great, wrote his famous treatise on *Politics*. Thus the city of Athens in the time of its splendor was a democracy, in which the whole body of citizens managed their own affairs and were all eligible to the public offices. Rome was also substantially a democracy, modified by highly aristocratic features, and at last passing insensibly under the hands of the Cæsars, while its democratic forms were still outwardly observed. Mediæval Florence would have come under Aristotle's definition of a democracy.

The cantons of Switzerland have perhaps given the world its best and most durable examples of democratic institutions. England, with its ancient

and complex scheme of a monarchy and House of Lords, has been moving toward actual popular government ever since the Stuarts were driven from the throne. The birth of the independent republic of the United States was simply an out-growth of this great and earlier movement of the English people, feeling their way toward thoroughly free institutions. But the new republic carried the burden of African slavery upon its shoulders for more than half of its career to the present time. It started with various forms of limited suffrage. Its citizenship to-day is largely composed of people who have lived under undemocratic governments and have never till lately breathed the air of freedom.

The conviction is abroad in the world that democracy is the coming régime. But it is as yet on trial. In many quarters there is even yet a feeling of dread about it. Most of the earlier political thinkers held that democracy meant the rule of the mediocre. Many think so still. Others fear, not without show of reason, that a vast centralized democracy will easily lend itself to the schemes of ambition, and will develop, like Rome, into an empire. Nowhere yet have the people fairly come into full use of their power. The laws under

which the people act have been framed to no inconsiderable extent in the interest of a class, namely, the owners of property. No one can tell how far such laws may have to be modified in order to express the will of the whole people. The history of the democracy is an unfinished book. Only its first chapters, relating the story of its infancy, have yet been written.

Interesting and valuable as history is, it is easy to overestimate its importance. By far the largest part of its record consists of men's blunders and failures. In the wearisome maze of its details, it is hard to distinguish principles and the lines of progress. There are great wildernesses of history in which one can discern little, if any, significant movement. Many a time mankind has wandered from the true path of advancement in futile experiments, which only serve at best as warnings to later generations. The history of medicine, of science, of institutions, of morals, of religions, of liberty, through thousands of years, presents to the reader only here and there brief eras of progress, like jets of light rising out of the darkness of the primitive ignorance and superstition.

The inventors, the discoverers, the reformers, the great leaders of the march of mankind, have

not been men who worshipped the past and followed historical precedents. On the contrary, they have thrown precedents aside and have addressed themselves in every instance to the pressing questions of their own age; they have grappled at first hand with the secrets of nature, with the conditions and the materials which they found immediately at hand; they have freed their minds of prejudices; they have set their eyes on ideals and the future rather than on ancient traditions and statutes; they have believed that "new occasions teach new duties." They have known history quite as well for its repeated warnings, marking "No thorough-fare" against the way of men's errors, as for its more definite and positive, but less frequent lessons.

In fact, history has largely been written from a wrong point of view. It has been made the record of man's crimes, his greed, his ambitions, his wars and oppression — the sensational side of his career. "Behold human nature, always the same," the historians have said. It is a very modern effort to write history in accordance with the philosophy of evolution. Only the few, like the late J. R. Green, have as yet fairly succeeded in setting forth the most impressive lesson of history, — the

development of those social or coöperative forces in human nature which constitute civilization. Read in this light, all human experiences — even rivalry, competition, war — find their interpretations as the incidents of a movement which works to make men so social, so humane, so intelligent, so sane and normal, so democratic, that hate, injustice, and arrogance must come to be held as no less opprobrious than the thumb-screw and the whipping-post. We have only begun to gather the materials to write history from this new point of view.

The history of the rise and growth of democratic government, therefore, hardly tells us anything of what real democracy is. It might be, and indeed has been, shrewdly turned into a tale of warning against democracy and a defence of absolutism. Men have shuddered at the doings of historic democracies, very much as parents may shudder at the risks that their boys run in learning to climb or to skate. The name of democracy, like many noble words, has a high and good meaning, and also a dubious and somewhat damaged meaning; it has had a double pedigree.

The ancient democracy was simply one of the forms of government more or less rudely suited to

a military or predatory age. When in a Greek city the people rose and overturned the aristocrats or the king, the government remained in the hands of only a larger number of fighters, whose business continued to be mainly war. The Athenian democracy was the citizen soldiery. The early association of democracy was thus with a rule of force. Though the basis of the government had become broader than it was under the rule of nobles, it had not changed its character. Brutal and rival factions or parties still continued. There was always the chance for a popular chief to make himself the new tyrant.

This was not merely the characteristic danger of democracy; it was the dominant feature of a military age, always liable to sudden revolutions. A citizen soldiery desired the wealth and emoluments created by successful wars and by the conquest of rival cities. Who ever heard of an ancient democracy planning for the welfare, the prosperity, and the happiness of its subjects? The early governments dealt with enemies abroad and robbers at home, with dangerous rivals also, or opposite parties, quick to take up arms and seize the reins of authority. This befitted a world which, without knowing Dar-

winism, was trying the animal experiment of "the survival of the fittest," and mostly believed that "might was right."

Early democracy arose out of no abstract doctrine of the rights of men. Actual deeds of outrage and injustice on the part of the ruling group, as illustrated in the story of the Roman Lucretia, or the maiden Virginia, doubtless stirred men to revenge and to overturn an arrogant dynasty. Even Aristotle and Plato, so far from seeing any sense in elevating slaves to a share in sovereignty, made provision for the institution of slavery as a foundation of the state. How can the precedents of ancient democracy have much, if any, value in solving the problems of an industrial age? A militant age offered no suitable conditions for a satisfactory democracy, nor did it afford conditions for any kind of government that would seem bearable to modern men.

The tradition of a military government only slowly passes out of men's minds. This idea makes anarchists of noble spirits like Tolstoi and Kropotkin, who have been used to the sight of government compelling and terrorizing its subjects and warring against innocent people. They suspect that this is the nature of all kinds of govern-

ment, even of democracy. They connect every form of government with militarism.

The fact to be remembered is that historic democracy comes to us largely infected with the usages of a predatory age. The pioneers of democracy have so far been obliged to work out their experiments in the teeth of hostile autocratic and class traditions, alien to the democratic spirit. The military mind and habit of thought are still with us. We still bear the burden of military establishments. We are still educated to regard our fellow-men in the military way, as friends or enemies, rulers or subjects; the spirit of opposition and enmity is still in the world.

Observe, however, that what has scared the conservative people about the working of democracy has not been democracy at all. A bad democracy is not essentially very different from a bad monarchy or a bad aristocracy. The bad king, whether a despot or a constitutional monarch, seeks to use power for himself rather than for the welfare of his people. The bad aristocrats hold and use political power for themselves and their caste. In the bad democracy the many are doing what the one or the few did before. Not merely each of a little caste, but each of a crowd is seeking to get

and use power, place, and money for his own selfish ends. Each man wants more than his share of honor, emolument, or advantage at the public expense.

The history of democracy even at its worst—the failure and ruin of democratic Athens, the fatal change at Rome from a commonwealth into an empire, the disastrous story of the republics of Italy, the episode of the French Revolution, the continual revolutions in the Spanish-American states, the misgovernment of American cities, and the tyranny of Tammany Hall—need not discourage any believer in democracy. It is a story of dictators, of oligarchies, of the working of selfishness and greed; it shows, not what a real democracy is, but what a true democracy should abhor and avoid.

Men are distressed at the condition into which Latin-American states have fallen. The cause of their distress is not the failure of democracy, but the survival of barbarism. Men are distressed when the people rise against their oppressors in Russia and kill a grand duke. Why are they not equally distressed when a czar shoots his people in the streets?

The fact is that true democracy has not yet

been achieved. We complain at men's struggles in working it out. As well complain of the university because college men occasionally get drunk and destroy property like children. These escapades are not results of university training; they show the nature of the primitive human material which the university takes in hand.

It may be urged, however, that history shows selfishness to be the unalterable characteristic of human nature, alike under all systems of government. Grant this for a moment. So far as the world has been the theatre for the play of the forces of selfishness, the story of the strife teaches us to prefer open democracy to any other mode through which men's conflicting or competing wills work out their results.

Since selfishness is bound to assert its will and strive for the mastery in any case, let the many and not the few have an open field. Let the method of struggle be lifted to the plane of the utmost intelligence and not suppressed in the dark. In the long run, the egotism and the selfishness of the masses of the people work less harm than the more subtle and crafty selfishness of a class, accustomed to think of themselves as the lords of creation, possessed of egregious ambitions and

extravagant covetousness. In the mass of men the counter forces of innumerable desires and wills tend to neutralize one another; and the multitude proves to be conservative beyond expectation. Give men, therefore, consideration and power and votes, as fast and as soon as they demand these things as their right. Such seems to be the practical judgment of a purely materialistic philosophy which governs its conduct by the teachings of the history of centuries of barbarism, and on the basis of the mere probabilities of social and political expediency.

We have already suggested that the most startling examples of the supposed failure of democracy have not been instances of the rule of many, but rather of the usurping rule of the few, who have hoodwinked or terrorized the many. The many in Paris never voted in the horrors of the Revolution. The trouble was, the democracy had not even been organized. You may say much the same of the cause of the misrule of American cities. The vast populations have poured in faster than they could be organized to determine what the will of the many really was. Democracy, even on a selfish basis, has yet to be tried in New York or Philadelphia.

Let us have done then with those who deplore the old times, when they imagine that they would have been the princes and aristocrats living in castles or sitting in council chambers. The fair chance is that these same men would have been peasants. Let them regret those fierce romantic days as they may. Mankind never retraces the way of its history. You can never again reduce men to slavery or serfdom. Never again can a few strong men armed coerce the unarmed many. They cannot do this much longer in India. The methods of democracy, even if we must call them mere external machinery, are the only means for a world that begins to think. Whether people are fit for democracy or not, they must have the name and the forms. Even in Mexico they get as much as this. It is the pledge that sometime they will have more. Even in a selfish world, the rule is that the people everywhere want to enjoy the rights and the privileges, though these are only nominal, which others like them possess.

So much for democracy in its lowest terms, as revealed in the imperfect forms of its historical growth. Is it not a wonderful world, which, out of all the mischief of its barbarism, has already

succeeded in elevating even a crude form of democracy over all kinds of aristocratic or autocratic rule, and recommending it, on the whole, to the more enlightened selfishness of all who really think.

II

NEW IDEAS IN POLITICS

THERE is nothing more striking, whether in the story of the individual man or in the history of the race, than the development from time to time of new interests and ideals. Watch the growth of any normal child. There come periods of crisis and change. The growing mind awakes to the sight of new objects of desire and is stirred by new motives. Again and again, the course of his life takes a fresh turn, as in the unfolding of a flower, and goes on different lines and toward different ends.

Society also, in the large, tends to follow the same processes of growth through which the individual passes. No merely uniformitarian theory of history will work. Seasons and crises come, like tides, when all society wakes up to fresh interests and is swayed by ideas, if not new to the enlightened few, yet altogether new in their appeal to the many. What else do we expect in a world, to the understanding of which we bring the clew of the idea of evolution?

Thus, in a marvellous way, mankind has almost suddenly come into the transforming use of certain simple but newly applied principles of mechanical, electrical, and chemical force. The face of the world has been materially altered by the new study, and the distinctly purposeful use, of these laws of matter and force. Mankind has risen to a new self-consciousness as to the world which we inhabit. Mankind has entered into a sort of new faith as to the beneficent possibilities of the world. See the magnificent results which we have already reached by obedient study of, and faith in, external nature!

We have studied nature outside of us. We have only begun fairly to study the far more important science of the human nature within us. We have only begun to learn to understand, apply, and use the forces and motives which as surely rule and make human welfare and happiness as gravitation rules the tides. We have taken human nature, as men once took the outward nature, as an impassable wilderness in which good, bad, and indifferent fruits grew at random, and warring powers were supposed always to be in conflict. So far from having faith in the possibilities of our nature as good, as we have faith in the soil,

we have habitually and even dogmatically distrusted human nature as bad. We have expected the worst of it and handled it against the grain.

The time has dawned to expect the same kind of awakening to the great natural facts and laws that concern the development of men, as we have already seen in the building up of our marvellous outward modern civilization. We are finding out that we cannot control the new wealth of the world unless we produce men better fitted to correspond to it, to distribute it more justly, to enjoy it worthily. In every respect the times call — we will not say for the discovery of new principles of government and society, but rather for the recognition and distinctly purposeful application, on a scale commensurate with our needs, of principles as old as mankind, which yet only a few have awakened to see and to use.

Let me merely mention here certain transforming ideas which are surely coming in to mould modern society. One of these ideas is the unity or solidarity of the human race. Men knew it when Terence wrote his plays. But they know it in a new form when a postal union binds the world together, when the railroad and the

telegraph traverse Siberia, when the Red Cross society is welcome on battle-fields in Asia.

Another idea, new in its suggestiveness, is the conception that we inhabit a universe: its powers are not discordant, but harmonious. In other words, the profound tendency underneath all things is to work together, not to work in antagonism or isolation. This is the meaning of a universe. We are persuaded that beneath appearances the universe reveals a vast scheme of coördination, or co-operation. The law of the world is that you must go with and not against the natural motion, that you must use, adapt, and direct its forces, not struggle against them.

This idea of a universe goes over into human life and emphasizes the thought of the solidarity of the race. This would not be a universe, if human life were essentially discordant, if strife were its characteristic method, if war were a permanent condition, or selfishness were the normal man's leading motive.

Familiar teachings now come into new light. The growing record of history attests nothing so surely as the sovereignty of justice. Again and again every experiment that man makes in injustice disintegrates society. He is thrown back

anew upon the simple order of righteousness, which like a highway never fails the men who follow it. So true is this that even when men leave the highway and fight for other people's territory, as the Japanese and the Russians have fought to possess themselves of Manchuria, they must generally first persuade themselves that they are fighting for justice. The people whom we call "heathen" do not really believe that might makes right, or that they can succeed in doing injustice.

More than this, the world contemplates, as it never did before, that wonderful rule of the Jew, of the Christian, of the Confucian, which bids each man to do unto his neighbor as he would wish his neighbor to do to him. Not that the world has yet learned to practise this rule, but the average man knows that it ought to prevail, and that its observance would put an end to most of the mischief and unhappiness in the world.

Moreover, men are proving the fact, never fairly demonstrated till now, that kindness or good will is the mightiest force in the world. Intelligence is power, skill is power, courage is power; but no power is so great as that of the man who combines intelligence, skill, courage, and patience under the

dominant force of good will. Here is the meaning of the word that "the gentle shall inherit the earth." It is indeed by virtue of a new and higher form which the law of "the survival of the fittest" takes in human evolution that this rare power of good will comes into sway. There is nothing that can overcome it. It goes as if with the swing of gravitation. Selfishness everywhere breaks up into faction and chaos. Good will binds and holds and organizes. Who are the men of might in history? Not the fighters, but the men of good will. Whom else can we use to pilot the vast ship of state than the men of generous public spirit? What use have we for arrogance, covetousness, selfishness, egotism — all of them names of human weakness?

Here, then, are ideas at work in the modern world which are as certain to change the organization, and especially the spirit of government and society, as the invention of gunpowder, the art of printing, the discovery of America, and the use of the steam engine have already changed the outward world. We proceed now to a profound fact which underlies the study of every form of social science, and on which the hope of democracy rests. Democracy is not a mere machine

to be compared with modes of machinery. It is not, as it often appears, a scheme to provide for a great "tug of war" between contending factions, or between multitudes of selfish voters. It is a force, or spirit, growing out of the nature of man.

III

DEMOCRACY AS A SOCIAL FORCE

THE old-fashioned political economy made the mistake of looking upon man as essentially a selfish and aggressive animal. We find the same defect in the old theories of government. "Expect men always to be selfish," they tell us. The more profound fact is that man is a social or co-operative being. The average man is engaged in social pursuits more than he knows. He cannot even fight or compete without being urged to combine more closely with others. He cannot be selfish alone. He is full of susceptibility to sympathy, pity, kindness, love. Though tempted to write "I" and "my" upon everything in sight, he takes a profounder pleasure in saying "we" and writing "ours" over a larger and larger realm.

You can and often do establish upon the basis of this fact a sort of fashion of sympathetic feeling among men. The young child easily learns to understand and to say "our home," "our schoolhouse," "our town," "our play," "our

team," — not "my country," but "our country." Strangely enough, whenever you come to the mighty issues over which men are ready to give up their lives, men are such social and coöperative beings that they will die ever so much more willingly, and even with joy, for the sake of the things, the ideas, the institutions of which they have learned to say "ours," than they will die for anything on which they have merely written, "It is mine." Is not the recent history of the Japanese people a striking instance of this fact?

Men's rights and morals belong to this social realm. Justice is not yours or mine. It is what we all conceive to be fair for all of us. Struggling for justice, we struggle for a common property. Truth is not a matter of private conduct ; it is the highway which we all must travel. Standing up for the truth, man recognizes that he is defending a common interest. It is so with every worthy law. If it is right, it is for the good of all.

The very idea of democracy now changes its basis. It is not an external machinery so much as it is an inward and vital force urging men together. It is essentially the working of the social or coöperative spirit. Embodied in institutions, it is the means whereby all men act together in

winning and maintaining their common interests. It is the means whereby all men can extend the broad humane title "ours" over a wide range. Whatever be the ultimate outcome, the ideal democracy has the same general aim. Kropotkin, for example, would make the great word "liberty" — our common liberty — coterminous with the human race. Writers like Bellamy, on the other hand, emphasize our common possessions and enjoyments.

The coöperative idea is at work long before men are conscious of it. It begins in the family, a little society in itself. Under the most tyrannical rule of the father as priest and king, as at Rome, the life is still essentially coöperative, and so far at least begins to be democratic. Each village and community, each clan and tribe, each association for industry or commerce, more or less instinctively proposes to give mutual help to its members. By the same law of nature even the wolves hunt in packs.

There are indeed two selves, the tiny egotist self, and the greater social self. If I toil for society, give up my property, sacrifice my life, it is not because I am coolly calculating what I can personally draw out of the pool which others and

I, like so many gamblers, have formed for the hope of gain. It is because I am more than my egotistic self: I am a social being; I live in others and others live in me. Beyond all that I can claim as "mine" is the ever growing territory which is "ours." I am more truly a man by virtue of the largeness of this region than by the virtue of anything that is only my own.

This greater region is not in the present only, but in the past and in the future. There is a certain immortality, on any theory, which belongs to all of us. I may be called upon to die, not for those who live now, but in some great issue of human rights, for the sake of men unborn. This is because the future generations, and we of this, say "ours" over common and, as you may say, eternal interests. It is our interest that our unborn children's children shall be as free as we are. At our best, as far as we are really men, we all respond to this kind of appeal. This appeal has raised common people to martyrdom in every age of the world, not for religion only, but for human rights. Men and women are daily practising self-denial in our modern world in the hope of bringing about fairer industrial conditions for their fellows.

This bond of mutual coöperation arises out of the deepest facts that we know. We are born into a network of multifarious relations. A man hardly knows what portion of his being belongs only and wholly to himself. He has become what he is through costly inheritances. He is bound with inalienable ties to parents, brothers, kin, his country. The ego, the "my," is the least of him. Do you say, "Give me my rights"? The world of men answers back, "Perform your duties — duties to aged parents, duties to relations, duties to neighbors, duties to the state whose laws and liberties you are eager to enjoy, duties to maintain the dikes which the public-spirited of former ages have built up to defend mankind against the floods of the old-time barbarism and ignorance."

The scene of the death of Socrates, as Plato relates it, illustrates this. "Come," say his friends, "assert your individual rights. Men are unjust to you. Athens threatens to put you to an ignominious death. Escape and take your liberty." And Socrates, the mightiest individualist of his time, replies, "I have no rights as against Athens and her laws."

IV

GOOD WILL: A MOTIVE PRINCIPLE

AMONG the difficult questions which have baffled political thinkers is this: What possible motive, it is asked, can you bring to bear upon men, powerful enough to keep them up to the arduous task of managing civilized governments, that is, governments for the benefit and welfare of all the people?

Men can understand the motive of fear, of punishment, or the hope of reward. Men see what makes the holding of office attractive to those who thereby win fame or fortune, and are lifted into a proud preëminence above their fellows. Give any group of men exceptional pay or emoluments, and they will devote themselves, as in any private business, for "value received." Indeed, many are already urging that the only chance for wise and good government is to establish sufficiently high prizes for political office to attract the ablest men in the community. Pay princely salaries, they say, and you have capable administration.

A democracy, however, depends for its success

upon the intelligence, the coöperation, the interest, and the loyalty of a multitude of persons, who are like so many privates in the ranks of an army, except that the voters, unlike the soldiers, receive no pay and wear no uniforms or brass buttons. Is it not expecting too much of human nature to suppose that a multitude of men will serve the state out of pure public spirit or patriotism, while only a few in any event enjoy the honors and emoluments of office?

We have already raised the question whether selfishness is so completely the dominating force in human nature as it is often regarded. The law of life or happiness is not merely to strive to get or receive. Life—a sort of rhythm—consists in both giving and receiving. But the emphasis of the movement of life is to give, to bring things to pass, to express power, skill, intelligence. Even the wild creatures delight quite as much in the exercise of their power—in leaping, flying, swimming, in hunting, and even perhaps in eluding the hunter—as they enjoy food or drink. Children at their sport almost forget to eat. The joy of the artist or poet consists in his work. There is something of the poet or creator in every man. The best men of business love to

accomplish results beyond the mere making of money.

Call it selfish, if you please, to desire to enjoy the utmost flow of life; nevertheless this flow must be primarily outward in various forms of expression. Let the outflow or expression be normal, and the inflow or income will, as a rule, take care of itself. In short, the rhythm of the circulation of each individual life follows a profound universal principle, which becomes more peremptory as we rise in the scale of higher orders of being. This principle is to give the stream of life free motion, not to clog or keep it back. The fullest life is thus the happiest life.

The highest form of life evidently is the action of good will. The principle of life therefore is to show forth good will all the time and to all men. This is the characteristic action of man. This is better than "altruism." It converts sacrifice into happy and positive terms. It is the noblest conception which we have of the action of God, the Spirit or Life in and behind the universe. This truth comes like a new discovery to our age. The few alone have so far been able to see it. For the first time it becomes the democratic gospel. The fact is that selfishness, as usually understood,

narrows and defeats life, while good will broadens and deepens it. The universe is doubtless so constituted that in the long run "whatever is best for the hive must also be best for the bee." The welfare of the individual is not contrary to, but consonant with, the welfare of society. In other words, the happy man, or the successful man, is also the most social man. He is the most complete individual, who at the same time puts the richness of his individuality to the public good.

We have here a motive of political action upon which we have hardly yet begun to draw. Show men that what they do is for the good of all, and they naturally love to do it. Appeal to their social spirit, and they will answer to this appeal. It is said that the appeal to men's selfishness is the most potent leverage upon their will. But the appeal to their justice, their regard for the common welfare, and their generosity is the most effectual and the most universal mode of human persuasion. The trouble to-day is not that this appeal will not work, but that there are not yet enough men who know how to use it. True, men need to be taught what is for the common welfare; they are often ignorant and misguided, they entertain traditional prejudices; they are like children. But, like chil-

dren, they see simple issues of justice and humanity, and they enjoy the exercise of their generosity.

History, rightly interpreted, is full of the evidence of this fact. The demagogue has always known how to play upon the social instincts of people, and to persuade them and possibly to persuade himself, that his selfish interests were public or national; for example, that the protection of the "infant industries" of the few was the protection of the labor of the many, that the war which the ruling oligarchy wanted was for the sake of liberty or religion. Was not the late Cuban war represented to be for the interest of humanity? The patriots and the humanitarians have left us an illustrious record of their success in appealing to the good will of mankind. It was the chivalry of the Lancashire weavers that saved America in the time of the civil war from an embroilment with England. It was the growing undercurrent of good will in the world that put an end to the institution of slavery. Good will or humanity is behind all laws and institutions; without it they would fall like a house of cards. Lincoln knew and trusted this fact. So did Gladstone. The day is coming when no man can succeed in political life who does not work on the lines of this principle.

As the old and animal motive of fear, or of regard for constituted authority, grows fainter, the new and more humane motive tends surely to take its place. All wrong is social wrong; all injustice or cruelty touches and blights the common happiness and welfare. All bribery and "graft" is an attack upon society, and upon its weakest and poorest members. Show men these facts, demonstrate them in plain terms, draw upon the innate chivalry that lies in our human nature, and you will presently bind men over to the highest standards of conduct. Mr. Roosevelt's extraordinary hold over the American people arises from the fact that they believe him to be a man who acts altogether out of regard for human welfare. Men instinctively respect such a leadership. The errors of men largely come from their thinking of themselves as mere individuals. They imagine that they can do wrong alone and suffer the consequences alone. They need to know that society depends upon them, as one stone depends on another stone in a wall, or one cell upon another cell in a vital organ.

With this point of view there is no contradiction between egoism and altruism. Construct and educate the most perfect individual, and the best point

of his perfection is found to be in his social sense. What is called altruism is simply the man's sight of, and identity with, large social interests. His best self always is one with the welfare of his family, his kindred, his village or city, his country, and all mankind. He could not be happy while others suffered and he did nothing to relieve them. His happiness is in working with, enjoying with, growing in manhood with, and even suffering with, the common fate, fortune, and hope of humanity.

We now have the answer to the enigma proposed by the English political essayist, Mr. Kidd. He inquires where the social force is to come from to stir each new generation of men with the willingness to make sacrifices for the good of posterity. For progress comes by cost, and never without sacrifice. Mr. Kidd reasons that men will never pay the cost and make the sacrifice without some sort of supernatural sanction. But we have seen that the highest element in our nature is that which gladly gives itself for all manner of social purposes. In one sense the best man, and likewise the common man at his best moments, makes no actual sacrifice. For what is called "sacrifice" is really the most complete exercise of the man's power or life. The man delights to do what his

good will plainly bids him do. It is the old idea, that the patriot is never so happy as when he gives his life for his people.

There is no need of calling in any supernatural factor to explain this, except as one may call all life the expression of a divine will. If in the rudest ages you could always persuade men to die for their country, it is no violent stretch of confidence in the native chivalry of human nature to believe that in a more humane and intelligent age men will be easily persuaded to act and vote, and give time and pay taxes, not only for the common good, which the individual may not always himself be able to enjoy, but also for the good of the coming generation which we can see only in our imagination. Is it not indeed the law of the world that each generation of parents must work and undergo sacrifices for their children? This is their pleasure.

The mighty "law of supply and demand" is already beginning to move upward from the brutal and material level into the region of spiritual forces, and to set its mark of value upon the men, both as leaders, managers, and captains of industry, and also as foremen and workmen, who add to their skill and their manliness this distinctly

human quality of good will and friendliness. There are not as yet enough men of this sort to fill the places. The demand has been too much for craft and fighting power. The waste of this brutal sort of effort is too calamitous to be borne. The new demand is for all-round social and democratic men, not for those who seek to get the most and give the least; but for the true artists, poets, and builders, who follow the joyous rule of the world, that the well and whole man is not here "to be ministered unto," but to serve, to bestow, to give, and to leave the world better off. This is his life.

V

IDEALISM AND THE FACTS

THERE are those who take a cynical tone when any one speaks of ideals. But who are they who can afford to despise ideals? An ideal is simply the architect's or engineer's plan. No one surely thinks it practical to build without any plan. You may call the plan unreal, but it is that which is destined to become real. The theory of gravitation or evolution, for example, is ideal, but it is built out of a myriad of actual observations. Precisely so with this ideal of a true democracy. It is not only that which we say ought to be, but it is that which the experiences of generations of men have combined to make practicable.

See how definite this human experience is which urges our thought along lines of democratic advancement. See the real world with all manner of experiments in society, industry, and government. Watch the forces of the old hate, animalism, and selfishness at work, and also the growing social and humane forces binding men more and more

closely. Watch the epochs in the long complicated history, where the most prosperity, success, happiness, freedom, enlightenment, and humanity have been. See what makes mischief, discomfort, social distress. As far as we have anywhere achieved harmonious and happy social results, this development has universally proceeded along the lines of the ideal democracy which we have been considering. You determine a curve by finding the points through which it moves. So you determine the grander movement of human progress by knowing the points through which forward movement actually proceeds.

Thus, for example, every one finds the story of Athens for two or three splendid centuries immensely interesting. This is because Athens, in a very rude way, as we can see now, was trying a veritable experiment in democracy. When before was the spirit of man so free to "strive and thrive"? What is Aristotle's good aristocrat but a lover of public order and of the welfare of the people?

Again, every one grants that the beginning of Christianity marked a new era in history. Why was this? Because the characteristic democratic genius of the Hebrew people blossomed for a little while into free and brotherly communities, break-

ing down racial lines and stretching hands to one another throughout the Roman empire. Grant that the empire finally conquered the new church ; nevertheless, so far as life was really worth living throughout Christendom for many centuries, it was by virtue of a dawning sense of a common humanity ; it was by a law of justice, mercy, and kindness. When these ideas caught men in the darkest periods, there was light and hope and the promise of better things.

Take again such an unpromising field of illustration as the English rule in India. Grant for a moment (what yet remains to be proved by the test of time) that the English rule has succeeded. So far as it has succeeded at all, it has not been by the rule of might and artillery, by fear and suspicion and hate. Success has come by virtue of English justice, clemency, humanity ; not by distrust of the people, but by trust and sympathy, through a few great administrators, like the Lawrences, who have had at heart the good of the Indian populations. Sir Andrew Fraser, after more than thirty years of wide experiences in the civil service of India, is quoted as saying, "Courtesy, justice, and freedom from caprice are the qualities in the Briton that win the love and gratitude of our

Indian fellow-subjects." Take out of the history of India the men whose lives have been inspired with the vision of democracy, Plutarch's type of men, and any day the whole fabric of Indian government would go to wreck. There is just enough of the spirit of democracy in it to save it. This line of historical illustration could be indefinitely prolonged.

The growth of democracy has come often where you would not have looked for it, through the slow ripening of the conservative side of human nature, through the growing sympathy and good will of the strong, moved no doubt by the piteous cry of the weak. The great Alfred was a king, but he was also a lover of his people, and an educator, a man of essential justice, whose life was an effort of public service. Shall we deny to such a man the name of democrat because he lived before formal democracy had come to birth? Washington was an aristocrat and a conservative, but beginning on the side of his conservatism, and always cautious, his devotion to the popular good made him as real, if not as advanced, a democrat as Jefferson was. Gladstone's life again affords a singular instance of the development of genuine democracy out of the solid conservative and aristocratic core

of a Tory beginning. What gave this great leader of men such growth in his confidence in the people, and in democratic ideals, and that too in an age when doubt and scepticism filled the air? The man's generous public spirit, his disinterested consecration to the welfare of the people, his profound religiousness, converted him from Toryism to be a democratic leader in the best sense of the word. Under whatever forms you find a similar sense of justice, popular sympathies, unselfishness, faith in a righteous universe, you will see the roots of ideal democracy. Which kind of human material would you rather have for building up democracy,—Alfred and William of Orange, Washington and Gladstone, slowly indeed going your way and cautiously trying every step, yet absolutely trustworthy and ready to die for your interests; or the jaunty crowd on parade in the streets singing the "Marseillaise," perhaps with bribes in their pockets, and surmising that every man also has his price?

Glance now at certain familiar and obvious lessons in the working of practical democracy. The world has tried from time out of mind the patriarchal method of family government. It was the rule of the man over wife and children and domestics.

It was from above downward. It rested in vested authority. The world is now instinctively trying on an immense scale the utmost democratic theory in the family relation. It discards the word "obey" from the marriage service. There is no rule of the one over the others; there is no rule from above downward. The only authority is the simple and natural authority of the greater wisdom and experience of the stronger character. There is no rod, there is no compulsion. The rule is by persuasion and force of sympathy. It is a little system of voluntary coöperation. There are thousands of such families in America.

I shall have occasion later to speak of the relation of democracy to the family. My point here simply is that this free and democratic form of family life, whose bond is in mutual respect and love, makes the happiest, the most successful, and the most vital type of home that the world has seen. It is a whole range above mere conventional monogamy, wherein the man is the master. It has doubtless come to stay. We shall by and by be able to translate the menacing results of too indulgent divorce courts into the positive terms of a great and hopeful secular movement that promises at last to lift the condition of women everywhere

from the bondage of man's individual authority, to a freedom and sacredness quite essential to human progress.

Another lesson in modern democracy is found in the schoolroom. It is within the easy recollection of many persons that school government was largely a tyranny, however benevolently intended. Its authority was like the law of the Medes and Persians. The rule was from above down, and the pupils were supposed simply to obey. There was often savage punishment. The parent was thought to be bound to uphold the dignity of the schoolmaster, even when the latter was in the wrong. We have now in a multitude of schools virtual democracy in actual working. Among thousands of pupils, for example, in the city of Philadelphia, the forms of democratic government under the name of "The School City" have been actually made to work. The George Junior Republic is a well-known instance of the working of this experiment among a peculiarly difficult class of youth. Without taking such systems of school discipline too seriously, they nevertheless indicate the kind of results to be expected in making even children partners in their own government. From any point of view they constitute quite startling evi-

dence to the fact that there is that element in human nature which instinctively responds to the human touch of trust, respect, and confidence, to the appeal for generosity and chivalry. There is a social and coöperative quality in human nature upon the existence and the development of which you can count.

It might be added that all the success which has been reached in the treatment of moral defectives in such institutions as Elmira, N.Y., Concord and Sherborn in Massachusetts, has been the fruit of a definite approach to democratic methods. The truth is, that the social nature of which democracy is the expression is in the hardest and most abandoned men.

Again, you see actual democracy at work in the numberless clubs, guilds, granges, and lodges, and in the humane and beneficent societies throughout the country. I wish that I might say the same of all the churches. But the churches are too often bound by traditions which ally them with forms of absolutism and authority. They are too often also oppressed by the despotism of money or by some form of the one-man power. They are often divided by shameful factions. A club or a grange is therefore a better instance of the success of the democratic principle than the

church is. In the club there is what Professor F. H. Giddings calls "like-mindedness" in a far more developed form than any one can as yet find it in the state. Good fellowship, sympathy, common ends, a certain definite coöperation, bind the members together. The attitude is one of freedom, confidence, mutual respect. Faction is intolerable, as compulsion is. Persuasion is the rule. All willingly bear the common burdens. The use of the ballot is merely to determine the pathway of common consent and pleasure.

Do you remind me that the club is the example of the régime of anarchism, seeing that any member can leave it at his pleasure? So much the better. For this proves that it is a highly successful and quite orderly form of free democratic organization. Why may we not discover that the democracy is constantly developing under various outward forms, some freer than others, while it yet remains democratic at heart?

I have wished to emphasize the fact that politics is only one field among others in the illustration of the modern working of the democratic ideal. It is the one where for many evident reasons the world is as yet at the beginning of its magnificent democratic venture. The town governments of

early New England indeed point the way for our instruction. But how far their simple business was from the enormous problems of the modern state! How easy it was for a few hundred men who all knew one another, like the members of a clan, and all went to one church, to coöperate for the few common concerns of their community! And yet Charles Francis Adams has shown that human nature in the towns of Massachusetts was often as mean, narrow, factious, prejudiced, and selfish, albeit all were of the one Anglo-Saxon blood, as human nature often shows itself to-day in the heterogeneous populations of New York or Chicago. If the wheels of democracy creaked in the little town of Quincy, who wonders that the vast wheels of the nation rumble and groan under their enormous burdens!

But however distant from our time true democracy is, there is hardly anywhere on record an instance of such success in democratic government as we have already achieved in America. President Charles W. Eliot in his essays has made a masterly demonstration of this fact. This may be held along with the most critical sense of our national failings and perils. Find if you can any other instance on such a colossal scale where the

welfare of men has been so largely regarded. Find a period in history where the average man ever had a better chance to bring up a happy family. Moreover, so far as we have succeeded in our grand venture, we have made this success on the lines of actual democracy, on the foundation of equal rights, of mutual tolerance, of growing respect for all kinds and conditions of men, not because we have compelled men, but on the whole have persuaded them. Our success has gone with the development of the humane sentiments, and our failures have been the failure of our humanity. Our success has been the outcome, not of men's selfishness, their distrust, their hate and jealousies, but of the precious leaven of men's essential religion, their faith in one another, their faith in justice, their faith in progress, their faith in a righteous universe.

VI

DEMOCRACY AND SOVEREIGNTY: NEW MEANINGS

A SINGULAR change is coming about in the meaning of the words "democracy" and "democratic." The emphasis of these words was originally in the ending, which signified "rule," "might," "force." The common idea was that the many got the reins which once the few had held. The few must henceforth do what the many required. It is the common idea now, not that all rule, but that a majority rule, and the others submit. Not even the wisest Greeks were able to conceive of such a thing as that all ranks of men, barbarians as well as Greeks, should rule. The many were slaves, born, as Greeks thought, to remain slaves. Neither did the framers of our Constitution quite face their own principles so as to provide that all men should have a hand in the gigantic "tug of war." That women also should take a hand in it was hardly dreamed. Property, even mules, long continued to vote in most of the states, while men were disfranchised and women were neglected.

I have repeatedly used the word "coöperation" as expressing the free or voluntary democratic ideal. This is the dominant thought in actual democracy. It signifies, not so much the rule of some and the obedience of others, as a plan of willing coöperation, where all take part, all modify the process, and all share in the results. For example, in the true home, in the good school, in the club or the real church, in the model town, we debate, we hear and weigh objections, we persuade and convert, we defer and wait, we respect others' opinions, we seek finally to act together. If ever we coerce a protesting minority, as the Tories in England, for example, have coerced the Dissenters, such an act is as alien to the ideal democracy as would be the compulsion of the wife by the husband in a true home. In a just and civilized democracy one can hardly imagine such compulsion.

The word "government" itself no longer means what it meant to our forefathers. We do not obey rulers, we obey laws. They are not other men's laws constraining us; they are the laws which we ourselves have a hand in making. The average citizen has no need to think of a constable. The constable, or the policeman, is in fact one of his own fellow-citizens, as truly as are the officers of

the board of health, who may come on occasion to fumigate his house, for his own safety as well as for the sake of the neighbors. Suppose now that a high-handed majority, or a ring of scheming men, procure the passage of bad or foolish laws, and proceed to execute them. The general principle still prevails. Even the foolish laws have become for the time ours. Let us give them trial, as we should wish others to do if we had passed them. Or, if they are really bad, let us persuade our fellow-citizens to join with us in altering them. Our case is different from that which we find under any other system of government. Everything depends upon mutual trust. On the whole we believe that our neighbors will be fair, as we wish to be fair to them. Even when they go wrong, we still trust that they will be ready to do justice as soon as we can show them what justice is. We can afford to be patient with them, as we ask patience in turn. The more completely we respect their manhood and the more we expect justice at their hands,—such is human nature!—the more we always tend to secure. Other men, we believe, feel and behave as we do ourselves under similar treatment. A general habit of good will, tempered with the necessary intelligence, is

thus the characteristic and ruling attitude of men toward one another in a democracy. There is no other intelligent attitude. Nothing else works so well.

A good illustration is to be found in the remarkable self-restraint with which a great party yielded to the method of law and order in the famous Hayes-Tilden electoral contest in 1877. Many indeed felt aggrieved at the result of the decision; but the method of peaceable arbitration by a congressional commission commended itself to the whole people as just, and accordingly a majority of the nation yielded their own will with a reasonable degree of good temper to an actual minority of voters. This result could not have been possible at the dictation of force.

So likewise every day men yield to the arbitrament of the courts. The courts have force behind them to compel obedience to their decrees. But most men would yield to the courts, even if there were no force in reserve. The courts are not the courts of another power or of another party; they are the courts of all the men who resort to them. Obeying their decrees, men obey their best selves. Perhaps the chief, if not the only, reason for an elective judiciary is that this system makes it

somewhat more evident that the courts are the people's courts, who have chosen the judges themselves.

The greatest danger from the existence of a proletariat without the suffrage, whether white or black, is that a multitude are required to obey laws in the making of which they have no share. The mere form of asking a man's advice or opinion about the institutions to which he is subject tends to elevate his self-respect and to make him content with the working of those institutions. The practice of democracy becomes a daily discipline in good will.

Time was when men thought that the wealth or prosperity of a merchant, a city, or a nation, must be at the expense of others. Success consisted in a man's getting the property of others. That some should be rich, it was thought, a multitude should be poor. That one nation should prosper, it was well that others should be unprosperous. No doubt many still think so. We often hear strange talk about "exploiting" the markets of the Orient.

We are at last finding humanity in business. The ideas of willingness and coöperation as the basis of the modern organization of government are coming to control even the getting of wealth.

True wealth flows from the freest possible exchange of goods and services. The bargain that leaves one party poorer is a bad bargain. In the long run trade would obviously cease if such bargains prevailed. The rivalry that pushes men to the wall and leaves them bankrupt is as ruinous in the end as robbery or war. The eternal laws of the world are against the men or the nations who imagine that they can prosper by getting more than they give, by enriching themselves while they make others poor. The rich city is that in which the largest number of people produce and also consume the greatest volume of commodities of every sort. That any group of people in the city should suffer hunger and want is equivalent to economical disease, so far imperilling the civic life. The rich nation is that in which all parts of the land both produce and enjoy to the utmost; it is that nation which is brought into the freest relationship of exchange with other prosperous nations, who give and take, to the mutual enrichment of all. It is not the poverty of India or of Spain that enriches the United States, but the growing prosperity of France, Germany, England, Canada. The well-to-do neighbor needs what we can make; the poor

neighbor cannot afford to pay us for our goods. Have we not amply demonstrated this fact in our American Union, where every rise in the tide of the prosperity of the South or the West means, on the whole, and often immediately, the flow of new wealth to the older communities of the East? Maine and Massachusetts do not grow poor because Alabama and North Carolina flourish.

We do not shut our eyes to the existence of enormous commercial and industrial antagonisms; they still survive with the traditions of the era of war. We are aware that there is a kind of brutal and bitter competition which is thought to consist in strangling one's rivals. We insist that this is as stupid as crime and murder. Whereas it was once the fashion of the world, we urge that the new spirit in modern civilization repudiates such competition and antagonism. The loud demand of the commercial world is not for men who can destroy their antagonists and get what belongs to others, but for men who can produce results to the advantage of every one, and beyond what they are ever paid for. Even the Rockefellers and Carnegies are forced in sheer self-defence to try to show that their administration has resulted in the enrichment of the people by the cheapening

of the processes of providing oil and steel! Mr. Carnegie himself says that no man has a right to found a monarchy of wealth. He is bound substantially to distribute it for the community out of whose joint enterprise and organization it arose.

The thought of wealth as coöperative in its source rather than the result of mere individual enterprise grows steadily. Thus even in respect of that most material of all things, money, a humane, a moral, a spiritual conception is lifting men from the realm of mere struggle to get and to keep, to a realm of peace, of good will, of combined effort upward instead of the effort of conflict. The prosperous world—all the political economies assure us—must be a world where men have learned to coöperate most effectively, where the many not only produce but consume and enjoy, and therefore make the larger demands for universal production. This is democracy.

A new principle enters at once into practical politics. The common idea has been that each party must antagonize the other party, that each majority must win at the expense of its opponents, that the gain of one party must be the loss of the other. The doctrine of the spoils of office was the legitimate outcome of the prevalent idea that

the function of parties in the state was to fight one another. Nothing could be further from the purpose of democracy. The business of a party is not to fight another party and get away the offices for itself. But one party supplements another. Each party is here to bring forward its contribution of a thought or a purpose for the common good.

This is the opposite to what men would have said in Florence or Pisa. They would have liked to see the opposite faction weak, foolish, badly led, disorganized. Men often say the same to-day. Republicans like to see the Democratic party weak and ineffective. The truth is that we want in our government all the wisdom, virtue, power, and ability that we can possibly assemble. All integrity and sagacity discoverable in any direction is a part of our common political capital. Any folly, vice, or weakness is a defect in the whole, a menace to the nation, like a running sore in the body.

Thus everywhere to-day the ideal of "team playing" prevails. Each strong man puts in his power and skill to make the whole team victorious. The stronger each is, the stronger the team. Does the team then wish to see other teams weak? Does Harvard wish to cripple Yale or Princeton?

This is worthy of savages, not of men. The stronger Yale and Harvard and Princeton all are, the more notable work each will do. The stronger all of them are, the stronger becomes the representative play of all the men of America. Is the end of the play or the work to crush others? Is the victory of one the humiliation or hurt of the other? This is the idea of barbarians, not of civilized men.

The one aim of all the effort is that the nation shall be filled with life, skill, energy, courage, and the more mutual friendliness. And likewise the ultimate end of all the work of the world is no longer to vanquish others; it is to secure everywhere the means whereby the power, virtue, product, manhood, civilization, of each people shall enrich all peoples. If men are evidently able to live thus together in a city, if they can live together so in a nation, who shall doubt that they must come to live in some similar coöperation of all the nations?

The idea of democracy as, essentially, the co-operation of various minds acting willingly together, is a view so comparatively modern that multitudes do not as yet credit it as practicable. You will find it dawning in the thought of the

little group of Stoic philosophers. It is the most important contribution of the Hebrew and the Christian teachings of religion. For these religions were fundamentally democratic. But it is also the result of New-World conditions, for the first time giving free play to teachings which only the few heretofore were in a position to comprehend. All men are finding out that you cannot long force or compel men. You must show them good temper, you must respect them and use conciliation. It is the old story of the sun, the wind, and the traveller, exemplified in a thousand new relations.

A tremendous objection against the idea and the name of democracy is now seen to disappear. A democratic régime was once thought to mean a vulgar mediocrity. You cut off the heads of all the tallest flowers in the garden and leave the rest. In a democracy of force and antagonism this was doubtless the case. In a democracy of antagonisms, each selfish faction seeks to turn out of office or even to destroy the ablest men who appear in the opposite party. The system of antagonism appeals to the worst men and not to the noblest.

It is otherwise in the good democracy. There is here no levelling downward; there is a ceaseless

force working on each and all to uplift. There is a demand for the best; there is the will in each group to use all the ability which other groups offer. The democratic theory is not to turn great men out of office, but to secure the services of such men. Do not fear that in a people once educated to demand the best things and the best service, there will be any permanent satisfaction with mediocrity.

We are brought from a new point of view to the origin or source of the democratic movement. Most people imagine that it chiefly uses one of the centrifugal forces in human nature; that is, the desire of each to assert his liberty. That this is a legitimate part of the democratic motive no one can doubt. But the opposite or centripetal force in our nature, which works to socialize and unify men, is the deeper and far the more effective part of constructive democracy. The one force liberates men's minds from prejudices, but the other urges upon them the needful sense of a common aim.

See how little the old doctrine of *laissez faire* has to do with real democracy. *Laissez faire* is strictly the doctrine of the individualist, not of democracy. The strong individual likes to be let

alone. He wishes his freedom to do as he pleases. He can defend himself, he can compete and succeed. He is apt to have small sympathy for the man of only average power and intelligence. He always praises his own qualities, self-reliance and daring, or perhaps cunning. He may be blind to the fact how much he depends upon others whose labor or skill he is shrewd enough to use for his own advantage. The robber, the monopolist, the tyrant, the slaveholder, the politician at times, approves the doctrine of *laissez faire*.

The democracy, on the contrary, exists for mutual help. It cannot afford to let things alone, or to let men alone who may be profiting at the loss or injury of others. The ideal of the democracy is not that a few trees shall lift their heads above the rest and grow strong, but that by admirable arboriculture the whole forest shall flourish. Neither is there any inconsistency between this ideal and that of the development of each individual tree. It will be found that the best democrat is the noblest type of the individual man. The qualities of self-reliance and courage will be forever in demand. We purpose to eliminate cunning, arrogance, and the disregard for others' rights.

We discover now a new meaning in the word

“sovereignty.” There is indeed no longer absolute and infallible sovereignty such as men once imagined to inhere in the head of a government. We do not say, “The sovereign can do no wrong.” The sovereign, whether father, king, or president, often does wrong, falls into error, can and must make amends and even apologies. The rule is the same whether the fiction of sovereignty is vested in one man, in a Parliament or a Congress, or in the assembly of all the voters of a nation. The exercise of sovereignty is a mode of social experiment. All sovereignty is limited by the degree of the wisdom, the experience, the virtue, and the good will of those who for the moment exercise it.

No claim of sovereignty, whether of a prince or of an assembly, for example, to take or give away land, or to compel obedience to a decree, no show of power to back the claim, no force of an insistent majority, can ever make an unjust act righteous or a foolish act wise. Every new exercise of sovereignty is a new social experiment, based on the experience of a succession of experiments whereby men have tried to accomplish political ends. Every exercise of sovereignty is a challenge to the intelligence and conscience of each citizen. Before the

individual yields his will to any kind of sovereignty, he is entitled to be satisfied that the action required of him is just. No external authority is sufficient to rule any man's will, unless the inward authority that makes the man a person bids him likewise obey.

Here is the tragedy of the individual in the power of the tyrant, of the tribunal, or of the multitude—Jesus before Pilate, Joan of Arc before the English judges, Thomas More on trial for treason. All we can say is that, through the age-long lessons of tragedy and error, the world is learning on both sides—on the side of those who head governments, and also on the side of the daring individual who criticises or even disobeys his government—to be modest, tolerant, and kindly. If the prophets and teachers make mistakes, it is no wonder that the people and their judges and presidents make mistakes too.

Try now to interpret the marvellous process going on through all history and never so tremendously as to-day. It is as if you had a view of the slow making of crystals. On the one hand is the murky mixture, the material still mostly in solution, chaotic and insignificant. At the first glance one might be ready to throw the whole upon the

rubbish heap. But watch more closely. Mighty mysterious forces are at work ; already down in the bottom of your retort you can distinguish the beautiful lines of the crystals. The facet of a single crystal is significant and prophetic of what the whole process is for. So with human society. Do you say that democracy has never as yet been tried ? True, it has never prevailed, or been tried on any large scale. You see it only approximately in the process, but as far as it has been tried, democracy has never failed. Moreover, you can trace the prophetic lines of the forming angles and facets underneath all the discord and chaos. Who can deny that there was never so much of it in the world as at this time, which begins preëminently to call for it?

VII

WHAT IS GOVERNMENT?

THE idea of the purpose of government is passing through an almost revolutionary change. This fact needs distinct attention. Even very intelligent men often fail to perceive how different the ends of government have become from those which mostly prevailed less than two centuries ago.

Two chief ends have usually been set forth to justify the existence and the cost of government. They were both peculiarly suited to an aristocratic social order. One of these supposed ends was the protection of the subjects of a government from their enemies. A ruling military caste, whose pastime was war, first made enemies and then undertook the task of defending their people from attacks which they themselves provoked. A considerable part of the history of Christendom has consisted in the record of this sort of governmental business. Read Machiavelli and you would suppose the normal life of a prince was in aggran-

dizing himself at the expense of his neighbors and his people. There are those still, hypnotized by mediævalism, who, when asked what the government is, think first of the war department.

See now how wonderfully the ancient defensive purpose of government is dropping out of sight! It is already traditional rather than actual; it exists more in men's vague fears and suspicions than in the real conditions of modern international society. The time has passed when a king or a president can successfully aggrandize himself or his nation by making war upon his neighbors. As the distinguished Frenchman, Molinari, shows in "The Society of To-morrow," the new economic conditions of the world tend everlastinglly to make war ruinous, not only to the people who must pay for it, but to the very class who used to profit by it.

Let us ask the question: Who are the enemies of a modern state, and where are they? What enemies has the United States? The only answer is that we have no enemies, and except by our own fault are not likely to have them. No savages, such as once frightened our forefathers, exist any longer to swarm over our borders. The Old-World terror of mysterious barbarian hordes from unknown parts of the earth has vanished.

We map in our geographies all the savage tribes that remain. The savages are now seen to be simply backward and rather wretched people whom we must pity and civilize.

Look now at our neighbors. They are as civilized on the whole as we are. England, Germany, Russia, France, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and the rest no more mean to attack us than we mean to attack them. Men over the seas are like us. Treat them with justice, fairness, and human respect, and they respond to such treatment, precisely as we do ourselves. Let us mind our own business and take proper pains to do justly toward others, and we have no cause to fear the evil designs of any nation. So far has the world got on since the time of the Spanish Armada!

In America, moreover, we have inaugurated a splendid experiment in governmental union. Millions of people who under Old-World conditions of disunion would have set up barriers and fortifications against one another, and looked on one another with suspicious eyes, and supported each its own army to watch the others, now live harmoniously together without so much as a custom-house between them. The plan which sceptics only a little more than a century ago called impos-

sible actually works. It is a fresh fruit of the new idea of the solidarity of man. For men of the very same racial stocks who once slew one another—Celts and Saxons and Teutons and Slavs—here live peacefully together and never think of the savage feuds which once separated them. Who says this is not a world of ideas, or that ideas, once embodied, do not alter the face of society?

My point is, that on a very grand scale the chief purpose of government, in the United States at least, has properly ceased to be defensive. What we still pay for military outfit is mainly the insurance money, made necessary by our habit of keeping incendiary material in our national house—fireworks, gunpowder, especially the intangible explosives—sundry suspicions, fears, covetousness to possess territory not our own, rivalry to make a brave show of force in the world.

The second main purpose of government has been supposed to be social order. The government, men think, is an arrangement by which the good and wise (or, shall we say the strong and clever?) keep the ill-disposed in order and make them behave. Government is exerted from above

upon those beneath. The word carries the idea of authority. The king, the nobility, or a dominant party enforces its will upon the rest of the people, or at best exercises a protectorate and plays the patron over them. This aristocratic notion of the government, like militarism, naturally survives under the forms of democracy. There are those who never think of the government without thinking of the criminal law and the policeman and his club.

It is enough to say here, that the necessity of government for keeping people in order has always been exaggerated. The more you insist upon this object of government the more difficult it is to secure it. There was never a more Draconian system of criminal law and punishments than that which the governing class imposed upon the English people till within a hundred years. No government ever did less good or developed more lawless subjects. All history shows that people behave well not from compulsion so much as from suggestion, because decent habits prevail, and their neighbors expect a certain standard of conduct. Even among savages the people habitually obey the common opinion of their tribe. The rank and file of mankind have no intention to do

injustice or violence to one another. Witness the admirable behavior of enormous crowds in all our cities, sometimes under great excitement. The use of government to enforce order is for the few and not for the many.

Turn now to the new and positive purpose of all modern civilized government. Few as yet see how immense and far-reaching is that familiar definition of democratic government, which makes it to be "of the people, by the people, and for the people." The interests of each are the interests of all. Here, as in a nutshell, is the idea of the solidarity of mankind. Here is the idea that each personality is sacred. Here is the faith in a universe in which it is actually possible to harmonize the interests of all men.

The new idea touches, and quite alters, the meaning of the word "government." We do not any longer mean a ruling class or caste, but simply an administrative order which we, the people, have set up, and which we maintain much as the common owners of a water-power maintain a plant and a staff of workmen to manage it for them.

The principle is the same in each department of our threefold system of government, the local, the state, and the national administration. Each form

is a method of coöperation for the welfare of all the people comprised under it. This is the one purpose of the government which might more accurately be called the "management" than the "government." A scheme for a part only of the people — for sailors only, or manufacturers, or old soldiers, and not for the good of all the people — might have been tolerable in Egypt under the Pharaohs, but it is intolerable for a democratic government.

Mark, also, that the government, in the new sense of the word, can never create or effect anything by itself, except at the expense and by the coöperation of the people. It can hardly be better than the people who constitute it, — efficient if they are slovenly, economical if they are wasteful. Its means, its machinery, its sources of income, are only such as the people furnish. Its officials are merely public servants. You apprize their worth and value by the great standard proved when men came to the teacher of Galilee and asked: Who is the greatest? And he told them, "He that is the greatest among you shall be your servant or minister." This is what we really think, when we honestly think at all, about our public men in America. The greatest man, like

Washington, or Lincoln, is doubtless the man who does the most for the public welfare.

Without entering here upon controverted questions, let us examine some of the larger enterprises which we are all agreed that it is well for us to intrust to our government to administer. For example, the postal service evidently conduces to the welfare, happiness, and enlightenment of all the people. We can indeed conceive that some mighty "trust" of express companies might render this service for us, possibly at less expense; nevertheless, few even of the capitalist class would vote to transfer this gigantic business with its necessary powers to any private corporation to be run for the profit of a few.

The national government also safeguards and lights numerous harbors and thousands of miles of navigable waterways. How else could this magnificent work in behalf of the commerce of the world be effected? Hardly could Tolstoi himself find fault with this function of modern government. The same must be said of various great internal improvements, such as providing levees for continental rivers and irrigating waste lands, touching the interest of whole commonwealths for all time. The fact is, certain great departments of

the national government have grown up to fit new needs which even the far-sighted framers of our Constitution could not foresee. Who ever dreamed that the government must establish a weather bureau, or maintain watchmen at every port to defend the sheep and cattle of its people from disease, or employ experts to study the various pests that destroy growing crops? Or that government must keep agents busy in every part of the world to report on the industries and products of distant populations? Who shall say that the President's cabinet will not sometime contain a secretary of the department of peace, whose aim shall be to promote in every way the common interests and the good will of nations?

Examine now each of the great divisions of government, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, and we are astonished by the growth of a new mass of business which never could have been before the age of the steam-engine, electricity, and the telegraph, and the closer social order which these instruments effect. Congress labors with matters touching interstate commerce, the management of transcontinental railways, the question of open or restricted immigration of people from the banks of the Danube, from Armenia, from China.

Less and less does the treaty-making power concern itself with questions of war. The new questions before the world are about the use of arbitration, reciprocity, open doors of trade, common and growing international interests.

The questions before the national courts touch also all manner of nice and delicate industrial relations. Meanwhile, the more society becomes co-operative, the less need there is for courts except for purposes of friendly arbitration.

See now what the state government accomplishes for the welfare of the people. Here is a species of government which, except for its slender support of a petty force of militia, made up of men who join it more for recreation than for any very serious purpose, has already sloughed off all military functions. And yet the work of each state government steadily increases. Legislation grows more complicated every year to match the complex structure of society. Laws are largely for the sake of public order, convenience, and safety. They are social rather than moral. They concern education, the public health, the conditions of labor, especially as touching the interests of women and children; they regard the proper limitation and control of

dangerous businesses like the sale of liquor or explosives.

Who cared for these humble things in the England or Germany of six hundred years ago? No Parliament definitely sought to interfere with the ravages of typhoid fever, smallpox, or consumption. No one prevented little children from being starved, tortured, or oppressed. No one sought out parasites to destroy the gypsy moth. No one built hospitals for the insane or parental schools for wayward boys and girls. We have space only to suggest the breadth of the scope of the administration of a modern state government. The idea everywhere, though still imperfectly carried out, is the health, the welfare, and the betterment of the people.

Grant, if you please, that our state governments are prone to be meddlesome, that there is a good deal of needless legislation, that the state authorities arrogate power to themselves at the expense of "home rule" in towns and cities. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how in modern society, with its rapid influx and change of population, we could properly care for certain common interests on which social life depends,—the highways for instance, or, again, for the innumerable waifs

and strays, the helpless, the feeble, the defective classes,—without some general organization between the city and the nation. No easy doctrine of *laissez faire* can provide for the necessities of a populous industrial state. Modern society cannot bear to see children suffer or grow up stunted and dwarfed, or go without generous opportunities of education. Civilized society cannot exist under conditions which submerge a tenth of the people below the line of decent housing and living.

Observe again the immense change which has come about in recent times in the nature of local government. Recall the London of the fourteenth century, shut in by walls, unpaved, dark at night, full of prowling ruffians ready to assault and plunder. London "politics" once consisted in the business of maintaining barriers and train-bands and keeping order among turbulent factions. The politics of a modern city, on the contrary, consists, or should properly consist, in providing all manner of public advantage which no individual citizens or groups of citizens could procure for themselves. Politics now has to do with unlimited supplies of pure water, with a comprehensive system of sewers, with miles of

well-paved and brilliantly lighted streets, with splendid public buildings, parks, and grounds, with schools and libraries, with lectures and musical entertainments free for all. We have no walls or moats. Our watchmen defend us against fire and against the ravages of disease. Even the police for the most part serve to remind us of our tacit common agreement to live together in peace, rather than to hold the rod of compulsion over us. Crime is indeed still a peril, and we hear too much of it. But it is obviously a survival from barbarism. The modern criminal is no brave Robin Hood, the pride of a county; he is a defective. The mystery which once wrapped him about has vanished. He had his excuse when men lived under a despotism; he is out of place in a government of the people. Make the government a better democracy, and all excuse for crime is taken away.

Local government evidently has no other proper design except to procure benefit for the people. Show the modern city that any public scheme or undertaking is intended only for the good of a class, and that scheme or undertaking must be sooner or later abandoned. Demonstrate that any enterprise will enhance the welfare of

the citizens, and the enterprise must be in due time adopted. Even in the most corrupt cities this idea is recognized. The worst local government, as in the city of Philadelphia, actually provides, with however great waste and inefficiency, schools, water, hygienic care, defence against fire, parks, highways, and lights. The taxes must at least be made to appear to go for the benefit of the people and not as a tribute to a class or a tyrant. Theoretically, they buy for all what individuals could not by themselves provide. To have gained the democratic theory of the purpose of governmental taxes is a vast step forward. It is not strange that we have not yet worked it out to its true results.

A most interesting consequence follows from our argument. Modern political organization, or government, as we still call it, seeks the welfare of the people. This does not mean merely comfort, health, books, schools, recreation. It means development in all men of those qualities which Plato and Aristotle had in view for the few, when they taught that the aim of the state is not merely to enable men to live, but to "live nobly." We have in mind an ideal of an intelligent, high-minded, generous, and public-spirited people. The

qualities which men once held were possible only to an aristocratic régime, we propose for the people of a democracy. Why should they not possess these great humane qualities? Shall we ever be content with outward comfort, and expect no corresponding advance in humanity? Indeed, no outward prosperity can be permanent without the more excellent type of humanity fitted to manage and appropriate it.

As soon as we fairly state the purpose for which government in its true essence exists, all monarchical, aristocratic, or despotic modes of government are seen to be impossible. In the various forms of the old régime you had an arrangement by which the one or the few, or a powerful faction of the people, subjected or patronized the others. The democratic arrangement is simply one by which all plan together for the common good.

Modern democracy is thus a problem of education. It is not a piece of clever machinery so much as a process of discipline in moulding human nature. We put up with its faults and lapses, as we bear with the mistakes which children make in their lessons. The teacher or the visitor might recite the lesson better, or might

handle the glass in the laboratory with less breakage; meanwhile the pupil is learning lessons which we agree are worth all the broken glass or the teacher's expense of time and patience.

VIII

LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY

WE may now venture to take up and explain the old familiar catchwords of democracy,—“Liberty, equality, fraternity.” “All men are born free and equal.” “The consent of the governed.” What do these glib phrases mean?

We have already observed that men are never born free, but under a lien of all manner of obligations. Not even a Nero or a Caligula, or a barbarian, is ever free to do as he pleases. In the animal world the eccentric creature fixes attention upon himself at the risk of his life. No right-minded man wishes to be free. He is glad to own the bond of human solidarity whereby he suffers and enjoys with all other men. What is this thing, freedom, which we are all said to inherit as a natural birthright? It is simply a man's freedom to grow and be a man. It does not yet fairly exist; for it cannot be in a brutal or selfish society. It is still an ideal to be attained.

Freedom thus belongs, not in the animal world,

where every creature is limited and menaced on every side, but in the spiritual realm, wherein the best or largest man takes his daily delight in the exercise of his skill, his intelligence, and his humanity. Freedom, at its best, is to be able to use and to utter your nature. It is like the freedom which they tell us is in every atom of the air or every particle of the ether, even while pressed upon, to answer back and make its own native elasticity felt in every direction. Democracy is the effort of each and all to attain this kind of freedom. It is still almost a mockery to tell men that they are born free. Free in Russia! Free in the squalid huts of the black belt of Alabama! Free in the one-room cabins of east Tennessee, in the slums of New York, in the coal mines of Pennsylvania! What we can truthfully say is only that we are working to secure freedom. This is the trend of democracy.

For this reason we have courts and other institutions of justice. Society needs the free force of every life. It is a matter of common interest if any individual is crushed and weakened. For the same reason, much of our legislation has its justification. A certain measure of order and rule is necessary to freedom. The law says, "Keep to

the right." This is for the larger freedom of movement. The law compels vessels to show the red and green lights; this is for the greater freedom of all shipping. It is doubtful whether Herbert Spencer quite appreciated how largely the spirit of freedom itself is obliged to clothe itself in the forms of order and rule. Here then we see mankind growing out of ancient and often very barbarous conditions — from the liberty of wilfulness to the liberty of civilization.

What now shall we say of the old phrase that men are born equal? It is only in the ideal or spiritual realm that this sentence has even the semblance of truth. On the animal or physical side men are not equal and are never likely to be. No two are alike in any respect. In the market of dollars they range all the way from indefinite thousands a year down to a minus quantity. On the physical plane most men believe in superior and inferior peoples, nations, and races, and in corresponding inequalities of privilege.

To proclaim men equal is to enter a higher realm of thought. It is a tribute to the spiritual nature of men. There is in each man what you cannot measure in the scales or in the market. It consists in all manner of human possibilities.

The feeble child, who looks up to you from his cradle in the meanest tenement-house, has powers and qualities, for aught you know, beyond estimation. There is no other basis in the democratic doctrine of human equality than this. Men are not equal considered as units.

Neither can we on any basis award men equality of power or influence. This would not be true to the facts. Practical, political, economic, or social equality merely means that each man may utter himself and express his mind and have consideration according to the weight and value of his opinions, his character, and his manhood. This is all that any man can fairly wish. A man in human society is like a stone in a wall. He counts for his size and weight, and only the size and weight which belongs to him. This is enough.

You say: "One man, one vote. Is not this political equality?" I answer that the counting of votes is a piece of machinery, a sort of a rude makeshift. It is the bane of our American cities that we have not yet contrived means whereby men and their manhood, not numbers, count. It is a bad democracy where only numbers count. But even at the worst, that which makes the numbers and guides the direction of the vote, however

crude, is the personal influence, the thought, the emotion, the persuasion, the humanity of men, and women too. And this in proportion to moral size and weight, for evil and for good. In the ultimate analysis in New York City, Mr. Jerome and Mr. Low count as men, not as units.

So much for equality in a democracy. The democracy pays absolute respect to each man's nature as a man and not as a unit, a machine, or a brute, and in this trust in his spiritual nature, it therefore gives each man a vote. But the democracy never foresees the time when one man's personality will not outweigh another's. The ideal democracy would simply be that where each personality exerted its full and free influence. Who wishes more than this?

Equality also obviously means that each man shall have equal treatment before the laws. This is not because men are equal. It is rather because they are not equal, and many therefore are in peril of injustice. Real equality of access and opportunity and treatment in the courts is still only the theory. No one claims that we more than approximate to it. We have repeatedly seen different treatment administered in America to Chinese or Italian immigrants, or to poor boys, from what

is administered by our police in the case of well-to-do offenders or anarchistic corporations. The laws are rigorously executed against petty gambling, while the gigantic manipulations of the stock market go on without hindrance. Again, as before, the doctrine of equality expresses an ideal toward which we are still working.

Take now the fine phrase "fraternity," and see how much we mean by it. On the physical plane we would all deny it immediately. We are not the literal and physical brothers of the Patagonians or the natives of New Guinea. Blacks and whites, Hungarians and English, are not brothers. All these people in the animal world would at one time have been ready to spring at one another's throats. What hinders them now? Costly lessons of experience hinder them. But behind these lessons is the faith to which we have just referred, quite undemonstrable, but very real, that men ought to be brothers. This is ideal and spiritual, but every man at his best believes it. It is as a man that you take the stranger, or the alien, by the hand and treat him as you yourself would wish to be treated. It is by virtue of your seeing in him, under all the differences, the same nature, just, true, benevolent, which constitutes your own best self.

I am bound to believe that this is the only kind of "like-mindedness" which will ever safely bind men together in a state. The sentiment about a flag, or a common history, the want of which, Professor Giddings thinks, separates men from fitness for a common government, is superficial as compared with the sentiment of humanity, to which men of every race and of even the most distinct traditions instinctively respond.

The spirit of fraternity is modest. It will not easily flow in the presence of self-assertion or arrogance. It catches as a flame from a spark at the tone of respect and good temper. The man possessed with this spirit does not think it worth while to claim, "I am as good as you are." He prefers to ask, "What can I do for you?" or, better yet, "What can we do together?" Fraternity begins when men join hands for common ends. Americans and Englishmen and Frenchmen were brothers when they sent their money to the relief of the sufferers from the eruption of Mount Pelee.

"The consent of the governed" is another much misunderstood phrase. Government, like other institutions, grew without much consciousness at first as to its justice. The barbarian, like the

child, begins by taking authority, rule, penalty, as a plain matter of fact. Later he thinks to ask the reason why. Consent or contract was surely never the origin of government.

“The consent of the governed” is really an ideal of justice, or of what ought to be. There can be no rightful authority which man holds over his brother to compel him to pay taxes against his conscience or to force him to go to war in a shameful cause. All authority at the last analysis arises out of the moral ground of mutual obligation. We owe one another, and we therefore owe society or the state, whatever can be shown to be needful for the common good, and only this. If on occasion we are called upon to die for the state, we must at least be given a voice in determining the justice of the cause for which we must die. This seems a universal rule. If we must at times yield our judgment in deference to a majority of our fellows, we do this in obedience to the same Golden Rule which we wish them to observe as soon as we win over a majority of the voters. Even when we yield our wills, we will to yield them. Our consciences, our thoughts, our manhood, remain free.

Thus “the consent of the governed,” so far from

having ever been the origin of government, is the goal and ideal toward which the slowly evolving world is approaching. Political administration that does not rest upon the general consent of the people is already in unstable equilibrium. Childish peoples the world over have begun to make the same demands for liberty and justice which our forefathers made at Runnymede, and again at Marston Moor, and later at Bunker Hill. Russians, Porto Ricans, and Filipinos are coming to see the same ideals.

IX

THE EXTENSION OF DEMOCRACY

I HAVE endeavored to suggest that democracy is never merely a theory or method of government. Its spirit enters into all human relations to alter their form. Already certain principles seem axiomatic. We ought all to have a share and a voice in making and changing laws. No man ought to hold the monopoly of rule, much less transmit an inheritance of political power to his children. No group of men ought to be able to command us against our will to fight and slay other men. But these principles go further than the province of politics ; they go over into the immense field of industrial relations. You cannot admit the democratic spirit and ideal in politics and keep it out of economics. To-day this question of industrial democracy is perhaps the largest, the most complicated, and also the most promising which mankind is required to solve.

Again, as before, the easy stock phrases, liberty, equality, fraternity, the consent of the governed,

demand the most careful and accurate interpretation.

Even more obviously than in politics, the realm of industry is essentially coöperative. Do you call it competitive? But what is the harm in competition as soon as men compete to give each other the best possible service? In the long run they must do this or they cannot succeed. Moreover, they must join hands together in our modern world in order even to compete. The social law of coöperation, whether they see it or not, underlies the whole industrial order.

The eternal laws, moreover, continually urge closer coöperation and throw out of the economy whatever does not permanently contribute to human wealth. The demand for the democratic spirit, which is essentially the spirit of the Golden Rule, is demonstrably the most conspicuous requirement of our age. So far as this is wanting, you see agitation and flaming revolt. So far as this spirit is present, as it is often present in employers and employees, light is thrown on our problem. Great profit-sharing enterprises are everywhere on foot; managers and men are learning to meet around a common table and to confer together about their joint interests; grand schemes

for accident insurance and old age pensions presage the coming of a new era.

Does any man now dare to claim that he is free in the economic realm to do as he likes? Does he say, "I can use my own as I please?" It is only as an animal that a man has any such freedom, which is limited on every hand by the freedom of other brute creatures to trample upon him and crush him. The truth is, we possess nothing that is wholly our own to use as we please. All material things to-day are a social product.

No rich man knows that he deserves or has earned the property for which he holds the deeds and titles. May he do as he likes with it? May he close his mines and shut down his mills? On the contrary, humanity forbids him to do anything socially hurtful with his property, itself a social product. No human will may rightfully set itself up against the social welfare.

Do you say that you have a right to be idle by the month, that you are free to do what you will with your skill, to waste it or burn up its results? Yes, as a brute in a world where other brutes may destroy the drones in the hive. As a man, your skill and your strength are not your own. It is preposterous that society — that is all of us —

must educate you and feed and clothe you, unless you in turn stand ready to respond and add your strength and your skill to the social whole. For the wealth of all is the combined product of all, smaller or larger as the individual contributors are idle or industrious, as they waste or save, are niggardly or generous. The bond is inevitable. You may do nothing in the assertion of economic freedom which you do not believe it would be well for all men in your circumstances likewise to do. The Golden Rule is the plain utterance of human nature wherever it speaks at its best. Call it, if you please, God in Human Nature.

On the other hand, it is evident that political freedom is only a small part of what a man needs. He cannot even be politically free by the mere gift of a ballot. Suppose the character of his work and the length of his working hours keep him ignorant. Suppose he is practically bound, for example, by the burden of poverty, to remain in one place, and cannot change his conditions for more favorable ones. Or suppose his work is so precarious that he never knows what it is to face the responsibilities of being a permanent citizen anywhere. Hundreds of thousands of legal voters are living to-day on plantations, in factory towns,

or in mines, whose votes are of no use to themselves and are a standing menace to others. Too many voters express at the polls their ignorance and their prejudices, rather than their intelligence.

Real freedom is the power to express skill, judgment, reason, aspiration, ideals, humanity. No man is a freeman who does only the bidding of others, voices other men's opinions, is made the dupe of the unscrupulous. No man is free who is driven or hoodwinked or bribed. The spirit of willing coöperation is essential to freedom.

It is evident that every man needs humane conditions in the performance of his daily work, quite as much as a free field in politics, in order that he may enjoy full opportunity for the expression and development of his intelligence, his character, and the total of his life. Not the nature of a man's work, but the temper with which he performs it, makes him free or a bondsman. The slave works because he must and chafes under his task. The mercenary works for his wages and aims to do as little as he can. The freeman works because his work is the expression of his character. It is his satisfaction and his joy to express himself and pour out his energy.

This satisfaction belongs normally to all the

nobler kinds of work. But there is no aristocratic line of division by which we can separate noble from menial work. If the mother's love lifts household drudgery to the level of a fine art, if the good farmer delights in making two blades of grass grow where only one grew before, if an Adam Bede can rejoice in making a chair or a table to last for hundreds of years, every man's task likewise ought to be translatable into the terms of gladsome and willing democratic service. It all goes to make mankind rich. It is pitiable when men are forced by the length of the hours of their work, or by squalid surroundings, to become such drudges as to see only the task, or the pay, and never its human significance. It is pitiable when men are so placed that they cannot catch sight of the ideals which alone give worth to their lives.

It is conceded that "a man's a man," in the realm of politics. It remains yet to be clearly seen that "a man's a man" in the economic realm as well. We can never treat men as cogs in a wheel, any more than we can treat them as slaves. It follows that every man ought to have some voice in the determination of the conditions of his work, as he has a voice in the management of the

state. He ought to be consulted. Too often men treat other men as they would not treat horses, and provoke their ill-will.

When, however, we say that men ought to have consideration, this does not mean that every man's opinion and voice are equal in value to every other man's; that the new man in the factory ought to have an equal voice with the old workman; that the man who is here to-day and in Montana to-morrow ought to count equally with the foreman, the manager, or the owner. In no conceivable scheme of socialism ought one man's voice to be held equal to every other man's. Take seamanship, for example. The captains of ships must be given, at least for the duration of the voyage, the responsibility and the directing authority over the lives of their crews. Men's votes are not equal on board ship and ought not to be. Grant that the ship is an extreme case, yet it illustrates the nature of all industrial or economic enterprises.

Democracy is indeed essentially the spirit of fairness. No just democrat ever wants more than his share, or to be counted for more than his opinion is worth. Democracy acts, or should act, to bring men together in view of common interests and duties, not to divide men into strata or classes.

All are, or ought to be, contributors to the common work. All also are members together of the employing public for whose sake in the long run work is carried on. The names of employer, manager, foreman, captain, mayor, governor, president, indicate only a larger responsibility and heavier service.

Do you ask: How shall the thousands of the vast industrial army have each a voice and a share, as to the conditions of their work? We answer that this is being worked out to-day by actual experiments. But only a general answer is possible. You cannot fix the details.

No one can ever determine the exact wages or salary that a man ought to receive. The more valuable a man's work, the more difficult it becomes to assess its value. As we have seen, the best part of a man is not his own; it is "bought with a price"; it is that with which he is bound up inextricably with other men. It depends upon inheritance and teaching. So with the best part of the work of a man, of a good judge, a president, or a skilled workman. So with the weight or value of any man's opinion or advice. You cannot measure it.

The real question is, in every case: Do you

wish to do men justice? Do you wish to pay others all that they deserve and no less? Do you wish to make provision for taking their advice, getting their consent, and having the benefit of their coöperation with you? The good democrat is he who seeks to do his best for the men whom he deals with, buys from or sells to, employs or assists. Give us the democratic spirit, and the rest will take care of itself. "Where there is a will there is a way."

Thus it would seem to be just and reasonable to provide representation upon the boards of directors of corporations, for the expression of the judgment and the needs of the workmen. These men have as real an interest as the stockholders in the administration and in the success of their company. To trust the workmen, to keep them informed, to use the counsel of their representatives, would seem not only to be humane treatment, but also wise and tactful. It is a direct appeal to men's intelligence and honor. May we not predict the time when it will be as common to find at least one director to represent the workmen in the directory of a company as it is now unusual to see them represented at all? The effort made by certain corporations to enable their

workmen to own shares of stock is a movement in this direction. There would be few strikes where workmen were fairly recognized as having a part in the control of the business.

It is absurd to suppose that any single method of organization must prevail; that every one, for example, must join a labor union. There may be various methods, all developing the same essential spirit of friendliness and fraternity. There might be the most ingenious and promising method, that yet would be a failure in the absence of the spirit of coöperation. Does any one outside of a lunatic asylum imagine that a Bellamy commonwealth, inaugurated by plebiscite, and then run by such men as Thomas C. Platt, would make a happy world? Do you get good government in San Domingo by calling it by the name of a republic?

There is one quite fictitious difference between men which the growth of democracy promises at least to modify immensely. It is the consideration which has commonly been given to certain men on account of their heredity. That a man comes of what is called "noble blood," that his ancestors have held offices and honors, that he has inherited wealth—these reasons alone have been enough to lift the man above the ranks of his

fellows. He has been thought to have a prescriptive right to enjoy the same special consideration as his ancestors held. It is true that we look for much from the man who has received much. The time is likely never to come when the honorable name of one who has done admirable service in the world will not give the children who bear it a special advantage. It is an advantage to be brought up with traditions of honor and usefulness. It is an advantage to any promising youth to face high expectations on the part of the people who know him. The son of a famous athlete or the son of an illustrious senator has advantages which no one grudges him.

All the more futile does mere heredity become when it carries with it no useful quality. The theory of the democracy is that each man shall find his own level; he shall have honor and value set upon him for just what he is worth and no more; he shall not presume to depend upon his blood or his family one day after the virility of the family stock has disappeared.

We have already in consistency with this principle discarded in America all hereditary titles. True, Americans sometimes run after them abroad and make themselves ridiculous. We

have absolutely denied any man's right to hold an inheritance of political office or power. This sort of claim to lordship has so utterly gone out of our republican traditions that we are hardly able to imagine how strong it once was in the world, how universally it was once admitted, how even to-day our democratic brothers in England continue to put up with it, how an Emperor William holds it as almost an article of his religion.

We still, however, admit a strange survival of this ancient claim to special hereditary power. It is in the transmission of property. We have abolished political dukedoms; we are contemplating the erection of the most gigantic commercial and industrial dukedoms that the world has ever seen. We allow men to add farm to farm and own miles of land and forests and mines. We allow men whose wealth has notoriously come by the manipulation of the stock markets, by the promotion of colossal financial schemes, or by the control of some monopoly, to take over under their names vast systems of continental railways. We hear of the "Vanderbilt" roads or the "Gould" roads! A little group of men meeting in an office or a bank in New York may, and do, levy taxes upon the whole people of the United States.

Grant that this is right. Suppose that all the captains of industry are disinterested and public-spirited. Suppose that they never abuse their power to take for themselves a dollar more than they deserve. Try to believe them to be honest trustees in behalf of the people in their management of the regal properties of which they carry the titles. Suppose that we would elect them, if they had not elected themselves, to bear these same responsibilities.

See what we do next. We not only recognize the natural lord or "captain of industry" who has acquired dominion over lands, highways, public resources, and the labor of men, but we actually give him the right, by virtue of our inherited Old-World system of laws of property, to transmit his immense industrial dominion, touching the interests of millions of men, touching wealth which they have all helped him to make, to sons and grandsons who may be imbeciles, who at best are no more likely to possess the skill, the wisdom, the disinterestedness, the humanity, needful for directing an industrial principality, than kings' sons, the Georges, for example, were fit to govern England. We live under the name of a democracy, and yet we permit individuals to

direct by their wills what shall become of incomes to be drawn from all the people hundreds of years after our time!

Sir Henry Maine has shown in his "Ancient Law," that when at Rome the right was first allowed to individuals to make testamentary disposition of property, the power conferred on the heir was always solemnly coupled with duties to be performed and trusts to be discharged. We practically allow heirs merely to enjoy property, free of the duties and responsibilities which the man had been obliged to exercise who amassed the property.

We will not here say that this almost irresponsible freedom in the bestowal of great properties, thus constituting a hereditary power over the lives and fortunes of a whole people, is necessarily evil. Perhaps it is expedient. But we are bound to say that it is strange and anomalous under the rule of a democracy. We raise the question whether justice or the interests of the people could possibly sanction it. We hear the old cry, "Have we not a right to do as we please with our own?" We may suggest that the Sultan of Turkey raised that cry in vain over lands and incomes and authority which have slipped out of his hands.

The spirit of democracy affords guidance in the whole realm of social relations. There is much that it cannot do, and does not even profess directly to do. The time will never come when there will be no differences of personal attractiveness and that indefinable quality which constitutes "charm," in any conceivable state of human society. You cannot command intimacy, or love, in the highest sense of the word; for human nature has as many different aspects and facets as a gem. The main thing which we ask in a good or wholesome society is that each individual shall be free to grow and rise, free to make and choose and enjoy acquaintances and friendships on the sole ground of his worth of character. This general principle of humanity transcends all distinctions of race and color.

On the other hand, it may or may not prove to be the verdict of experience that the closer relation of intermarriage is good between the people of races whose traditions and inheritance are wide apart. We know of no decisive evidence on this problem. It is one of the most profound problems that mankind is set to solve, and must be reckoned with in all the discussions of future human development. Grant the negative conclu-

sion. Is there any humane reason why, with the development of intelligence and character, the people of any two races shall not travel together, work and eat together, go to school and church together, vote together, and respect one another as persons? There is but one answer to this question, at least on the side of religion. To deny the common humanity is simply a form of atheism.

X

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS: THE SUFFRAGE

WE have so far mainly considered the principles of democracy. It becomes necessary to grapple with certain great problems which already demand all the wisdom and the statesmanship of the world. They must at the same time be largely met by the good sense and good temper of the multitudes who now hold the ballot. The question is: Does the democratic idea or spirit promise to solve the practical issues now before us? Will the idea of democracy work?

At the outset we are faced with the problem of universal suffrage. There is a great deal of almost cynical scepticism about it. Was it well ever to have admitted this principle? What shall we do with it? Is it even necessary to the democratic spirit that every one shall vote? If so, in general, are there not terms and conditions which may limit such a universal rule?

We have shown that the democratic idea is that every life shall find its expression and count for

what it is worth. We habitually trust men. We wish also to educate men, and the appeal to their judgment is a method of education. The ballot indeed is only a piece of machinery. It is a method for the expression of men's manhood. Its use is not in itself a natural right. The natural right is that a man shall express himself in some valid form touching the interests which affect him. As a mere matter of good policy, it would seem well to give the man utterance and not to suppress his manhood. You would make even an animal content if you could.

Grant what you please, then, as to the merely mechanical nature of the ballot; grant that it may not be an altogether adequate expression of human will; still it is a valid expression, as far as it goes. The presumption is that every man ought to have it; and I use "man" in that broader sense which includes women, too. Reason should be shown why it is given to some and withheld from others.

For example, we withhold the suffrage from minors. But I am not aware that minors make any complaint of injustice. They are all treated alike. They have the expectation of the common franchise before them, as soon as they are mature enough for it.

May we not also sometimes make an educational, or even a property qualification for the suffrage? We can easily conceive that an educational standard, as much as the ability to read and write, might be made to seem quite fair to the disfranchised themselves, provided help and hope were offered to enable them in due time to enfranchise themselves. No sound democrat, however, could consistently draw any line, which would admit ignorant whites and exclude the same class of black or brown or yellow men.

A reasonable limit of time of residence might also be made to seem quite just to the very men whom it would exclude. Does any one claim that he deserves to have a voice in the affairs of a city in which he has no permanent residence, nor any stake in its affairs? We have undoubtedly been slovenly in granting the municipal franchise to those who could never have fairly complained of injustice if they had been required in some way to show that they have something more than the interest of birds of passage in the welfare of the city.

A property qualification always threatens to divide the rich and the poor, a mischievous division in a democracy. As has often been pointed out, it would work to disenfranchise Jesus, Epicte-

tus and Paul. Nevertheless there is a form in which money may fairly have a place, especially in the terms of municipal suffrage. Why should any man claim to hold the right to vote and expend money, who pays nothing whatever for the common burdens? I believe that every just man, however poor, would prefer, at least till old age, to be required to pay something, if no more than a reasonable poll-tax, as a qualification for voting on all matters which touch money and property. We do no kindness to men in a democracy in exempting them from the common burdens, while we allow them the common privileges. In fact, it seems fair, and therefore democratic, to grant as much as a municipal franchise to the large class who have actual interests in some other town from that in which they reside. Why should not the man who pays taxes in New York City and lives in Jersey City have a vote in both towns? Why should a man be taxed without any representation in the town where he owns a *bona fide* summer residence?

Is there any sufficient reason why womankind should be excluded from polling their full influence as well as the men? No. Women are excluded from the suffrage because in barbarous

society, out of which we have emerged, the women were thought to be inferior to the men. The tradition still binds us. We hardly reckon how immensely all the functions of government have changed their character from mere masculine to universal and human interests. Government is not a mere fighting machine, neither, as we have seen, is voting a tug-of-war between angry factions. Politics is properly the friendly consideration of all manner of common interests, in which the women are as much concerned as the men. Why should the state then keep up the Old-World barrier of political inferiority against such mothers, sisters, and wives as are in the homes of Iowa or Massachusetts? No one can give any reason, except such arguments of conservative timidity as have generally withstood every step in the advancement of mankind.

This is not to raise the somewhat academic question of the equality of the sexes. It is to affirm that the modern and democratic method, not to say the religious or civilized method, is to treat and respect all people as persons. We regard women, therefore, as persons. We look for intelligence, character, and public spirit among them. We tend to find what we expect. This

treatment is wholesome and educative for men and women alike. Does any one seriously forebode evil results from it? There is surely nothing unwomanly if our wives and sisters have an opinion of their own on the public housekeeping and express it by a ballot.

So much for certain general considerations in favor of the democratic rule of universal suffrage. Whatever exceptional conditions may restrict this rule, such as a qualification of age, of actual residence, of education, or of moral fitness,— they must evidently be so framed as to seem quite fair to those who may temporarily be deprived of the suffrage. The conditions should also be such as distinctly to encourage those who do not yet possess the suffrage, to qualify for it. Well-informed negroes tell us that their people have no objection to such suffrage laws as the state of Massachusetts has passed.

I do not forget that the use of the suffrage is no mere matter of theory, but a serious practical problem. We are constantly reminded that there are considerable populations in the world to whom all the traditions and usages of popular government are new and unfamiliar. Such are many of the immigrants to our shores from eastern and

southern Europe. Such are most of the people of Cuba, Porto Rico, and Hawaii. These are people, we are told, who are not politically men yet, but children, that is, minors. Some are asking whether these should not be permanently treated as minors? This is the question which men are actively raising as regards negro suffrage in the South.

To ask this question is to assume that a certain gifted class, namely, ourselves, have the right to grant or to withhold the suffrage from others outside our privileged order. This is to say that the world is properly divided between human beings who are men, and others who are not yet men, between those who are fit both to govern themselves and to govern others, and the rest of mankind who are unfit even to govern themselves, and who need, therefore, to be taken in hand by their betters. This was precisely the contention upon which slavery was justified. This is the aristocratic theory of society.

Inasmuch as many hold this theory, let us appeal to the facts, and try to discover, if we may, on what ground men may be divided into two classes practically so diverse that one should live in tutelage to the other. The truth is, there is no

such ground of division. The world is made up of men of all grades of physical, intellectual, and moral power. They differ in genius, in character, in aptitude to learn, but their differences imperceptibly shade into each other. These differences are in every family group, and in every school. Find among the graduates of the greatest university the perfect, mature, and normal man, who marks one hundred per cent in every human value, sound in body, with thorough common sense, brave, patient, just, temperate, benevolent, constant also, on whose faithfulness and truth you can count every hour of the day,—the man fit and worthy to lead, and we shall find for every such university graduate ten men of the same educated class, more or less immature and imperfect, lacking in sound sense, wanting in virtue, in self-discipline, in good temper, in patience and manliness, upon whose constancy no one can certainly count. Such men too often go through life immature, unwise, inconstant. Some of them are never able to earn their living in any serviceable way. Are those not men?

Let us be modest together. Let us grant that if any of us wish to be counted as men, we had better treat others also as men. For, the more

we expect manly conduct of them, the better they tend to behave. Or, if we all are only children, let us be as patient and considerate toward others' shortcomings as we like to have them patient toward us. Here is a basis of fact. The idea of democracy rises out of this basis.

The truth is that all races and peoples, like the individuals composing them, are still more or less in the childish, or, as we say, the uncivilized state. No one of them has yet learned the splendid art of self-government. How far away is America from this goal! Evidently no group or set or class of favored people in America is constituted of grown and quite mature and civilized men. There is no dividing line that anywhere corresponds to the aristocratic theory of the "better" people, fit to rule, and the childish people unfit to rule. The world has tried the aristocratic idea for thousands of years and worked out a demonstration that in folly, in inhumanity, in tyrannous spirit, in avarice and selfishness, in intellectual and moral childishness, the rule of the "better" people has been on the whole as conspicuous a disappointment, at least, as anything to be feared under the name of democracy.

The success of democracy fortunately does not

depend upon a high degree of intellectual education, limited to the few, so much as upon a constant appeal to the sense of justice. This native sense of right and justice awakens very early in human life. It is in children, who show themselves reasonable whenever you appeal to their love of fair play. The same sense is in childish people, who always have their codes of conduct, and do really govern themselves in all primitive communities, long before any imperial government ever undertakes to rule over them. The conscience of the well-to-do class is often sophisticated; their selfishness, while subtle, is apt to be specially unscrupulous. It is a fact of frequent observation that the plain, average, unsophisticated, and even childish man is at least quite as open to the appeal of justice as his better educated neighbor.

The issues of government are likely to turn upon questions of right. There is no evidence to show that there is any superior class with whom such issues can be more safely trusted than with the very people whom the few too often look down upon as inferior and childish. On any simple question of justice you may always appeal with confidence to the plain peo-

ple, even to the ignorant. Neither is there evidence to show that childish people are any more ready than the "better people" to put themselves into the hands of unscrupulous leaders. Witness the contentment of the respectable people of the state of Pennsylvania, under the sway of the late Matthew S. Quay, most unscrupulous of political despots. Witness, *per contra*, the repeated revolt of the East Side of New York against a rotten Tammany.

True, there are complicated and confusing problems in modern government. Childish people will go wrong, we are told. But these problems are confusing, because the people of light and leading go wrong, are divided among themselves, and confuse the issue with their helplessness. Witness the silver question, whereon the most eminent men lost their way. Witness the eternal question of the tariff, regarding which the business men mostly seem to vote, not from principle, but from fancied property interests. Would any childish people do worse than the propertied classes of Great Britain did, up to the middle of the nineteenth century, in restraint of trade?

Besides justice, there is another point wherein children and childish people are peculiarly sus-

ceptible to the modern idea of democratic government. We have seen that democracy means coöperation. The idea is, "all for each and each for all." It was the motto of the Three Guardsmen of Dumas,—and it is the essential of socialism. Children understand this just as well as older people do. They are even more willing to carry the idea out. You can persuade them both to play together and to work together. The difficulty is in keeping them together in sustained effort. Is not this difficulty quite as great with the well-to-do class? It is a difficulty which grows with the growth of selfishness, but when grown or civilized people are selfish, their selfishness is more menacing and unmanageable than is the selfishness of the childish.

We are reminded of the fearful waste and corruption of the "carpet-bag" governments in the Southern states after the Civil War. The very name of those governments implies one source of the mischief. Northern white men had seized on an anomalous situation for purposes of selfish greed. "The ruling class" at the South let slip a splendid opportunity; or rather, they were not wise or good enough to

see it. All their interests, material and moral, lay with the enfranchised blacks. The two races were there to work out civilization together, not in rivalry or in enmity, but coöperatively. Every white man who professed the Christian religion was bound in honor, to give a helping hand to his black brother, to be his friend and to remain his friend. The negroes by all accounts were ready, and are now ready, as all childish people usually are, to respond to the trust and the friendliness of a stronger people. The South was not civilized enough for this, nor was the North. Evidently what is needed in solving the vast problem, caused by bringing negro slaves to the United States, is the temper or spirit of coöperation which alone can bind men in a political society. This does not mean the fear of the negro, but trust, respect, and education. The same spirit which makes a harmonious school out of young Poles, Italians, and Yankees will make a harmonious nation out of the same heterogeneous elements.

I am not denying that the presence of a multitude of ignorant and childish people is a serious peril. Children are irresponsible and fickle. The one cure, however, for irresponsible people is to

put responsibility upon them. Is there anything else that makes men out of children? Grant that this method is slow and costly. Manhood and civilization are worth whatever they cost.

We may here concede, without prejudice to our principle, that the assumption of the suffrage by any citizen for the first time might well be made to seem, what it really is, a solemn and important business. So far from giving dignity to this step upward in manhood, we have almost gone to the opposite extreme in cheapening it. I have already suggested that no able-bodied person ought to exercise the suffrage as a mere personal right. It is a public or social duty. Few young Americans seem yet to recognize this. Few see that every public function is a trust. Many have never been told wherein the giving or receiving of bribes is as bad as treason.

The question for every voter is, What can I do for the social good? Young men can be made to see this; the youngest members of labor unions often actually see it. The voter is pledged to contribute service, time, and money, as well as to vote. It is bad democracy that lets him evade this side of his duty. Is it not worth suggesting whether there ought not to be in America some

fitting and dignified ceremony whereby in every municipality all new or young voters shall be inducted formally into the ranks of citizenship? "The Young Voters' Festival," recently tried in the city of Boston, may serve as a hint of a method which needs only to be invested with the sanction of law and usage in order to solemnize, as if with the force of an oath, the assumption of the right to help rule the nation.

The question of the suffrage for childish people is somewhat modified by the fact that democracy is in process of development in the world. We watch a historical movement still in progress, by which government is actually passing in one country after another from the hands of the few or of a part to the hands of the people. Thus, the great reform measures which marked the legislation of the last century in Great Britain were so many steps through which the holders of a restricted suffrage were challenged to share their duties and their privileges with the hitherto unenfranchised.

In the course of such a progressive and evolutionary movement, may it not be fairly permitted to the present holders of political power to proceed cautiously and step by step, and thus to guard the precious ark of government from the rude jolting of

those who might lay hasty hands upon it? This question is asked by those who take counsel of their suspicions and fears more than by those who respect men's manhood. The answer is on the lines of what we do in the case of our own youth. We withhold the suffrage from them no longer than they would generally themselves admit the reasonableness of our delay. They are made certain that they will presently have the franchise on fair terms. The same general rule seems to hold good everywhere. Let us make fair and reasonable terms, such as, for example, the ability to read; let us interpose no hopeless delays; let us make no conditions which will raise issues, or involve the conflict of will with the new people about to enter for the first time upon the duties of a civilized government.

It cannot be too clearly seen that the relation between a class, or a people, who have the suffrage to give, and another class or people who are disfranchised, is anomalous and fraught with peril. It is usually the accompaniment of conquest or some kind of barbarism. It can be allowed to continue, only as disease is borne with, for the shortest possible time. At best it is analogous to the situation of a man who has inherited

slaves. The worst thing that could happen to him would be to become content with the institution of slavery. Equally fatal is it to the class or the people who make excuses for contentedly holding wardship, or lordship, or any kind of sovereignty over others.

XI

THE LAWS: THE LEGITIMATE USE OF FORCE

THE answer to the question, where the laws come from, is not so difficult as it once seemed. Men used to say that the laws of a state were supernatural; they had been given to some chosen lawgiver, Manu or Moses, from heaven. They could not be altered or repealed, but only interpreted.

We know now that human law, like everything else, is in a constant process of change and growth. We see new laws as they come into being and we even make them. They come out of human needs and exigencies. They begin in the tentative or experimental stage, and they struggle for their existence, as other human institutions have to struggle to approve themselves by use. The laws touching the alcoholic drinks are an example of this tentative process through which laws have to run the gantlet of experience.

Examine the legal code of any modern people, and it will divide itself at once into two classes of

laws. One part consists of those rules of conduct and social adjustment which have become solidified by the usage of generations. The history of even this solid part of the legal system would reveal curious changes of growth and decay. The common laws for the protection of property, for instance, among English-speaking people will prove to have had a development in the direction of extreme individualism. The history of penalties will show strange fluctuations, at one time toward extravagant severity, and again, later, toward leniency and humanity.

Behind the changing details of legal provisions certain general principles characterize the common laws. The more important they are, the harder they are to define. Thus, there is always an idea of justice which all laws seek more or less crudely to embody, but which no law can ever describe or satisfy. There is an idea of humanity to be traced even in the customs and legislation of barbarous peoples who were daily violating their humanity and oppressing or killing one another. The more advanced peoples, like the Greeks and the Hebrews, tried to formulate the principle of humanity into solemn rules for the protection of strangers. To do injury to a guest was like the violation of

an oath. The development of commerce always has tended to demand appropriate legislation in behalf of foreigners.

So much for a class of laws which have everywhere come to express the habitual experience of mankind in view of certain fundamental principles: "Thou shalt not steal; thou shalt not kill; thou shalt not commit adultery; thou shalt not break a pledge or promise," — such laws as these, in various forms of application, survive like primitive rock. Men everywhere agree in general to the universal rules without which society obviously could not exist. If these laws did not exactly come down from heaven, they are in the nature of man. They may need new adaptations at times to new circumstances, but even those who take the most extreme anarchistic ground against government have no quarrel with the principles that such laws express. In fact, they often claim that men generally tend without constraint to keep these laws of their own volition.

The second class of laws are those which society evidently makes for itself, or at least suffers to be made through its existing authorities, whether through the majority of a legislature or by the decree of an autocratic power. Many of

these laws are simply for convenience and may or may not prove to be serviceable. Many of the new laws, like those requiring vaccination, are in the name of the public health, or they are for the protection of children. They limit, for example, the hours of work in certain employments. Such laws frankly interfere with individual liberty, but they do this in the name of the welfare of the social body. Other new laws are the expression of new social or moral ideals. Thus the prohibition of gambling is an attempt to urge a new standard of conduct upon men whose forefathers gambled without a twinge of conscience. New laws against offensive advertisements in public places represent a growing artistic sense, which protests against being compelled to submit to ugly sights at the instance of a few ruthless and greedy individuals.

The laws that aim at convenience, at the improvement of the public health, at more enlightened standards of moral conduct, at the general betterment of human conditions, are all experimental. They may be mistaken; they may prove oppressive; they may have to be modified or annulled. They are often merely methods, and faulty methods at that, to carry out some general

public purpose. The tax laws, for example, the internal revenue laws, with their extravagant punishments, and the customs regulations, with their petty persecutions of travellers, necessitated by the system of protection, may prove to be subversive of real justice.

What do we mean when we speak of the "sanctity of law"? The idea has perhaps come down to us from priestly legislators, seeking to magnify their office. There is a real sanctity which attaches to the unalterable principles at the foundation of society. We instinctively reverence justice, truth, honor, liberty, humanity, especially when incarnated in the deeds and lives of true men who have been ready to die for those ideas. We rightly call these things divine. But the sense of sacredness is felt rather toward our ideals of justice and goodness than toward the legislation which imperfectly expresses these ideals.

As for ordinary laws, and especially the laws which are fresh from the factory and are under trial, laws which may be declared constitutional by one court and set aside by the bare majority of another, laws which may have been procured by purchase or favor, — it is an abuse of language

to declare such laws sacred. We will regard the human law, we may be bound to obey it, we will give it trial, we will respect if we can the men who enacted it, but we hold our reverence only for those things which endure through all time. We can get along without an undue sense of the sacredness of laws of our own manufacture, but we cannot get on without respect for justice.

It follows that fair, patient, and intelligent criticism of the laws is always in order in a democracy. This is because we want the best possible laws ; it is because laws are for men and not men for the sake of keeping the law. Men may deplore the decline of the conventional sense of the sanctity of law, but this artificial feeling, suitable to absolutism and autocracy, is giving way to something more real and wholesome, namely, the good will essential to a democracy. For it is the part of the people, governing themselves, to seek, to find, and to do justice together. All legitimate law is an effort to this end. Under the democratic spirit we reverence principles and we reverence manhood, but we use laws as a means ; we watch their action to see how they work ; we hold them or obey them, subject to amendment or abrogation ; we never expect too much from them ; we never dream that

they can do perfect justice. We are therefore cautious of subjecting ourselves to too many of them. There is a simple practical test to which all such rules are finally subject. So far as they prove to serve human welfare, all rational people become quite willing to adjust themselves to their working and to find freedom under them. Indeed, no rule that we voluntarily accept really represses our liberty.

It has commonly been held and often reiterated, that all government and social order ultimately rest upon the appeal to brute force. Behind all laws, votes, public opinion, decrees, and plebiscites, it is said, stand the policeman, the sheriff, the jail, and the soldier. Grant if you please that nine out of ten men would obey the laws, pay their debts, "keep to the right," and respect each other without the sight of a constable, yet there is the tenth man, who is still more or less of a child, a savage, or an anarchist, unfortunate in his education, unstable in character, self-willed, a menace to himself or to others. What if thousands of such swarm to our shores and fill our towns? Will you preach, in view of their presence and the obvious facts of crime and drunkenness, any literal or Tolstoian doctrine of non-resistance to evil?

The truth is, the spirit of democracy is in no way inconsistent with the use of needful force or compulsion. Neither does it make us over-timid of pain and suffering. It only forbids the use of hate or revenge. Never forget, it urges, that the man is a man. Never treat him with enmity. Always maintain your good will toward him. Is there any man whose welfare you, as a good democrat, do not desire? The spirit of democracy does not deny the facts of the world, the childishness, the anarchism, the brutality, the insanity,—but it deals with facts, as the good engineer deals with his problems of various materials and their resistance, without ever forgetting the main end of his work.

Mark the difference between the old and the new thought touching the use of force. Whereas once man treated the brutal or the childish man as an outlaw, hated him, and sought to get rid of him, we treat him, however he behaves, as potentially a man. Thus, for example, the officer finds a crazy man abusing a child. Do you suppose Tolstoi himself would stand by and see the child murdered? Pity the crazy or drunken or passionate man if you will; for very pity's sake you will save the man from doing both himself and the

innocent child irreparable wrong. You knock the man senseless if necessary. This is what you would wish another to do to you, if the circumstances were reversed, if you had lost your control and had become a brute.

The case is analogous to that of the surgeon who risks the child's life in an operation to save it. Pain and the risk of death are a part of the operation. You are not denied action in the use of your strength or your skill; you are denied hate in the action, or revenge after it. On the contrary, you proceed, or ought to proceed presently, to cure the ill-doer. You restrain him if need be, as you would lock up an ugly dog. You give him the regimen of the hospital, as long as he needs it,—for life, if occasion requires. You appeal from "Alexander drunk to Alexander sober"—from the will of the sick man, or the wild man, whose manhood is not yet achieved, to the will of the well man or the civilized man, whom you hope to see. Thus we frankly admit into our present democracy bolts and locks, the court and the constable. We admit them as we admit the operating table and the surgeon's instruments. There are sicknesses and wounds in the world; there are also animal men, our "contemporary ancestors,"

as President Frost of Berea College has called them.

We see from time to time, in the more backward parts of the United States, in the form of mob violence and lynching, a fearful upheaval of the wild forces of primitive barbarism. Does any one suppose that society should quietly tolerate mad outbursts of cruelty? One might as well urge that we should let the maniac go unrestrained for fear of hurting him. It can never be kindness or reason to suffer a mob to run wild. This is not to befriend men, but to help make beasts of them. Order, even though backed up by cold steel, like the surgeon's lancet, may be wholesome, curative, and humane in the face of a surging mass of craziness. The one rule is that the spirit of order and mercy shall always direct the tools and the minds of the restraining forces. Let those who deplore mob violence see to it that the blame for inciting it is never traced back to their own angry words or harsh temper!

XII

THE TREATMENT OF CRIME

THE growing spirit of democracy is working a radical change in the feeling of society toward the so-called "criminal class." It is also slowly transforming the character of penal legislation. The keynote of the old method in the treatment of crime was retaliation or revenge. Its spirit was hatred and contempt, as of a superior toward an inferior class. The keynote of the new method will be sympathy.

Crime is a species of social disease. While technically it is violation of law, more strictly any act or conduct that is discovered to be hurtful to society must be accounted crime. Any nefarious business, like the slave trade, is a crime, even before society has found out its character. Any kind of monopoly, which bleeds one part of the people for the enrichment of others, is a crime.

Crime is essentially the will to get more than one's share, to do less than one's part, to do one's own pleasure at the expense of others, to outrage,

insult, or harm another. Crime is injustice, selfishness, wilfulness, expressing itself in hurtful action.

The criminal is not another species of man different from the rest of his kind, but the same man, only less fortunate than his fellows in his birth and education, in his conditions, in the strength of his will, or in the force of special temptations. He is very apt to be dull and backward, or defective in brain power, or lacking in moral sense, perhaps the child of a drunkard or of neurasthenic parents.

Or, again, the criminal comes on occasion from the educated and favored class, a defaulting treasurer, a dishonest member of Congress, a college professor, a magnate in business. Evidently no aristocratic line separates the good from the bad, but the most favored of men become dangerous to themselves and to others as soon as they leave the way of justice and good will.

There are special reasons for a considerable prevalence of crime in the United States. A new country, with a vast and thinly settled area and numerous frontier and mining settlements, attracts to its shores the boldest as well as the most ignorant of immigrants. We have the task of assimilat-

ing into peaceful habits of coöperation the most diverse races and colors. Cheap facilities of travel daily carry men away from the associations of their childhood into strange environment for which they have had no moral training. While old laws tend to lose their sanction, the legislatures of forty-five states are constantly creating new laws and new crimes, which supreme courts allow or set aside, perhaps by a bare majority vote! How can one reverence a law which constitutes as crime in one state what is no crime in the next state? How can a simple-minded Kentucky mountaineer, or a farmer on the Canadian border, be expected to set revenue laws on the same level with the Ten Commandments? Everywhere the people are discovering that the laws, so far from being handed down from heaven, are man-made and "judge-made"—the work of human creation. What if they surmise that certain laws are not really "of the people, by the people, and for the people"!

There are three main ends to be secured in the treatment of crime. The first is the protection of society. We tend largely to overestimate the value of the security afforded by our machinery of judicial processes and penalties. A recent estimate presented before the national prison associa-

tion reports as many as a quarter of a million people in the United States who in some degree support themselves by crime. Doubtless a larger number live close to the danger line of criminality. Evidently, then, the larger part of the "criminal class" are always at large. The occasional arrest or conviction of a murderer does not greatly reduce the number of men of homicidal proclivities.

The treatment of crime should obviously follow the analogy of methods of modern medicine. Modern medicine is the art, not merely of combatting disease after it appears, but of going back to its causes and preventing it. The only security against crime is likewise in forestalling it. It proceeds, as disease does, from bad and abnormal social and economic conditions. The problem of crime is the problem of imperfect democracy. It is the survival of animal and barbarous habits, of ignorance and prejudice. It thrives in the dark. It rises like the death rate, whenever the spirit of war is abroad in the world. It gives way before enlightenment, the growth of humanity, the prevalence of more just and tolerable conditions of life, comfortable homes, well-lighted streets. It cannot bear publicity. Schoolhouses and churches, social clubs and benefit orders, are so

many safeguards against crime. Whatever socializes men and binds them together more closely prevents crime. If democracy is the spirit of coöperation, the more democratic people become the less is crime possible. In normal social relations no man is easily tempted to crime.

In the cautious report of the Committee of Fifty on the liquor problem, it appears that intemperance is at least one of the causes of crime in almost fifty per cent of the cases investigated in behalf of the committee. Society stretches lines of saloons in almost every town to tempt men through their social instincts as well as their appetites, and then builds jails to confine its criminals. Society, scared by the natural results of its conduct, presently passes hasty laws to close its saloons, without making the slightest provision to satisfy those healthy social instincts to which the saloon caters. How can we expect immunity from social disease as long as we look with comparative indifference upon the herding of multitudes of human beings in unhygienic homes and without uplifting forms of recreation and social enjoyment? There can be no security from crime while children are ill born and ill brought up, stunted and starved in body and soul.

The second aim in the treatment of crime is to warn and deter individuals of weak morals and will from the commission of crime. This for the sake of the individual and also for the security of society. The trouble with the old system of criminal jurisprudence was its utter want of sympathy. The treatment prescribed by the law was often such as to challenge the cunning, the daring, and the wilfulness of the wrong-doer. There has never been so much crime as when society has tried the experiment of publishing savage warnings to frighten men from the commission of crime. It is human nature to be both tempted and provoked by a threat, especially the threat of an alien power, of a superior class, or of an unsympathetic majority.

We do not deny the wholesome use of warnings and deterrents. No thief or highwayman asks society to stand by passive, and see murders committed, trains derailed, or houses robbed and burned. The trouble with our present penalties and warnings is that too many men do not yet recognize the nature of the legislation of their own country. They think the laws are made by others and against themselves. Or they suspect, sometimes with a ray of justice, that the laws are intended to protect those who have got more

than rightly belongs to them. The sight of a single millionaire swindler takes the sting out of the penalty of the petty rogue brought into the police court.

Effective penalties are not mere arbitrary rules. They are rather the natural results of unsocial acts. They are such as the ordinary conscience and judgment tend instinctively to approve. Thus, it is obvious that the man who cannot keep the peace, or curb his passions when at large, must be restrained, as we would restrain a savage dog. But do not call this "punishment." For punishment is a dangerous word in a democracy, implying a subtle assumption of superiority in those who inflict it over those who suffer it. It bars sympathy; it carries the idea of retaliation.

The most effective of all natural deterrents against crime probably lies in men's sense of shame and social disgrace. Few men are so insensitive as to bear up against the firm and serious disapprobation of their fellows and especially the disapproval of their own social group. The worst effect of herding wrong-doers together in jails, and crowding them down into an outcast class by themselves in the dark alleys of great towns, is that they are enabled to give one another social coun-

tenance and to set up heroes of villainy. In a truly democratic society, where no submerged tenth suffered the pressure of alienation from their more fortunate neighbors, no evil-doer could think himself a hero.

The question of the use of the death penalty meets us here. We are not prepared to deny that society in the necessary use of force, to restrain the animalism or the insanity of eccentric individuals, might go so far as to take life. The best men and women are always willing to give their lives for the sake of defending or purchasing human welfare. To say nothing of war, in the experiments of science, in discovery and exploration, in a thousand factories and mines, men die daily. If the good must die, on occasion, that the community may live, surely the criminal must die, if this is shown to be for the good of society. The burden of the proof, however, is upon those who would compel us to maintain an obsolescent and barbarous custom of punishment. Does the death penalty effectually warn brutal men and protect society from revolting crimes? There is no proof whatever of this. On the contrary, the mitigation of penalties has generally coincided with the diminution of crime. Society to-day is as safe, other

things being equal, in the states that have abolished the death penalty as in those states that retain it. In fact homicide is not the basest form of crime. It is probable that most men who have been convicted of murder would never, even if they were at large, commit murder again. As long as professing Christians are quite willing to contemplate war, that is, killing men on a large scale, it will be impossible to impose a serious respect for human life by the mere arbitrary device of the death penalty. Indeed, in a world that clings to the barbarity of war, there must always remain peculiar risks of life and property.

The real issue as regards the use of deterrent penalties is not a question of sentiment, but of humanity. How can you bring to bear upon weak human nature the most effective and persuasive influences to safeguard the public and to stiffen the individual will? Severity may be kindness. But it is essential that the treatment shall carry the touch of sympathy and not mere impatience, disgust, and hate. A democracy can never afford to forget that its wrong-doers at the worst are men, to be treated and persuaded as men.

It follows that the third and chief aim to be pursued in treating crime is to cure and save the

man who is found guilty. If you save the man and make him a good citizen, you have taken the most effective means of protecting the public. The worst count against our present criminal system is that it rarely leaves the man treated by it any better. Society takes on itself a fearful responsibility, if for its own protection it locks men away from their fellows and then returns them worse in every way than they were before. There is reason to believe that even the most progressive states are still doing this mischievous work on a vast scale with scores of thousands of men and women.

I have referred in another connection to certain illustrious object-lessons showing what effective curative influences may be brought to bear upon the most unfortunate men and women to change them into decent citizens. The states of New York and Massachusetts, for example, have established reformatories which are working out the most difficult of social problems with marked results. It has been sufficiently demonstrated that, with time and money enough, wise direction, and especially the democratic and friendly spirit, moral recovery can hardly in the worst cases be called impossible. In other words, there is demanded

for the cure of the criminal something of the same hospital treatment, firm, kindly, intelligent, as the state and the city now give to the diseased and the insane.

The hopefulness of the curative method is specially pertinent to the care of young offenders. They are usually the victims of evil social circumstances. They are probably not worse in nature than other boys and girls. Most interesting and encouraging experiments have been made, as, for example, at Denver, Colorado, through the establishment of a children's court presided over by a judge who knows how to handle boys. A system of probation is also on trial in Massachusetts and other states, through which a friendly officer follows the course of the youthful probationer and seeks to keep him out of danger. The states are only beginning to understand that the use of curative influences is as sure in the realm of conduct, upon weak or wayward youth, as similar agencies are effective in the healing of weak throats and lungs.

The curative treatment of crime is likely to be also the most deterrent to the criminal. We have treated the robber and the burglar as if he were a dangerous enemy of the state. We have adver-

tised his doings as important. We have even fostered his self-esteem and vanity. We propose now to treat him as if he were sick,—not stronger than other men, but weaker, a subject of pity, needing the care of the hospital. We should give him the least publicity possible. We propose to keep him in confinement, not till he has worked off the arbitrary sentence of a court, but till he is ready to earn his honest living like ordinary men. The idler, the shirk, the tramp, the criminal, will be intimidated by nothing so much as by this rigorous but kindly system of overcoming his wilfulness and his conceit by the development of his own manhood.

Moreover, as soon as society undertakes to treat a man for his own good and not as the object of public enmity, the best self in the man is instinctively compelled to consent to the treatment. The patient does not wish to go to the hospital, but he knows that he ought to go. He does not wish to live on gruel or to take exercise, but his intelligence submits to the decree of the doctor, where the same man would resent the command of the jailer.

Certain important considerations at once follow. It is evident that wrong-doers ought to be classified

and distinguished from one another, and given treatment according to their varying character. We now imprison men for whose restraint there is no need and whom the jail hurts; and we lock up and presently discharge thousands of hardened and erratic characters who distinctly ought to be kept out of the way of doing mischief. We could probably afford to close a large number of our jails, if we would use the rest, precisely as we use our insane asylums, as places of detention with various grades of severity for patients who cannot be trusted at large.

Our methods of treatment ought to be fitted to the nature of the offence. We are apt to confound crimes against property with crimes against persons. It has been a salutary reform in the law that creditors can no longer imprison their debtors. The community is rendered hardly safer by sending a tiny proportion of its cheats and defaulters behind prison bars. The natural punishment of a cheat is not imprisonment, as if he were a dangerous man, but simply to publish him as unworthy of credit. There is no need to send the dishonest grocer, or milkman, or liquor dealer to jail. Mark his shop or his wagon with the established fact that he cheats or adulterates his goods. Keep the

mark of his dubious character as long as he deserves such a character. Neither can we see why an unskilful, cowardly, or disobedient engineer or pilot requires further penalty for his default of duty than to be pointed at as the man who has wrecked a train or sunk a ship.

Another point needs to be fixed. The treatment of men who are discharged from imprisonment has usually been an outrage. Society arrests a man and breaks his ordinary relations, perhaps confines him at hard labor, and then later casts him out of doors with little or no provision for his necessities. Patients thus thrown out of the hospital upon the streets would be expected to suffer a relapse. No wonder that crime becomes chronic in the case of men to whom all doors except those leading downward are shut in their faces. It is said that the wrong-doer deserves nothing better. Who knows how much any of us would get on the ground of mere deserts? We do not aim in a democracy at bare justice, but at something infinitely higher — the welfare of all kinds of men. We must not only give men wholesome work while we confine them; we must teach them how to do such work as the world is willing to pay for; we must also give them some reward for their labor,

to be paid them when they go out from confinement ; and we must take pains to help them find honest occupation and decent friends, so as to make valid connection again with the vital forces of society. Otherwise, we neither save the man nor protect society.

Moreover, it is to be feared that many strangers fall into the criminal class through the misfortune of their ignorance. Modern society has made new crimes and misdemeanors which earlier men never heard of. Who has ever told the Chinese laundrymen that it is a sin to play for money, in a city where millions of dollars change hands every day on the stock exchange ? Ought not a democratic people to take special pains to publish, and even to explain and justify, new laws or rules, and perhaps to give a considerable time of preparation before fines and penalties are enforced ?

Again, it is doubtful how far public morals are furthered by reforming legislation that is distinctly in advance of the thoughts and the habits of the average population, — legislation, for example, in favor of purity, or temperance, or against gambling. It is a dangerous and anomalous condition when a mere section or a majority of a community, undertake to treat a considerable protesting

minority with fines and penalties as lawbreakers. This is not democratic government, for it lacks the elements of sympathy and coöperation. It is certain to be carried out with harshness and arrogance, or else the laws themselves fall into desuetude.

To sum up our argument, we have to consider the penal system with its courts and its houses of detention in the light of a moral health department. The wise magistrate, like the wise physician, will send as few patients as possible to the confinement of the hospital, for only the few need drugs and surgery. The hospital will also discharge its patients as soon as possible and set them about their work. On the other hand, the pest-house will be in reserve for the extreme case of those — the most pitiable of all — who are judged to be beyond cure, or whose presence in society is clearly shown to be an intolerable infection, like the plague or smallpox.

It follows that we shall require, not alone for judges, but also for sheriffs, constables, policemen, and wardens, a superior class of men to those who have hitherto mostly served the older penal sys-

- tem. It has been deemed enough at best to have just officers to represent the majesty of the law.

It has been uncommon if in any good sense the wrong-doer regarded them as his friends. He has more likely thought them his sworn enemies. But we shall expect these officers in the future to be men of more than usual humanity, in fact, the type of men who make the best physicians or ministers. Men will be specially educated to seek and take these places. The most hardened criminal will discover that these officers are his friends — not sent to hunt him down like a brute, least of all to torture and degrade him, but to help him if possible to make a man of himself. There can be no other form of penal system fitting to a democracy. The officers of the law must come to represent not the ill will, but the good will of the community, not the interests of property, but of mankind. While in an inchoate state of society, anomalous and exceptional moral conditions may excuse the use of force and constraint, the spirit and the principles of democracy bid us use as little force as possible, and for the shortest possible time. The presumption of democracy is against restraint and compulsion. The presumption is to treat men as well, and not to treat them as sick. There must be overpowering reasons, to which in gen-

eral the sick or the unfortunate would themselves consent, before they can be subjected to any form of public duress. As soon as this rule is obeyed in any state, the problem of the criminal class will cease to present serious difficulty.

Finally, the state, like the individual, must be willing to forgive injury. This is almost a new doctrine in the world, but it proceeds from the consideration of the idea of reasonable democracy. Let the worst criminal show that he has come to his manhood, and we have no wish or need to segregate him from others. Give him reasonable probation, and let his past be put behind him. In fine, we treat him as we treat the insane who appear to have recovered their sanity; with proper caution, indeed, but with the hope of permanent cure.

XIII

THE PROBLEM OF PAUPERISM

How large a proportion of people are supported in whole or in part by the labor of all the others? Without counting children, the number of those at any given time who for various reasons are doing nothing and earning nothing is very large. There is always, except perhaps in an extraordinary season, a host of men temporarily out of employment. Every trade or profession has its considerable fringe of members who get barely enough work in a year to make a living. One condition of a sufficient supply of workmen in a busy time is that in dull times many have nothing to do. Ill health and low vitality, want of skill or good sense, illiteracy, intemperance, or other bad habits, untidiness and slovenliness, sheer laziness, a sullen temper or disagreeable manners, — all contribute reasons enough why many men are always "out of a job." Thousands of men travel up and down through the country as "tramps" and too often fall into crime.

The number is also large who have been incapacitated from work, at least for a time, by reason of accidents. Thus, the list of annual casualties among railway employees reminds one of the losses of a terrific battle. This is a part of the price we pay for living in an age of machinery.

Moreover, the burden of old age tends to press upon modern workmen earlier than in the plodding times of our forefathers. Few elderly men are found in machine shops and factories. The rapid change of methods and processes and the invention of new machines dislocate the older men from their places, who do not easily adjust themselves to new requirements.

Again, the growing wealth, comfort, and kindness of the world, aided by modern medical science, enable a multitude of weakly people to survive to old age, who in a more strenuous or barbarous period would have hardly passed beyond infancy.

The opening of all sorts of industrial opportunities to the competition of women, while perfectly fair, involves a certain displacement of men. While some women have gained independence, other women are rendered more dependent than

before. A good many are unable to keep up with the pace of the industrial machinery and fall behind to be supported by others. The period of marriage is deferred; the risks of married life and its high scale of cost deter men and women from entering it.

Thus all who work carry, as it were, upon their backs, almost as in the days of militarism, an army of those who either will not or cannot work. Many complain that this condition is owing to the present free or "competitive" system of industry. It would be more accurate to recognize that pauperism, like many other diseases, marks a lack of health or virility in the social body. Organize the world to-morrow into a socialist state, and you will have to consider, as now, how best to help those who seem to need more than they can give in return. There will still be those who lack the skill, the health, the power, or the will to work. You will have to continue the eternal labor of education and of moral discipline.

It is not altogether easy to define pauperism. It is the name of a social disease, but no one can distinguish the line where poverty passes over into actual helplessness. Pauperism is a

name of disgrace, but the more we know of the conditions through which men and women sink into pauperism, the harder it is to cast blame upon them. So far as we venture to blame people, it is not because they are poor and need help. There are a host of people, the feeble in body, the aged, invalids, whom society is more than willing to help, whose patience and gentleness, whose friendly smiles and good temper, constitute a benediction upon all who see them. We never blame those who do as well as they can. Those rarely are useless who wish to be useful. We blame only those who are willing to be useless, who like to be carried by the labor of others, who imagine that the world owes them a living. But we blame such as these even if they are rich. We cannot really be very hard upon the tramp who eats at the kitchen door, if we who feed him and then try to get rid of him are living out of what other men have produced, without giving any equivalent service in return.

It is evident that society, that is, all of us, are already supporting the needy, both the deserving and the undeserving. We support them mostly through personal channels, as well as by

means of public relief. We do this work with some loss and waste and more or less actual hardship. Can we do it in any other way better than we do it now? How far is it right to intervene by process of law or by force, if necessary—as we do in the case of the health department—to save the unfortunate from their own faults, to break up families on occasions, or to forbid marriage between distinctly unsuitable parties?

These questions cannot be answered so easily for great cities as they might have been answered for rural or village communities. For multitudes to-day suffer from fluctuating industrial conditions for which all society is responsible,—conditions inseparably involved as incidental to various processes of development through which society is passing. For many of these processes, as, for example, from rural to urban life, no one can be held to blame.

There is a tendency to throw the relief of the poor more and more upon the state. Let the state arrange and supervise a system of accident insurance as in Germany. Let the state assume a vast system of old-age pensions. Let it stand ready to provide every one with employment. Let

it, therefore, take over at least the principal industries so as to have plenty of work at all times to distribute. Seeing that society already doubtless spends hundreds of millions of dollars in relieving the necessities of those who cannot work, why not assume this same burden once for all as a part of the regular task of the state?

On the other hand, it is rather remarkable, when we count the millions of our populations, how far we are already learning voluntarily to coöperate in a thousand very natural and humane methods to relieve one another's distress, and how well on the whole we succeed. There were never before so many benefit orders and mutual insurance societies; there were never such colossal schemes for pensioning, for example, railway employees; there was never so much wise and helpful private aid bestowed,—I do not mean by the rich to the poor, but by relatives and neighbors to one another, by the poor to their fellows.

What men fail to see is that all this effort is a constant discipline in sympathy and humanity. The world grows more generous by the daily exercise of its friendliness. This costs time and money and constitutes what men call "sacrifice."

Could as fine results in civilization come in any other way? Is it not better that the son should care for his aged mother than that she should merely draw a public pension and take care of herself? Is it not essential that help rendered to relieve human infirmities should carry the personal touch, as given by some kinsman or friend, rather than go under the stamp of an official?

Moreover, an important part of the upward movement of society is in learning values. This is also a costly discipline, which can never be had for nothing. Does the parent lazily give his child whatever he desires? Or does he pay the child for trifling services and errands more than the work is worth? The child never learns the values of money, or in other words, of labor and skill, by easy gifts or fictitious wages. He must actually see the worth of his work as compared with the scale of standards by which human labor is generally rated. So long as the child does not do enough to earn the cost of his living he needs to know the truth. So in the case of men generally. It is not good for a man to be paid, under the name of wages, more than his work is worth. If we give men pensions, the pensions ought distinctly to be earned. If employment is to be fur-

nished to men out of work, the demand of manly self-respect is that such work shall not cost more to the public than it brings in.

It is notorious that in an army there is a percentage of men who add nothing to the efficient or fighting force, and who cost more than they are worth. So, unfortunately, in every department of industry there are those who fall below the mark of profitable efficiency. Does not any scheme for the relief of this class rest upon a falsehood, if it proposes to pay even a "minimum wage" in excess of the value rendered to society? If I am a bricklayer and fail to lay bricks enough in a day to make good what I cost, ought I not to know the truth about my work? If my farming is so negligent that I cannot live upon my product, ought not the kindly help of my neighbors, made necessary by my failure, to serve as a spur to my energy to learn to farm my land more effectively? It seems clear that in any just scheme of society the distinction must be maintained between the work that is worth paying for and the work that does not pay for itself, or is only educative, or serves at best as a test of honesty and good will.

America has learned a very costly lesson as to the peril of a national system of pensions. The

very men who began their relation to the general government on the side of patriotic service in the Civil War, presently developed an enormous hunger for public aid. Congresses and presidents proved to be powerless to resist the increasing demands of an organized pensionary class, who a generation after the war still require from the taxation of all the people a sum as large as the German empire lavishes upon its gigantic military establishment.

Moreover, no governmental system of pensions reaches the real paupers, that is, those who are content to live upon the labor of others. Since laziness or selfishness survives from savage times, it seems likely that for a long period the world will have to contend and to bear with pauperism, as we must fight and endure disease. The two problems are of a similar nature. No outward scheme of organization will more than shift the burden of cost. While the spirit of democracy urges endless sympathy, it can never suffer us to shut our eyes to the facts of life and the stern but kindly laws that guide the growth of society.

On the other hand, we may well hope to develop out of various interesting experiments, now under

trial, a real and considerable amelioration of the evils of pauperism. We are coming to recognize that it is a matter of common concern that the men who serve in ten thousand posts of danger shall not suffer accidents and disease alone and unaided. We are responsible together for the conditions under which a large part of the labor of the world goes on. If we had better not guarantee state pay and state relief to every one, we are bound to take the more care (perhaps, with the aid of legislation) that the field of industry shall be practically covered with a sufficient network of various forms of insurance societies. Seeing that the public is a party to the use of labor, in all public service enterprises, the German method of supplementing other sources of insurance and pension income by governmental grants is suggestive. We who ride in the trains on which brakemen and engineers are injured, may be justly asked to contribute along with their associates and the owners of the railways to help protect them against distress. We, too, owe them something. If the railways sometime become the property of the people, this duty will be the more obvious. It will also in that case bring its risks of extravagance.

Again, society is growing rich in its corporate capacity. Already an increasing amount of value in lands, buildings, and equipments belongs to the people as shareholders in municipal, state, and national enterprise. Unfortunately this value is largely overbalanced by our wasteful habit of public debts, lent and owned by the few and paid by the many. Under a just system of taxation, this indebtedness must at last be wiped out, and the people will become the owners in full of all public property.

Without entering here upon subjects in dispute, it must be evident that large domains of wild and forest land, mines, franchises, and other natural resources ought never to have been alienated from the people. It might be granted also that the lands on which cities have grown up ought properly to have been made the sources of public income and not the means of enriching a few promoters and speculators, a privileged class. It is not too much to hope that what ought never to have gone from the hands of all the people will some day be recovered for the use of the people. The experience of the Swiss people is encouraging on this point.

It never pauperizes a people to own and

manage a certain amount of public property. The slums which breed disease and vice in our great cities would soon disappear if the increase of the wealth in the land, which now goes to a small portion of their people, were made to flow to all the inhabitants upon whose joint labor and prosperity the value of land doubtless rests.

May not the lovers of democracy justly look forward to a time when every self-respecting family shall inherit, as its birthright, out of the growing public wealth of the nation, at least as much as the use, rent-free, of its home? That the well-to-do shall inherit as much as the value of a house to live in, we accept as a matter of course. But why should we not assume as much as this for all honorable citizens? The control of the home is almost the essential condition of good citizenship. The truth is, that we have come into the use of a world which through generations the labor of the ancestors of practically all of us have toiled, suffered, and shared in preparing and enriching. It seems only reasonable that to a certain extent all citizens should be recognized as the heirs of this wealth. Provided with a decent home, as the common right of the family, few people would any longer suffer the condi-

tions which now reduce so many to pauperism. The democracy can never be content to contemplate a great houseless, proletariat class. The democracy can never comfortably face the question why, in a world fast growing rich, only the few should possess all and the many should inherit nothing to keep them from hunger and cold. May it not indeed be a condition of safeguarding the proper rights of private property to take steps to resume in behalf of all the people that considerable proportion of wealth which ought always to go down from generation to generation as the property of the people?

XIV

MAJORITY RULE

IT is a pity that, when citizens meet together to vote, they still carry over into the working of the democracy the traditions of a military or savage régime. We repudiate the idea that the democracy is a brute "tug of war" between antagonistic crowds. The fundamental thought is mutual understanding, conciliation, and common effort. Nevertheless, issues arise when, after all persuasion, votes must be taken and decisions must be recorded. What shall we then do with the unwilling minority? The answer to this question depends upon how much of the democratic spirit we possess. The democratic theory is, that the ruling majority are seeking the welfare of the whole people, not of the majority alone; that they will not therefore act without proper discussion, or without giving opportunity to hear all sides of a question and to listen to the possible protests of individual citizens.

Men used to say, "The king can do no wrong."

We know that the majority of a people may be as fallible and even perhaps as wilful as the king used to be. Hence the more care is needed, especially wherever a minority is large and intelligent, not to do in the assumed name of all the people what may really be unjust to many of them, and possibly, in the long run, to all. The theory of kingship, at its best, always was that the king was the trustee for the interests of the people. The theory of democracy is likewise that the ruling majority acts for the whole people, not like a bad king, to compel its own will or to serve its selfish interests.

The determination of questions by the vote of a majority is simply a matter of convenience, for want of any better or more accurate machinery of choice. There is nothing in itself sacred in this method. The community, the city, or the state is confronted by practical problems. Shall we build a bridge? Shall we make a toll-road free? Shall we introduce water or erect a schoolhouse? Shall we borrow money? How shall we raise our common revenue for needful public expenses? Shall the nation sell its public lands? Shall the nation take the control of railways? Shall we restrict the natural rights of all the people to buy certain goods where they please, in order to help individ-

uals build up new industries, for the assumed advantage of the nation? Such questions as these by the dozen challenge the people of a progressive modern community.

Modern society cannot sit still. It must decide and move, or else wait and perhaps suffer by delay. The tacit agreement therefore, sanctioned by long usage, is that what the majority vote, after due deliberation, shall be taken as the sense of the whole people. The minority will behave as they would wish the others to do if the situation were reversed. Otherwise, what possible action could be taken by the community? In general we all agree to this method of decision. It is the best we know.¹

There are certain important limitations which mankind has already learned with respect to the theory of majority rule. New limitations are already in sight. We have learned, for example, that no majority may ever enforce upon even the few their religious or other opinions. The welfare of society demands that thought shall be free.

¹ The old Greek system of election by lot, preposterous as it may seem, was quite as democratic and just as our elections generally are. It worked to secure at least a few men who were quite free to serve the interests of the city.

Religion especially demands liberty. Modern men have no respect for a religion that cannot face the light. Our fathers did not see this. They were ready to exile or punish men for their opinions. It will be a sorrowful day if the world ever forgets the immense cost that our fathers have paid for our freedom of thought and opinion.

We not only cannot compel our religion upon others, we cannot enforce the morality of a mere majority. It must be proved beyond question that an individual is doing injury to society, in order to warrant the majority in branding him as a criminal. Thus, the democracy cannot enforce Sunday laws, as in old times, on the ground of the supposed duty of "keeping the Sabbath"; for all men are not agreed in recognizing this duty. The Sunday laws are coming to represent merely a common social agreement to maintain one day in seven for the rest, the recreation, or the instruction of the people, as each sees fit to use the day.

The marriage laws likewise represent a long experience in the evolution of the family. Some of the people would like to make them stricter; others, little thinking of the social consequences, would suffer them to be relaxed. The general agreement touches what the vast majority of the

people believe to be for the common morality, for the protection of children, for the encouragement of a noble ideal of domestic life. The marriage and divorce laws of modern society must on the whole commend themselves, not to a bare majority, but to the whole people, as for the common advantage.

A considerable section of highly reputable American people hold that it is only a question of winning a majority, when they will enact universal prohibition of the manufacture, sale, and use of alcoholic beverages throughout the United States. Another eager section suppose that by a majority vote they could rightfully inaugurate national socialism. What a singular misunderstanding of the nature of a democratic régime! To compel sumptuary or socialist legislation upon an unwilling and reluctant minority would not be democracy, but a species of tyranny. Where is the freedom, or the fraternity, if you force the decree of your conscience or your theory of economics, any more than your religion, upon those who do not believe it?

The immediate danger is that hasty majorities will thoughtlessly throw away the liberty that has made popular government possible. Wit-

ness the action of the Congress of the United States. It has passed laws—a shame to civilization—which serve to prevent even educated Chinamen from coming to our shores. It has sought to forbid harmless men from bringing certain unpopular opinions into America. Witness the shameful Turner case! It has erected artificial barriers between ourselves and our excellent and friendly neighbors in Canada, to say nothing of the rest of the world. No mere majority ought ever to have the legal authority to enact measures of oppression, against the plain teaching of human experience.

It will be asked, “How shall any new standard of morality or of political advancement come at all, if we may not vote it in as soon as we get a majority for it?” Let it come, we reply, in the natural order of things, first, as an ideal seen by the few; next, as a principle of conduct winning its way because it is best; next by persuasion, example, and imitation, and by one step of fair trial at a time, for example, through local option; and last of all, through substantially general consent, by such acts of legislation as confirm the public will. What valid moral law is there to-day which does not rest upon the gen-

eral consent of the whole body of people? Thus, our boasted civilized law of monogamy long worked its way, without any legislation whatever, and survived and at last made legislation, not because it was weak and needed protection, but because it constituted the strongest and happiest type of family and nation. Legislation and legal force only confirm it,—somewhat as the stamp of the government mint gives currency to a piece of precious metal. But its value rests upon the general demand of the people.

We have seen that it is a purely arbitrary rule that a majority shall decide a public question in behalf of all the people. There are certain grave issues, such, for example, as a change in the state or national constitution, where we demand a two-thirds vote. We demand this in certain cases to override the veto of an executive by a legislature. We generally require the unanimous vote of a jury in its solemn condemnation of a criminal. The question arises whether, in fairness to all the people, we ought not to bring many other grave cases under the decision of a two-thirds, or even sometimes a three-fourths vote. Is it fair for a bare majority of the nation to force the whole people to sacrifice the natural

right of free trade? Ought the majority of the Congress of the United States to be empowered to plunge the nation into an offensive war, as in the late war with Spain? We earnestly question whether local option or other prohibitory laws ought not to require at least the vote of two-thirds of the citizens. This is because democratic government ought to be essentially coöperation.

So in the realm of industry and trade. It is unfair for a mere majority of a labor union to declare industrial war by a strike or a boycott. Neither have the owners of railroads or of coal mines the right to precipitate, by a majority vote of a directorate, untold losses on all the people of a nation, or to levy a tax at pleasure on all their property.

Unfortunately, we do not largely succeed as yet in the United States in enjoying even majority rule. Many citizens do not vote at all. Representatives to Congress and other public offices not unfrequently get their election by a small fraction of their constituents. The state of Mississippi affords astonishing figures to illustrate this. In that state, in 1904, less than one-sixth of the men of voting age actually voted for President.

Even Presidents have been elected by a minority of the votes of the people. Probably many a senator sits in Congress who could not retain his seat for a day if the people of his state were suffered to vote directly for or against him.

For most officers, we allow a bare plurality, sometimes a mere faction of a party, to elect our candidates. Measures of importance are enacted by the aid of representatives who have made log-rolling deals to vote for what they do not believe to be for the public good, in return for getting support for their own pet legislation. Their votes do not represent majority rule, but its defeat. At every popular election thousands of voters help to choose men whom they do not wish, who have practically put themselves up for office. How can any man ever be free to serve the people who has had to manœuvre or beg his way to an election?

It has been said that Great Britain is still substantially ruled by an oligarchy. The same may be said of America. The democracy at best has only a veto power in extreme crises. Too often the ring or the "boss" rules. A prominent Pennsylvanian said to a neighbor, "Every

man has a chance to become a boss, and this is what makes a democracy."

Various superficial expedients have been proposed for bringing out an actual vote of all the people. Thus it has become common to send carriages at the expense of the party treasuries, or worse yet, at the cost of scheming individuals, to convey voters to the polls. But we doubt whether any man's vote, who will not take the pains to convey himself to the polls, is a valid contribution to the public welfare or wisdom. Why should a man be given a free ride for his vote and not money also to pay for his time?

No less unpromising is the suggestion of fining non-voters, or in some way compelling their vote. Who wishes the public opinion of men who are driven like so many criminals to the polls by the fear of fines and penalties? If a citizen has no opinion or "choice," why should he be urged to say by his vote what cannot be true or useful? A great vote proves nothing of the success or the quality of a democracy.

It is no wonder, however, that voters take little interest in politics and hardly know on which side to throw their votes. While public business largely consists in advancing private and very

distant interests, while it concerns affairs in the Orient rather than domestic necessities, while it deals with intricate tariffs, while there is little room for intelligent choice between parties or candidates, many people will remain in doubt of what use it is to exercise the ballot. The people need to have some hope of usefulness. There are various questions upon which they should act directly, and not merely through legislatures. Propose genuine public business, propose it for the sake of the public good, show people how it concerns them, and they will instinctively come to take an interest in it. Let those who are without interest in the issues of an election abstain from voting if they like. Urgency should be expended first on the making of a more intelligent electorate rather than upon the marshalling of uninformed voters to the polls. The fact is, that the exigencies of a feverish partisanship and the use of patronage have created an abnormal demand for thoughtless voters. With the destruction of the spoils system this fictitious demand will subside.

It is unfortunate that in most elections the issues, even when real ones, are too complex to permit intelligent expression of opinion. Thus, in a recent

presidential election the issues of sound money and of an imperial policy were so confused that no one could show what his real wish was upon either subject. So also, in a late state election in Massachusetts, the voter was asked to choose a lieutenant-governor, not on his merits as a man or his fitness for office, but rather as a crude means of expressing an opinion in favor of a reciprocity treaty with Canada.

The extended use of the referendum will doubtless tend to put an end to such baffling anomalies in our system of ascertaining the will of the people. Real popular government will come only so far and so fast as it is possible for the voter to make his vote effective and to be hopeful of results,—to hit the exact mark with it.

Important as valid majority rule may seem, in place of the rule of a few or of a part, there is one result even more important, namely, the harmonious rule of the whole body. This is not so futile an ideal as many may think. On most subjects of political action it is practicable to expect substantial unanimity of the mass of the citizens. They are largely unanimous now as regards a considerable number of their common concerns,—the generous support of the schools, the desire for

justice and fair play. Wherever a clean issue is intelligently presented to them, they tend to take the side of humanity. As they are better educated and obtain more worthy leaders, the subjects will increase in number upon which they will act with satisfaction together and at least be content with the verdict at the polls. This is the natural trend of civilization. For the proof of human progress is in the ability of men to act harmoniously together, as distinguished from the barbarous habit of feuds and factions. Multitudes already have learned to live and work together in our great cities with habitual order and good will. These multitudes are learning the same good will in the conduct of their elections. Their children in the public schools are daily learning to act together. The forces that urge men toward closer industrial and political coöperation are subtle, profound, and irresistible.

XV

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

THE democratic idea of government takes on a great and rather perilous modification when it has to be adjusted to the management of the interests of large populations. There are obviously only a few simple subjects which are suitable to be decided, as it were "off hand," by a vote of the mass of the people. Even when important lines of policy must be settled by the votes of the people, the determination of the methods of framing and carrying out the will of the people must naturally be intrusted to the hands of committees, selectmen, councils, and legislatures.

The theory of representative government is easy to state. The word "representative" suggests what ought to be done. The council, the legislature, or the congress should be in miniature what the people are in mass. The little body should reflect, as completely as may be, the political thoughts, opinions, sentiments, aspirations, and ideals which are most actively present in the

minds of the people. In other words, the legislative body should represent—not one section of the people or one mode of public opinion among them, but all sections and parties and modes of thought.

Suppose in any city or state there are those who favor public ownership of the railways, others who avow themselves to be socialists, others who want the public to own the railway tracks, but think it best for private corporations to run the cars, and others who hold to the system of private or corporate ownership and management of all such enterprises. The ideal council or legislature ought to reflect these varieties of opinion. It ought also to be sure to embody in itself the interests of farmers, working-men, professional men, merchants, and manufacturers,—in short, all classes and conditions of men.

A genuine representative body would thus be an example of what is called proportional representation. Every considerable element of popular movement would have a voice to express itself in the legislative assembly, precisely as every such element actually has a voice in the town-meeting or other popular assembly. Each active element in the political life of the people would have voices

and votes in proportion to the numbers, the weight, and the interest which it commanded. This is the only tenable theory of representative government.

When we say that a legislative body should represent the people, we do not mean that the representatives should be no better than the average of the citizenship who elect them. They ought of course to be selected men, above the average for honesty, discretion, and experience. Any child is able to see this. If the people really and freely chose their representatives, if candidates were obliged to wait till the people wanted them, instead of pushing their own election by unseemly urgency, the natural tendency would be to select good representatives. Here is the function of the aristocratic element in the democracy. Choose only the right kind of aristocrats, namely, the best of the people, who will give their skilled service for the sake of the people. Such are the Lincolns and the Gladstones!

There are two chief ends to be secured in representative government, as distinguished from the direct action of a pure democracy. The representative must truly represent the people who have chosen him. If they have elected him upon an issue of some proposed reform or public improve-

ment, or, as in the era of the Civil War, upon the question of the maintenance of the Union, the representative must evidently act and vote as the people who chose him substantially direct. If he changes his mind and wishes to vote on the other side of the question, he must resign or appeal to the people for instructions. From time to time and on certain simple issues, he is merely an instructed delegate.

But a representative is not merely an instructed delegate. There are many questions for the settlement of which the people practically require him to use time and special care, and possibly superior experience and wisdom, to help determine the public policy in their behalf. The many cannot profitably enter into those matters of detail that demand the discussion of various sides and aspects of a subject. They employ their representatives as they would employ a physician, a lawyer, or an expert business adviser.

The theory of representative government is that, when a legislature or congress has fairly debated a subject and then proceeds by a vote to adopt a method, a policy, a reform, a public outlay, this action shall stand, as if all the people had voted upon it. This is for the sake of proper effi-

cency and the expedition of business. In most cases, there is no reason against using this form of representative action, instead of the more cumbersome form of appeal to the people.

Unfortunately, our American representative system is singularly hampered by certain awkward and illiberal restrictions which tend to vitiate legislative action. Thus the American democracy is not as free as the English people in the breadth of its choice of strong and able men. The English constituency may elect the ablest men whom it can find, whether inside or outside the district. We Americans must limit ourselves to a choice from actual residents in a district. It is as if the people of a town forbade themselves to call in a doctor from the next town.

Another piece of bad and undemocratic machinery is to be found in the electoral district system. Each state is divided into a number of congressional districts in such a way as to make it not only possible but likely, that a single party will enjoy representation out of all proportion to its actual numbers. Missouri, for example, in the Fifty-eighth Congress had fifteen Democratic representatives and only one Republican. In the very year while this Congress was sitting the same state

cast a Republican majority for President. So evenly were parties balanced. The states of Connecticut and Vermont by this unfair system of electoral districts sent Republican representatives only to Congress. The same anomaly prevails in the smaller districts which choose the state legislatures. This is neither good democracy nor honest representative government. Evidently, no group of people whose numbers are sufficient to entitle them to a share of the representatives ought to be compelled to be represented by their political rivals. Neither ought respectable bodies of independent citizens to be deprived of all real representation. It is an affront to the intelligence of our people to suppose that this injustice cannot be corrected. Various practical forms of proportional representation are already in sight.

Our representative system loudly calls for reinforcement and enlargement by certain simple expedients which have had favorable trial in Switzerland and Australia, and also in some of our own states. A plebiscite for the alteration of the constitution of a state is already required. There are important issues that equally deserve to be especially remanded to the body of the people. It is true that such issues should be

simple and so stated as to require the vote of Yes or No. There are calls for special expenditure of money, the extension of the public credit, or the granting of franchises to corporations, which ought not to be decided by the few, but by an appeal to all. The appeal, or "referendum," to the intelligence, the conscience, and the public spirit of the people is a discipline in character. Moreover, a legislative body is likely to do better work if its members know that negligent or corrupt measures are liable to review and rebuke by special vote of the people.

Why should we all sit by and see a city council, a legislature, or a congress, itself the creation of the people, enact measures of dubious wisdom, or of threatened extravagance, while we are unable to make immediate and effective protest? In fact, if there were always perfect freedom of motion (whether with or without prescribed legal sanction) by which the people could express themselves at once in protest against hasty or careless legislative action, for instance, against the granting of a public franchise, or an extravagant appropriation, legislatures and city councils would always stand upon their good behavior.

Besides the referendum, already in limited use

in America, there is good reason for establishing the excellent Swiss system of the "initiative." The few promoters of favored interests confessedly exercise too much power. Why should not the many, as well as the few, be enabled to bring forward appropriate legislation for the consideration of all the people? A reasonable proportion of the voters ought at all times to be able, through appropriate political machinery, both to call an immediate halt upon questionable legislation, and also to set new measures before the people. Nothing less than this is democratic government. To deny this right is to distrust the people and to institute an oligarchy.

The weak side of popular government at present is in its legislative system. Faults charged to democracy ought in reason to be charged to legislatures and congresses. The fault is not so much with the common people who elect as it is with the men who are elected. The members of the higher representative bodies are apt to be fairly well educated and owners of property. A considerable proportion of them are lawyers. Nevertheless, these bodies are constantly passing measures of corruption and extravagance, to the injury of the plain people for whom all legisla-

tures are supposed to act. It is not the people of Philadelphia, or the people of the state of Illinois, who venally sell their public franchises at the behest of scheming corporations. This kind of work is not done by the illiterate or at their bidding. It is done by men of the well-to-do class, and with the quiet consent of the "best people." This is not the failure of democracy. The remedy is to appeal to the good sense and the conscience of the people. The legislative bodies instinctively avoid this kind of appeal.

Meanwhile, the tendency on the part of legislatures everywhere is to usurp the functions and the power of the people. Whereas, city councils, legislatures, and congresses are strictly the creation and the servants of the people, and their appropriate office is to help thresh out the cumbersome details of public affairs, and to give their leisure, care, and deliberation to proposed measures and laws,—in fact they tend to make themselves guardians and rulers of the people instead of trustees, counsellors, and stewards, for their benefit.

It cannot be too often emphasized that home rule, or the doctrine of local responsibility, is an essential principle of democratic government.

There is nothing so highly educative to a people as to make them directly responsible for ordering their own affairs. The legislators practically deny this principle. They like to keep business out of the hands of the people. They prefer to decide for them rather than to let them decide for themselves. They come actually to distrust the people who appoint them.

This tendency toward the usurpation of power is seen in an extreme form in the Senate of the United States. Men have notoriously come to buy their way into this body by the expenditure of fortunes. It is so far removed from the public that its tedious usages and its "senatorial courtesy" are openly permitted to block the way of public business. Its best men lack the courage to make it a really popular body. Who imagines that a resolution to require the election of the senators by the actual majority of the people of each state would carry the consent of the Senate? There are patriotic men in the Senate. Why are we obliged to distrust their sympathy in the case of so reasonable and democratic a proposition? We touch here one of the most profound problems now before the country. It will be the subject of a later chapter.

XVI

DEMOCRACY AND THE EXECUTIVE

OUR democratic machinery of government naturally carries with it the survival of various traditions and details of organization that properly belong to aristocratic forms of society. Thus the upper chamber in a legislature or congress is an obvious reminder of the ancient House of Lords. No one would think of instituting such an arrangement for the service of a democracy; and though its use may be defended as affording a sort of check upon hasty legislation, there are other modes far more congruous with the democratic idea, interposing delay upon too precipitate action.

It is, however, in the powers of the executive that we find the most important and perhaps the most dangerous survival of the ideas of the autocratic system of government. The pardoning power, for example, is frequently lodged in the hands of the executive. This was fitting in a monarchy, but such one-man power does not fit a democracy.

The veto power is another relic of the monarch-

ical system. It is doubtless often used to protect the interests of the people and to stay reckless legislation. It is defensible on the ground that the executive, under the democratic system of government, stands above every one else as the representative of the whole people. But the veto power is one-man power; its use tends to diminish the legitimate responsibility of legislators, who too often pass foolish laws under pressure of private or corrupt influence, in the hope that their bad legislation will suffer the veto of the executive. Strictly the veto power over unwise legislation should rest, under suitable provision, not with the executive,— himself the servant of the people,— but with the people themselves.

The executive also inherits the old monarchical command over the military forces of a state. Perhaps it would be difficult to show in whose hands this power could more wisely be placed. Nevertheless this sole power is incongruous with a democratic society, precisely as war itself is incongruous with all the dominant ideals of modern life. So far therefore as the President or the governor of a state is a captain-general, the fact represents an exceptional or anomalous function of his office. Every enlightened person must wish that the executive

may have no occasion to serve in this capacity. In fact, the executive is never chosen in the United States with reference to military experience.

Again, the executive has more or less power of appointment and removal of officials. Here is the evident survival of the theory of one-man power. In the case of the President of the United States, this power, though somewhat curtailed by civil service rules, is still enormous. The system of partisan patronage is built upon it. Few kings have at their disposal such gigantic means of expressing and carrying out their own will as the President still possesses through this power of appointment. To a certain limited extent the executive must be able to appoint or to remove his heads of departments for the sake of the best administrative efficiency. But beyond those officers for whom he is directly responsible or with whom he has personal relations, the exercise of authority to dispense executive favors, or again to withhold or take away official position, upon the vast scale of the public service of eighty or ninety millions of people, is wholly undemocratic.

Another survival of the royal prerogative is to be found in the treaty-making power which the Constitution of the United States vests in the

President and the Senate. The power to make war, though distinctly reserved to Congress, is subtly involved in the authority which the President holds as commander-in-chief, along with his influence over the action of the state department. We have seen this power to involve the nation in possible war grow by exercise. In President Cleveland's Venezuelan message with its implied threat, in the train of events which led to the Spanish War, in the case of the Boxer rebellion in China, in the setting up of the republic of Panama, in the proposed collection of debts in San Domingo, we see how quickly a word or an order of the President may involve the people of the United States in the most embarrassing, if not hostile, relations with another nation. It is at least a very grave question whether such royal responsibility, not simply for carrying out the decreed will of the people, but for initiating novel action, ought to be given in the name of democracy to a single man.

Again, the course of events since the Spanish War has carried the American people, without their ever having expressed their distinct approval, into the establishment of a very considerable colonial system, after the fashion of the rule of England in India. In this new sphere of action,

touching many millions of people, whose language he cannot speak, the President has been intrusted, beyond the scope of the Constitution, with the power of a monarch. President McKinley, as captain-general or imperator, actually carried on war to compel the unwilling people of the Philippine Islands to submit to his authority. Here was a war, at immense cost in blood and treasure, upon which Congress never voted to enter! It was a President's war. Could there be a more perilous extension of the power of the chief magistrate of a democratic people?

There can be no doubt that the executive should have sufficient power to do what the people actually direct. He should also report to the people, or to their representatives, such lines of action as may appear desirable for them to undertake. It may impress the popular imagination when the executive passes those strict limits of a popular servant, and plays the rôle of the prince, takes his own initiative, and "brings things to pass." It is enough to say that this is the reverse of the nature of popular government. Its picturesqueness conceals the eternal danger of all forms of one-man power. The most benevolent prince only breaks the path

upon which the foolish or arrogant self-will of smaller men presently travels toward injustice.

We have spoken as if the executive must always be a single person. We have inherited this idea from the age of princes. For certain purposes, as, for example, the mayoralty of a city, it may prove that one man is more efficient than an executive board or council. We are told that the management of a city is largely a business, which therefore demands centralized responsibility. But many of the most successful business enterprises are controlled by an executive board, whose president is one only among his equals. Even when the president of a great railway is the administrative head of the system, his powers are limited by his directors. Already the business world sees reason for alarm at the misuse of the vast forces of capital by the one-man power, whenever directors fail to direct. Witness the history of the Equitable Life Assurance Society.

Even in the management of the city the great departments, such as the police and the schools, are often as well directed by small boards or commissions as by a single head. Or, if there is a single man in command, as the superintend-

ent of schools, he acts under the control of the committee.

There is no condition short of the exigencies of war, itself a survival of barbarism, where one-man power seems to be essential in the service of a democracy. The Swiss, who have gone further and more successfully in the fulfilment of democracy than any other nation, govern their state admirably by a council of seven, of which the president is only the chairman. This form is certainly more congruous with the democratic idea than the headship of a single man, lifted by special prerogatives above the ranks of his fellows. There surely is no state government in the American Union which might not be as well managed after the Swiss system as by a single governor.

In the case of the government of the United States we may fairly affirm, with the teaching of history behind us, and with due respect to the men whom the nation chooses for its chief magistrates, that the average President cannot be expected to be at the same time so wise and good and large-minded as to be safely intrusted with the remarkable and enormous powers which have gradually fallen to the office. A truly modest

and democratic President would prefer to have these powers largely curtailed.

It may be said that the President is supposed to take the advice of his cabinet. But the men in the cabinet are themselves appointed by the President. It is as if the stockholders of a great railroad allowed their president to choose his own directors, whom he could dismiss at will if their counsel was distasteful to him. Thus in the administration of the most elaborate and expensive public business in the world, we set our President in a position of isolation such as no intelligent body of men would allow in any other great enterprise. This is because our forefathers, in ordering our government, took over the traditions of royal and military authority.

We do not urge these considerations on the ground of the Old World fear of tyranny. No one, we may hope, needs seriously to fear that a President of the United States will deliberately usurp power and oppress his own people. We are not afraid of Herods and Neros, Tamerlances and Napoleons. But we fear the action of small, weak, obstinate, and arrogant men, or bustling and impetuous characters, to whose hands too much power has been committed,—a Pilate too

eager to please the multitude, a stupid George III, a President Johnson puffed up with the sense of his own importance.

There was once thought to be cause for the apprehension of radical and precipitate action on the part of the people of a democracy. There is far greater cause of fear from the rash and ill-advised action of the executive. The people have allowed a strain of responsibility to accumulate upon the shoulders of their President too vast for any man to bear. The most benevolent and well-intentioned President may be led unconsciously to commit acts of arrogance and utter hasty words whose consequences upon the peace of the world and the welfare of his people no man can measure. The good democracy has no right to put its chief magistrate in the way of temptation.

XVII

THE PARTY SYSTEM

THE stranger who came to America, having read about our theory of government, would find that everything worked in practice differently from what he had expected. He would have read that this is a government for the people and by the people, that office is a public trust, that the office should seek the man and not the man the office. He would have read of the admirable theory that a grand electoral college, representing the people of all the states, should choose the executive of the nation, and that the President should be the servant of the whole people. He would find the same theory, as far as the provisions of the Constitution go, for the choice of senators and congressmen. He might imagine that they were elected as the best agents to be had for the public business of the people. He would not suppose that able and disinterested men, under our American system, could be practically ostracized from the service of the people,

as effectually as if they had been sent into exile.

Turning from the theory of American government to its actual practice, the stranger would find a gigantic and complicated system of party government never contemplated in the Constitution. He would find the people mainly divided into two great parties, each continually struggling either to hold, or to seize, the reins of power. He would find the beautiful scheme of the electoral college reduced to a sort of honorary vermiform appendage. He would discover that public officers were generally chosen, not so much for their ability and patriotism, as for their qualifications as good party men, and their "running power" to get votes. He would find public offices to an alarming extent regarded as the rewards, if not the spoils, of faithful partisan service. He would find some of the best men in every district doomed to private life, as if they belonged to a disfranchised class, for the fault of being independent of partisan allegiance,—in other words, for preferring the public good to party success. He would discover the recent growth of a system of laws whereby the government is made actually to take over the con-

trol, and even the expenses, of the party caucuses !

It has come to be a common opinion, especially in England and in the United States, that democratic government can be carried on only by the existence of two great permanent parties. This opinion is fostered by the enormous influence of the partisan press. The people are in danger of being hypnotized to the assumed necessity that every man must array himself as a loyal member of one or the other party,—the "ins" or the "outs," as if the getting and keeping the offices were the main end of all political action! Ostrogorsky, a very thoughtful Russian political writer, has recently done a valuable service in an important and voluminous book on the history and the failure of the party system. It is more correctly a treatise on the vice of partisanship. He shows that the party system has everywhere become exaggerated so as to be the enemy of good democracy. Democracy means all possible union. Partisanship divides men and emphasizes the importance of differences. Democracy means the utmost friendliness. Partisanship provokes hostility and intensifies men's egotism.

Let us briefly see how far the current party system may be necessary and useful. A slight reference to familiar history will make this plain. On the establishment of the government of the United States there were natural differences among the men who framed the Constitution. One set of men tended to favor a highly centralized form of government; the opposite party, shy of centralized authority, held that the government ought to meddle as little as possible in the business of individuals. One group believed in exalting the supremacy of the nation; the other believed in as much as possible of state rule and home rule. One party were prepared to believe that a state might withdraw from the Union; the other party were ready to maintain the Union as indivisible. The socialistic and the individualist or anarchical tendency is thus always swaying men one way or the other.

It was not, however, at first imagined that these two fundamental tendencies in human nature ought to be divorced from each other and differentiated into two opposing camps. No one dreamed that a President of a Federalist habit of thought might not work harmoniously with a Vice-President, or a Secretary of State, of the

Democratic tendency. The two kinds of thought naturally shade into each other. The same man might be on the side of centralized power in one issue, and on the side of home rule in another. Thus Jefferson, great Democrat as he was, had little hesitation in using almost dictatorial powers in the purchase of Louisiana. In fact, so far as the socialistic and individualistic habits of mind prevail, there is nothing to be gained, but much to be lost, by the sharp division of the people into two permanent parties, one of which only shall be suffered to manage the government, while the other party is kept in opposition. The need, on the contrary, is that the people shall be represented in the government by the ablest men of both divergent tendencies of thought, each modifying the other. A cabinet composed only of the friends of strong centralization will hardly be so wise, as if it were made up with the help of the men who tend to see the advantages of home rule and individual initiative.

The fathers of the American republic left an apple of discord in the household. It was the institution of slavery. Presently an abnormal line of cleavage showed itself among the people.

The Republican party took its rise in this tremendous issue. It was a combination of men organized to oppose slavery and to prevent its extension. It compelled a distinct realignment of political forces. For a few years definite measures of action were called for to which the Republican party was pledged, and which the Democratic party of that day only existed to oppose. Here was not an example of normal, but of quite exceptional and temporary, political effort. The spirit of war was in the house; men contended with each other, and almost forgot that the life of a democracy consists in co-operation and good will.

After a short period the Republican party had accomplished its purpose; slavery was overthrown; the nation was once more united. But the great party in its death struggle with slavery had built up a complex organization, like a machine, which ramified into every village. The opposing party, too, had paralleled the methods, the machinery, and the weapons of attack and defence, instituted by its rivals. Both parties went on by sheer momentum and force of habit. Neither party now had any special mission; neither rested on any foundation of settled principles, which plain people

could understand. There was no marked difference between them. There was only the old difference of tendency; the party which had fought the Civil War through on the whole favored a strong and centralized authority at Washington, able and willing to intervene to maintain order throughout the country, and inclined to make its power felt abroad. Colossal mercantile interests had learned to lean upon this strong centralized government in order to build up their manufactures and to protect their business. Democrats still tended, as in earlier days, mildly to deprecate the growth of wholesale and unprecedented national expenditure.

The old party names, however, continually sounded more hollow. They at last represent no actual differences. There is more real and honest difference between men in each party than between the two parties. The Democratic leaders, like their Republican rivals, mainly wish to exercise power and hold office. Neither party promises any great reform. The Democratic President Cleveland was as quick to send Federal troops into Illinois to intervene in a great railway strike, as President Roosevelt was to offer mediation in the coal strike of 1902. The same Democratic

President threw out a hasty menace of war with Great Britain in the Venezuelan affair. Both parties voted to fight with Spain. Both parties lavish the people's money on war ships. The men who furnish campaign funds for both parties are interested in the same monopolies and the same tariffs. Both parties are the survival of a condition which passed away with the settlement of the slavery question.

Much the same may be said of the history of the two great English parties. The almost revolutionary issues upon which the Liberal party came to the front no longer divide the people of Great Britain, or else they rise in new forms, to which the present parties were never organized to respond.

So much for the obvious fact of the decadence of the bi-party system. The fact is, it is not founded in any truth of human nature. Men are no more truly divided by nature into two political camps, as Tories and Liberals, as Democrats and Republicans, than they are divided morally into two permanent classes of the bad and good. Men are naturally of all shades of political opinion and tendency; they naturally break into groups; they form and re-form over new issues, and ought to

be free to settle every question on its merits, and not to use it as a football of party advantage.

See now the positive mischief which the party system works in the deterioration of good government and the real destruction of the rule of the people. In the first place, the ends for which each party now exists are fictitious, meaningless, or positively hurtful. Neither great party stirs the slightest sense of genuine chivalry or patriotism among its voters. The one intent is to keep the offices and to exclude the men of the opposite party. Grant freely that many good men are doubtless persuaded that the welfare of the country rests in the triumph of their own party. So much the more the misfortune, if it be thought possible that the shifting of a majority from one party name to the other will ruin the nation. To believe this is to distrust popular government. The party system itself is at fault, if the mere change of administration from the foremost men of one party to the foremost men of the other threatens the business of the country!

Moreover, the vast partisan machinery in vogue almost wholly takes away from the people the liberty of choice. They may not have such candidates as they please, but only such as the

machine offers them. The party organization, which was first intended merely for national purposes, has proceeded to seize upon every state and municipal government likewise. It is not enough to vote for a Republican or a Democratic congressman, but we must have partisan legislators and aldermen. The party machines fatten on city offices, educate the young voters to become spoils-men, and falsify the whole system of government at the fountain head.

Partisan government in each state capital hampers the free rule of the people of the cities and towns. It makes special laws interfering with their liberty. It requires New York or Boston or Chicago to go to the legislature for measures of reform or relief, which the people of the city ought to be enabled in their capacity as free men to vote for themselves. Each Republican legislature is jealous of the freedom of a Democratic city, and each Democratic city in a Republican state suspects the policy of its state government.

All legislative action becomes involved in partisan politics. Measures for the good of the people cannot be considered frankly on their merits, but as related in each case to the party interests, to the winning of a prospective election, to the put-

ting the opposite party "in a hole." Men are marshalled by the party whips to vote together, who do not honestly think together. Men are constrained by the caucus to approve legislation which they do not believe in. Not the majority, but a scheming minority, actually manages to rule.

The party system works injustice to honest minorities, to the extent of the practical disfranchisement of thousands of voters. Thus the Democrats of Maine and the Republicans of the Southern states have scarcely enjoyed the possibility of the exercise of political power for a generation. So with all smaller parties, which may on occasion offer some new political program, as, for example, the Prohibitionists, the Populists, the Socialists. So with independent citizens everywhere, who can sometimes only make their silent protest by withholding their vote from either one of "two evils."

As we have already seen, the real democracy needs the representation of all sorts and conditions of men. It wants to hear in its legislative halls the expression of the desires and the needs of all its citizens. No more weighty charge can be made against the two ruling parties than that, in as enlightened a state as Massachusetts, they will not

permit so much as the experiment of proportional representation. The party managers know that this fair and simple step in the direction of democracy, thus immediately allowing a multitude of disfranchised voters to regain their just share of political power, would be the death blow to the party "machine."

The need of a democracy is that it shall employ its best, wisest, and most public-spirited citizens. There are some such men in almost every community who are naturally fitted by their courage, their independence, and their humanity for admirable political service. There is always a legitimate "aristocratic" element within the true democracy. It is not an aristocracy of family, or birth, or wealth, or even education. It is open to the children of the poorest. It consists of the men and women who possess the gift of leadership. John Mitchell, for example, the head of the coal miners' union, is such a natural leader. The best democracy enjoys the service, the counsel, and the leadership of its best citizens. This is the true and perpetual meaning of "aristocracy," a word which means the rule or management of the best men. What good democrat, the man of the people, wishes inefficient, mediocre, and corrupt service? The

worst danger to democracy lies in the ignorance and apathy which rest content with scheming and selfish leadership.

The party system works subtly to degrade and deprave popular leadership. The question may almost never be asked: Who can best serve this constituency, that is, all the people in the city, or the district? Who can serve most ably the interests of the nation? The party question becomes: Who is the most available candidate to win the election? Who is the most active partisan? Availability may mean exceptional use of money, or it may mean an easy conscience, a readiness to make compromises, and an unscrupulous freedom to change one's political principles to order. The successful party leader must consent to eat his "peck of dirt." "Yes," as one of them said to his neighbor, "I will eat a bushel if necessary." Partisan success is to capture votes, whereas real political success is to add to the common welfare.

The mischief is not merely that able and courageous men, who will stoop to eat no dirt, who will bend the knee to no ringster or "boss" or plotting corporation, are set aside from public service. The worst mischief is that the youth are trained to false public standards. They are taught not to

act as free men, but to truckle and sell their souls. The party management, by creating an unworthy demand, tends to develop the wrong type of supply. The party system thus boldly strikes at, or subtly poisons, our public education. Partisanship has even invaded the common school system, has reduced the high office of teacher to the level of patronage, and levied political assessments upon the small salaries of its educators.

The rich and the educated are in the habit of obtaining the services of lawyers, physicians, architects, and artists, wherever these happen to reside. Intelligent people are bound to have the best of everything. The people ought to have the same freedom to find their public advisers and servants, and specially their legislators. The people of Great Britain have reserved this inestimable privilege. Any constituency in the United Kingdom may elect a John Bright or a John Burns, as long as he lives in the empire. It is no matter in what little German town an able mayor resides; Hamburg or Berlin may choose him, if either likes. The American partisan system has practically abrogated this natural right of the people. Under the name of a false democracy, the local politicians of the party in power divide among themselves, with-

out regard to fitness, those offices on the thorough administration of which the public welfare depends. In no constituency are we allowed to seek a man of national reputation or ability to represent us in Congress, unless he resides in our district. The ablest men in the country largely reside in cities; the country districts suffer correspondingly by this steady drain away from them of their young men, whom they cannot, under the party system, employ in their highest public service.

We have in the United States an excessive number of elective offices and a needless frequency of elections. The partisan system complicates and exaggerates this evil. The printed ballot in many cases is merely a baffling list of names of unknown persons. No reasonable choice is possible to voters who must pass upon the merits of scores of candidates.

It is no part of the democratic theory that all officers must be directly chosen by the people. A method suitable for a small township, where all the citizens know one another, may be eminently unsuitable to the needs of a great city or a state. The spirit of the democracy merely requires that the people shall be able to secure

efficient service, and promptly to dismiss negligent public servants. For this end a large proportion of the offices should evidently be filled by appointment; through properly safeguarded civil-service methods. As soon as we learn to rid ourselves of the bondage of partisanship, every election will be a practical command on the part of the people to their higher officials to choose their assistants in the interest of all, and not of a part.

The essential condition of wise and considerate public conduct is free discussion in open public meeting. The town government at its best forced upon all the people attention to their common business. The people of a city ought to discuss together their common concerns no less than the citizens of a town. The party system has acted largely to render this method of open discussion impossible. The voters of the rival parties rarely meet to discuss the questions at issue before them. They are marshalled into separate caucuses; public discussion has mostly ceased; many men hear their own partisan leaders and no others; they read only their own partisan papers. The need in a democratic system is that all kinds and conditions of men should meet and know one another's thought, discover their common bonds

of sympathy, and recognize their community of business interests. We shall never solve the problem of the democratic government of our cities till we learn to meet, not as partisans, but as fellow-citizens, by wards or by precincts of wards, after the fashion of the "town-meeting," to discuss our common interests. What could be more reasonable or humane or democratic than this simple proposition?

The party system ties the hands of the bravest President who could be elected under it. The President must take nominations for important offices from infamous machine politicians. Washington or Jefferson could be the President of the whole people. But the party system makes Mr. Roosevelt the President of the party of the protective tariff.

We have called attention to the vast and centralized power which is vested in the hands of the President of the United States. The party system worked to make this vast extension of authority possible. The calmer opinion and sentiment of the people lacked clear and independent expression in the houses of Congress. So patriotic a senator as George F. Hoar was not quite free to disregard party interests and represent the

welfare of the whole people. Thus in the highest places the party caucus, with its standing menace against individual liberty, compels men against their judgment to "back" the acts of the party chief in the White House.

The party system works in every direction to create and intensify needless antagonisms among men who ought to act together. The difference of opinion between men upon the party question of a protective tariff hardly touches more than a point in most men's lives. This prominent partisan issue is hardly a vital question at all with millions of Americans. Yet it is used as a leverage to separate men permanently into hostile and suspicious camps. The partisan spirit always thus draws its artificial lines of cleavage between men who have otherwise no natural reasons to quarrel or oppose each other. The spirit of democracy, as we have seen, is essentially union, good will, and coöperation. The first party question is: How can we beat the other party? This is the survival of barbarism. The first democratic question is: How can we best act together for our common welfare? The common interests in which all citizens need wise counsel and admirable service are generally ten times more

important than any sectional or partisan interests which divide them. The party system subordinates these common interests to the minor concerns of a minority or a faction. The people who go to the national government for assistance to their schemes already enjoy an immoderate share of public legislation. While the party platform may seem to threaten the "trusts," yet the men behind the trusts, with their powerful attorneys and lobbies, shape and interpret the action of the government.

It may be asked: What else would you have if the two great time-honored parties were to disappear? Would not other parties at once take their vacant place? The fact is, that there are various issues and vital interests before a modern nation. These issues do not naturally arrange themselves under two heads. They fall into groups. Some of the people want changes or reform in the tariff. Some wish to check the growth of military expenditure. Some believe that the nation can effect reform in the abuses of the alcoholic drinks. Some desire certain changes in the direction of socialism. Some aim at a more comprehensive scheme of national aid to education. The vast majority of the people only want honest and

economical administration. They hardly know or care what the government at Washington is about, provided it does not disturb them. Meanwhile the designs and the ideals of various groups of men, who for selfish or disinterested motives wish to make use of the national government, do not generally have any connection with the more pressing necessities of local or state government. The municipal issues, which touch the largest part of each man's burden of taxation, are apt to be as free of relation to national politics as of the politics of Europe or India.

The natural plan of carrying on the government would seem to be the same for the nation or the state, as it is for a well-ordered New England town. For the most part the citizens would naturally choose simply the most trustworthy men and keep them in office as long as they remained worthy of trust. They would judge that a man of common sense and integrity, whether he believed in free trade or protection, would make a better congressman than a man who agreed with the electors on a theory of protection, and lacked wisdom, honesty, or courage.

As in a town, so on occasion national groups and parties would arise and combine over particu-

lar issues, and disappear as soon as the purpose for which they had come into being had been reached. Clubs and societies would be formed with reference to important matters of possible legislation. They would naturally seek to find representation in Congress. Whether they were wise or foolish, they would deserve to obtain a respectful hearing and in reasonable proportion to the number of the people who favored them. The Congress in general would be composed of men who would represent all the different interests of the people. They would generally agree in seeking to secure the best service of the whole people, while individuals among them, standing for the urgency of groups and special strata of public opinion, would be free to exercise such influences as they could command. The President and his cabinet themselves would usually, unless in a period of some exceptional and abnormal excitement, represent and act for the whole people, and not for a bare moiety of them. It would be possible in theory, as it is actually now in fact, for these associates to enjoy wide differences of political opinion, only that the nation would have the benefit, as it does not freely have now, of frank expression and discussion of

such differences in cabinet council. There is scarcely an opinion held by intelligent men that ought to prevent a cabinet from working harmoniously together in the effective performance of national duties.

It is said by the partisan that the group system of government, as in France and Germany, works ill and lends itself to vicious log-rolling and to the control of government by mere minorities holding the temporary balance of power. What works ill, we reply, is the spirit of selfishness and injustice, wherever you find it. What can you say to the detriment of the present bipartisan system more damning than the notorious impression that, from the President of the United States down, throughout both houses of Congress, and including the great cabinet officers, there is not a man pledged or quite free to serve the welfare of the people of the United States! We say this with personal respect for a great many of the men in command. Yet who of them is free enough not to ask: What does the party demand of me? And this too when the party does not even mean a majority of the people, but rather a caucus of Congress, or a national committee, or the pressure of partisan politicians, or even of overgrown capitalists.

The truth is, we are only experimenting at the beginnings of the working of real democracy. Party government no more deserves the name of democracy than does a constitutional monarchy. The very nature of democracy, as a method of humane political coöperation for great common ends, has yet to be preached, to leaders and to people, in school and churches, in cities and out on the farms.

XVIII

THE RULE OF THE CITIES

THE *seamy* side of American civilization is to be seen in the cities. The underworld of low life is close to the most dazzling wealth and luxury. Over a hundred millions of dollars a year in the single city of New York goes for civic expense, while the overcrowding, the poverty, the vice, and the wretchedness of the great city goes on almost unabated. An army of police stand ready to make arrests and to hurry their victims away to great station-houses. A huge machinery of so-called justice is provided to dispose of offenders against the laws. But the conditions which make crime continue. What holds true in one city is substantially the same in all cities. Nowhere yet have the people of the great towns learned how to bring the forces of their wealth and intelligence to bear so as to make human life clean, wholesome, sweet, and happy.

If the men of our cities had wished to give discipline in public affairs to the boys of the grammar

schools and had turned over the entire management of their towns to the older boys, they could scarcely have fared worse in waste and folly, and not nearly so ill in corruption and fraud, as they have actually fared in many of the centres of American civilization. If the men had given their whole attention to making money and had resigned civic business to the women, the women could hardly have contrived to take the onerous responsibility of public housekeeping with so little seriousness and so slender regard for human comfort and welfare as the men have generally shown.

Read the lists of men serving on American city councils and passing upon the expenditure of a total revenue sufficient to administer an empire; read the lists of men who have the charge of the school systems involving the welfare of hosts of little children; study the antecedents, the character, and the education of men occupying administrative places in the care of streets, public grounds, prisons, and hospitals. You will find the names of men who would not be trusted by their neighbors to serve as trustees or executors of the smallest estate. You will discover men who have had their education as bartenders or habitual idlers. You will find men put at the head of great departments

of public business on account of their success in marshalling voters to the polls. If our cities were to advertise for men who could waste and squander the largest amount of public money, we should procure the very men whom we now place in positions of honor, trust, and responsibility. So cruelly is democracy wounded in the house of its friends.

It is no fairer to blame democracy for civic misrule than it would be to blame religion. As well complain of democracy that our cities suffer from typhoid fever or pneumonia, as complain because they suffer from corrupt and incompetent officials. Men suffer from these evils under all systems of government. Men will cease to suffer from these troubles only so far and so fast as they learn to care for and to seek the public health and virtue with the same diligence which they use now in caring for and seeking dollars, the semblance of value.

Let us try to discover what special reasons there may be why we in the United States fall behind other countries, less democratic than we are, in the management of our cities. One great reason, doubtless, is in the newness of our cities, in their rapid growth, in the heterogeneousness of their

population, and particularly in the absence among us of any framework of tradition to guard the new civic life, while it has been taking on its vast growth in size and responsibility.

Thus in a European city, Glasgow or Berlin, one sees everywhere present in the life of the modern city the survival of habits, forms and institutions which have held over from the more oligarchic régime of the earlier time. The leading merchants and thinkers of the city are still looked to as the leaders of municipal enterprises. The forms are still preserved which make it easy and natural to bring forward men of ability and character and to use them in the public service.

Grant that the cities of Europe are all headed toward full democracy ; their movement has been a growth, or development, and not a revolution. Moreover, the general movement seems to have left European cities larger home rule and more civic freedom to work out their own problems than the somewhat meddlesome state governments in America have allowed. City politics in Europe tend to be quite as clean as national politics ; in America city politics may be far worse than national politics. In Europe the national government tends to keep the cities on a decent level ; in

the United States local politics have become means of undermining the political health of the whole nation.

Again, in discountenancing aristocracy, we in America have suddenly lost to a large degree the services of a kind of public men, without the like of whom no people can long survive. We mean men of the character of Lord Aberdeen and Wellington, fearless of popular clamor, trained like watch-dogs to serve the state without a thought of personal profit. The aristocrat at his best is a man of honor. Such a man makes a better mayor or superintendent of streets than the most effusive democrat who is only in office for what he can get. A people pervaded with the spirit of commercialism are trying the experiment of government by commercialism. The cities suffer most, because they offer so many rich fields for vulgar exploitation. "Graft" is everywhere at work, vitiating almost every kind of business. It is not strange that we fail as yet to learn that civic democracy requires and deserves, not less, but more, fidelity, thoroughness, capacity, and disinterestedness than any other form of municipal government.

It should be remarked that the suddenness of the transition from town and other local methods

of government into various forms of city charters has been most unfortunate. Here again one notes not normal development, but simple revolution. Our signal failure to govern our cities "in comparison with foreign experience" is partly to be traced to this fact.

In an old-fashioned town government the people actually met, discussed their affairs, and appointed their various committees to carry out their will. No scheme ever worked better than this. Meanwhile the town grows populous and the town-meetings become unwieldy. Why not use our experience to alter or modify our excellent system of town government? If, for example, a body of a thousand voters makes twice too large a town-meeting to do business effectively, and four hundred or five hundred voters work admirably together, why should we not take measures to form a town council of the smaller number? Draw town councillors, if you please, once a year, as we draw jurors, one to so many voters. Or, let each group of three, or a dozen, or a hundred neighbors choose which of its members shall sit in the town council. Give us each and all the opportunity freely to make our influence and our will felt in the affairs of our town. Give each electing group the opportunity,

as often as we desire, to hear our own delegate, to instruct him, to recall him, to replace him. All towns up to a population of one hundred and fifty thousand would seem to be manageable, with the proper modifications touching the various executive departments, upon lines growing naturally out of the experience of local democracy.

On the contrary, we have actually thrown our experience to the winds, and have set up a brand-new institution under the name of a city government. We did not even begin by asking the original question: What sort of a management will best serve the civic interests of a large population? We are only slowly returning to this primary question after wandering for nearly one hundred years. We are at last learning to frame an occasional city charter with reference to the facts and the real demands of the people. For the most part indeed we went across the sea, and we took an ancient model upon which to build democratic cities in America. We set up a little king, the mayor, with a House of Lords, the aldermen, and a House of Commons, the council. Numerous cities established a system of municipal government almost as elaborate as if they were going to rule Great Britain!

However voters may choose to continue to play the perilous game of national party politics, no one can make the slightest argument for the admission of national politics into the administration of cities. There is not the most remote connection between the fitness of a man as a mayor or alderman, and his opinions upon the policy of free trade, or naval expansion, or colonies in the South Seas. The management of a modern city is essentially a great business, requiring the peculiar qualities — namely, integrity, faithfulness, efficiency, watchful care for economy, and good temper — which everywhere bring business success. There can be no controversy on this point. What, then, shall we say of the apathy and stupidity of the American people in giving up the control of the splendid revenues of their cities, to be made the prizes of partisan and factional conflict for the most unscrupulous demagogues and their henchmen?. All other reasons for the failure of municipal government in the United States may be set aside in comparison with the anomaly of trying to carry on the practical business of great corporations by the use of the party machinery set up to win votes in the quadrennial national elections! No device could be more mischievous for dividing the men

and nullifying the forces that naturally work together to make good government.

Observe now the difficulties in which the average voter is involved at a city election. He goes to the polls a mere unit, not to say a cipher, among a multitude of other units. Even under the Australian system and in the voting booth, his isolation from other men is emphasized. If he has attended a caucus preliminary to the election, he has probably done nothing more there than he does at the polls. He votes in silence. He has had no real and honest conference or consultation with others. He has been in no way enlightened as to the issues before him as a voter. Is the voter a party man? If so, he is nearly certain to be voting in the dark. There is no act of faith more blind in the most superstitious religion than to trust the party machine and act as one is bidden in a great city election.

The voter examines his ballot. He is sure to be bewildered by the number of strange names. It is a mere chance if he really knows one man out of the scores of candidates for councilmen, school committee, and other offices. It is a very exceptional elector who can be adequately informed of the fitness of a sufficient number of

these strangers, to fill out his ticket. This is not an honest method of election. It is more like gambling, the dice being loaded in advance by men who superintend every election in their own interests.

The truth is that no voter is prepared, or can be prepared, to pass judgment upon so complicated a problem as the mongrel list of names presented to him upon the official ballot in most American city elections. No business man would dream of obliging himself to turn out once a year all the more experienced men from the most important places in his counting-room or factory, and to fill their offices by a hasty choice of dozens of unknown applicants — especially applicants who have put themselves forward in the hope of getting an easy berth and good pay.

It has been suggested as a remedy for the prevalent civic anarchy, to strengthen the authority of the mayor. Make the mayor responsible for the good conduct of the city; give him, under civil service rules, large power of appointment and removal of his subordinates, of the superintendents of the various departments, of the school committee, of the assessors, and the rest. Let the heads of the departments constitute an advisory

board or working council, like the cabinet of the President of the United States. Give the mayor then a long enough term to make his mark. Watch him and be ready to retire him, or to re-elect him, as he deserves. Thus the people would have one capable man, devoted to their welfare, and subject to their approval. The city government would thus be a sort of temporary monarchy, tempered perhaps by the use of the referendum and the liberty of the people to veto such measures or appointments as they might not approve.

If the people of a city must act forever as units, some such plan as this would seem to be sane. It could hardly involve greater risk of misrule than we run now. It would be an intelligent and consistent method of government; it would fix responsibility; it would make a city election, and every needful referendum consequent upon it, level with the comprehension of all the people. Each election would also tend to become, as elections now necessarily fail to be, a process in the political education of the people. Neither would such a plan be less democratic, except in appearance, than the blind and baffling methods which to-day in every city deceive people by fictitious

popular names, while they are always manipulated to give the designing few the power over the purses and the interests of the many.

It must always be remembered that popular government does not essentially consist in the number of the officials who must be elected by the votes of the people. In imperial Rome the people still kept the forms of the republic. The forms of democracy are used in Mexico. But the essence of democratic government is that when the people vote, they are free to express and to carry out their intelligent will. No one pretends that we are free to express our intelligent will in casting a blanket ballot, made out for us by a group of politicians and crowded with unknown names. We should come actually nearer to the expression of our will by committing the appointment of the most of our officials to a trusted mayor, or to a carefully chosen and somewhat permanent council of heads of departments, than by voting in ignorance as we mostly do now.

It must have already become evident that the chief root of the trouble in the control of our American cities is the want of true democracy. We have agreed that democracy is essentially a spirit of coöperation. The people of a new city

are unfortunately strangers to one another. It is an immense lesson to learn to act together for common ends. The differences in race, language, and religion in an American town somewhat increase the natural difficulty of civic coöperation. Nevertheless, the task is before us; it is not impossible; it is the one way that promises large success. It rests upon the facts and the needs of human nature. Already the people of great cities, as for example in Chicago, and at last in Philadelphia, have begun to show signs of their susceptibility to the appeal to the common civic interests for the good of the whole people.

The origin of the modern democratic ideal was in the actual and natural working of the town government, especially in New England. The clew to success in the management of our cities lies in retracing our way to the starting-point of good local government. The people of a town meet from time to time to consider and act together. The reference of any new business to the will of the people is always open. The people see and hear the men who are to take charge of their affairs.

Good, it is said, but this is impossible for the people of a great city. Let us take measures to

render it possible for them. For their interests are not relatively less important, but far more weighty, than the affairs of the town. The voters of a city are already accustomed to be divided into wards or into voting precincts. But they never or rarely meet, even in their own halls; they scarcely know each other as fellow-voters. The only meetings are partisan, thus dividing the very men who ought to confer and act together. The voters may not even see those who aspire to be their representatives. Suppose now that we make it a necessary preliminary part of every city election that the voters attend a ward or precinct "town-meeting," where candidates can be openly nominated; where also candidates for the city council, for example, shall be present and give an account of themselves; where the general issues of the election shall be set forth, with such matters as specially concern each locality or ward; where any information can be promptly had to satisfy the questions of citizens touching the conduct of the city; where necessary discussions can be held upon any referendum before the people; and where instructions can be voted to guide the representatives of the district in their action at the city hall. Here will be a natural opportunity for the citizens of a ward to learn

to know each other and to act together. It will be an opportunity for men of ideas and public spirit to make their influence felt. It will be an opportunity also for the demagogue, but he will have to appear openly, and the means to defeat him will be equally open.

No one can say that some such method of civic coöperation is not worth while ; for you can hardly have real democracy without it. No one can say that it would be asking too much time and interest of the citizen. For what purpose could he more fairly be asked to spend an occasional evening in the course of a year ? It is hard to see in what way he could do more to help further the public interests as well as the political education of the people.

Let us also suppose that we make it for the personal interest of each voter not to neglect the ward "town-meeting." Let us drop from the list of registered voters any citizen who may fail to be present twice in succession, either at an actual election, or at the meeting preliminary to an election ; let us require a moderate registration fee for replacing a voter's name upon the list, and double the fee if he is obliged to register a second time within two years.

It would seem also fair that a man should be allowed to register (though without voting power) for the civic meetings, not only of the precinct where he dwells, but also where he works or does business. A man ought to have at least a voice in the discussion of the affairs of the locality where his working interests lie.

It is not enough to secure the empty names of popular institutions. It is not enough to go through the form of political activity by throwing a ballot into a box. It is necessary that our institutions, our methods, and our political machinery shall express our intelligence and serve to develop our civic life. It is necessary that men shall vote, not as units, or as partisans, but coöperatively as fellow-citizens. It is necessary to appeal again and again to the public spirit and the common sense of the voters. The appeal should always be made over a simple issue, as between a demagogue and a true man, or a plain Yes or No over a public measure, the granting or refusal of a franchise, or the incurring of public indebtedness. Every such appeal once talked out, with its friends or opponents openly heard, is a discipline in political life, not for the few only, but for the many. It is also a method of developing manhood.

The mere fact that means are freely offered to the people to question officials and exercise authority over them is itself a guard against the abuse and corruption of government. Let the city council know that they must give the people a referendum on any dubious legislation; let them know that purchasable representatives are liable to be called to face direct questions in open "town-meeting," and to be summarily retired from office; let them be committed to a general policy of trusting the people instead of throwing dust in their eyes. When such conditions hold, there will be the least necessity for distrusting or reversing the action of the representatives of the people; for they will be accustomed to work harmoniously with their constituents and will take pleasure in furthering the common welfare. Concede that this ideal is costly, and will demand a long struggle. Nevertheless the realization of the vision of the true city will be worth all that it costs. The effort to attain it is as good work as any man can do.

XIX

THE PROBLEM OF WAR

We have called attention incidentally to the marked development of mankind out of the military into the industrial régime. But men are still educated into and hypnotized by the traditional view of a military society; they continue to insist upon war as the normal condition of the world; ancient usages and abuses die hard. Too many men are still under arms in what is called Christendom, and too many military and naval officers are interested in the maintenance of war establishments, to make it safe to predict how soon the gates of the temple of Janus will finally be closed. It therefore becomes a practical question to determine what the bearing of the spirit of democracy is upon the international policy of a popular government.

The problem with the United States is not that of Italy or France, surrounded on every side by threatening fortresses. The position of the United States is unique. We hold the opportunity to give

the world a majestic object-lesson of the behavior of an advanced democratic people in a new era of history. It is in the power of the United States to gain the headway of centuries in establishing peace and civilized order. On the other hand, the peril is that the United States may fall under the control of the forces that make for moral inertia, and may so serve to delay the very era of popular welfare to which our institutions are consecrated. War is the great enemy of the democracy. The men who despise the people are always the willing friends of war.

We have admitted a principle that would theoretically justify possible war. We have made a clear distinction between the use of force and the use of hate, between brutal violence and the hurt or pain, akin to surgery, directed by a wise and merciful intelligence. Few modern men would probably deny the rightfulness of the use of military force in repelling a foreign invasion and asserting national freedom. We may imagine barbarian hordes descending upon our shores for plunder or conquest. Who would stand idly by and see the ruin of civilization?

What is the use, however, of imagining a state of the world out of which we have happily

passed, or of fancying what we ought to do with Old World perils? The questions touching the righteousness of war in our day are not the same questions as in the time of Charlemagne or Philip of Spain, as the question of the use of one's fists to settle a grievance is not the same question in the case of the grown man as it is with the unformed schoolboy. We face new conditions; we have sight of new ideals. The more humane men become, the more revolting war is. It is more ruinous than it ever has been. The world is bound so closely in the bonds of international commerce and travel, that war in one point threatens loss everywhere. It is like fire in a city; it menaces the whole of society. Less and less can the world afford to permit it.

The fact is that war, like crime or disease, is an anomaly in modern civilization. Here is the world-wide difference between the theories of ancient and of modern life. In ancient life war was an habitual part of the business of the nation. The regular work of government was to be ready to slay men. The old habit was to look on foreign peoples as natural enemies. The democratic habit is to see natural friends in all nations. This is the underlying thought of our

democracy. Whereas the governments in the old times actually kept on hand the war-engendering microbes of hate, jealousy, envy, suspicion, inhumanity, and war therefore always threatened to break out, like the plague in Bombay, it is the first duty of a modern state to get rid of these evil microbes. The great objection to the support of a huge military and naval establishment is not their cost, nor the immediate peril of our liberties, but the established fact, that the subtle germs of war, pride, antagonism, arrogance, jealousy, thrive in the substance of a great war department, as the bacilli of consumption thrive and multiply in a deposit of abnormal animal tissues.

Let us frankly consider certain varieties of possible war, with reference, not to imaginary problems, or to the issues of earlier times, but to the actual conditions which we see in our world of to-day. We may rule out altogether, so far as we in the United States are concerned, the necessity of war with a superior power, as, for example, for the defence of liberty. We have even become so sure of our freedom as to have lost sympathy with the struggles of other peoples for the freedom which we enjoy. The average American's

advice to Finns, Armenians, or Hindus would probably be the same as we practically give to Filipinos, namely, not to do as our fathers did, and make war to the death for the right of self-government, but to be patient and await the slow and sure constitutional changes which are bound to come under every form of modern administration.

Whereas Americans in the flood-tide of their enthusiasm for popular rights once hailed Kossuth and Garibaldi as heroes, they now distrust the ability of every people who live under a foreign sovereignty to manage their own affairs. One might suspect that the majority of our nation to-day had descended from a Tory pedigree. Or, were the Tories of our Revolutionary age right in their opinion that there was no just cause for revolution and war against England? And is it possible, as we now look back coolly upon the slight imperial impositions of George III, that America only needed patience and the firm pressure of growing public opinion to have obtained without bloodshed all that Canada and Australia enjoy to-day?

Moreover, we have passed, we hope forever, though at vast cost, upon the problem of revolutionary secession from our union of states. No

one fears civil war. Or, if bitter voices are sometimes raised in prediction of some coming crisis of industrial revolution, we ought by this time to know the one way certain to avert the approach of mischief; namely, to do justice in public and private, to develop a more generous humanity, and to foster the growth of the democratic spirit. There is in fact no subject, as there was in the days of slavery, which threatens seriously to afford the material of civil war. There are quite constitutional means for winning every change or reform which the body of the people call for.

We have mainly to consider what possibility of righteous war there is with other equal and sovereign nations. Let us count upon the fingers of one hand all the nations with which the United States is likely to have any pretext for a bloody quarrel.

First of these nations is England, our own mother country. Through her colonial possessions she is our nearest neighbor. For the width of the continent her Canadian border marches with ours. We have no better or more friendly neighbor. Our laws, institutions, and customs are with slight differences substantially the same. Our people generally profess forms of the same religion.

A thousand international links bind us more closely every day. For any thoughtful and humane mind war with England is too terrible and preposterous to contemplate. It would be the straight and almost contemptuous denial of the Christianity of a hundred thousand churches.

For what national interest could war with England be entered upon? Not for any possible pecuniary gain to either nation. Not for the acquisition of territory. There is not even the slightest boundary question anywhere in sight. There is no piece of land upon the earth whose lawful sovereignty stands in doubt that is worth fighting about for either nation. The vast mercantile and industrial interests of both nations are overwhelmingly against war. The sympathies of the great mass of the plain people of both nations are equally against it.

Must we then consider the possibility of war with England over some fancied insult or question of national honor? It is certain that the representative men of both nations have no slightest disposition to insult or prejudice or injure the people of the other nation. There has been immense gain in this respect in fifty years on both sides of the ocean.

What now is national honor? It is not honor to be hunting for imaginary insult; it is not honor to look on one's neighbors with suspicion; it is not honor, worthy of civilized men, to be quick to take up arms and to fight and kill. Revenge is not honor. Is it not rather national honor to be humane and friendly? Is it not the part of the strong nation, as of the strong man, to keep a cool temper, to give and to expect justice, to maintain sturdy good will to all?

Where is any one going to find ground for fear of war with our English brethren? Must it be over our cherished Monroe doctrine? It is enough for the moment to say that England has shown remarkable willingness not to offend our sensitiveness on this point. Is it not time for both England and the United States to agree, and to establish their agreement by the most solemn treaty possible, that under no circumstances will they ever fight each other; that for the future they will seek the settlement of any grievance that may arise between them by the pacific, honorable, and civilized methods of grown men, not by the vain and unintelligent arbitrament of the barbarian!

Can we discover any reason for the apprehen-

sion of war with the Republic of France? Here is a nation with which we have always had a tradition of friendship. An immense trade connects the two countries. Hosts of American travellers are always enjoying French hospitality and admiring French art, science, and scenery. In no part of the world do American and French boundary lines touch each other to furnish even the occasion for a quarrel. The interests of both people are growingly pacific and international. In no country is there a stronger sentiment among its leaders in favor of the peace of the world and against the brutality of war than in France. May we not safely say that, as regards the forty millions of Frenchmen, the United States does not require a single company of soldiers, or as much as a gun-boat, to defend us against national injury or insult? In other words, we have no need to raise the question of the rightfulness of a war with France. Nothing but the most culpable folly and perverseness in the administration of both parties could allow a conflagration between them to kindle.

Much the same must be said with reference to the great and friendly empire of Germany. Millions of its people are among our most loyal citi-

zens. What good German, or what respectable American, can think of war between the two countries as anything less than wickedness? We have no boundary questions or issues between us over the possession of territory. We respect each other's national qualities. Americans go to Germany for education. We are cousins by virtue of the common sturdy Teutonic stock. Raze all our fortresses to the ground, and there is nothing justly belonging to the United States which the most strenuous German war lord would dream of seizing.

Grant that German officialism and militarism are still somewhat coarse and rude, as befits the survival of an aristocratic régime. The only reason for apprehension of this offensive militarism is in the growth of an insolent and quite un-American military and official caste among ourselves.

There are trade rivalries between us, some one suggests. And what is the proper settlement of trade rivalries? Does any trader or manufacturer on either side of the ocean want to settle their rivalries by the sword? Only soldiers, and very dull soldiers, think of carrying on trade by force. The merchant and the manufacturer know

well enough that war ruins trade and brings industries into bankruptcy. It is said that trade follows the flag; it does not follow the battle-flag, but the flag of peace. Trade follows the progress of civilization, which war destroys. You can demonstrate by figures that war ships are, like armies, a burden of taxation upon the normal trade of the world. There is not even the Old World excuse that they safeguard the ocean from pirates. In truth, even in the old days, trading ships took all risks and ventures, and penetrated and explored distant waters, where the ships of war only followed them. It is insane to suppose that Germany and America have any cause in their commercial rivalry to threaten each other with war. Their people simply do not want war. The growing democratic spirit in both nations forbids the word of ill omen.

What shall we say of the "Colossus of the North"? Where can any one find a reasonable imaginary excuse for the United States to wage war with Russia? The traditional relations between the two countries have certainly always been friendly. The willing sale of Alaska to the United States emphasized the friendly intent of the Russian government. The spheres of political

action of the two nations are as nearly distinct as possible. A considerable trade binds the two together and is sure to grow larger.

It is said that Russia is an empire, and her rule tends to stamp out the individuality and freedom of subject races. True, few Americans could live under the Russian system; but Russia has only done on a larger and a cruder scale what America has begun to do in a more refined way in the Philippine archipelago. Russia proposes to civilize, educate, and unify wild and heterogeneous peoples. Russia wants sea power, as does America. Meanwhile Russia has been learning a fearful lesson of the futility of despotism. Daily the spirit of democracy, drawing all men together, penetrates to every town of this great empire. Men are reading modern books; plain people are asking questions; new ideas are in the Russian air. Russia is now an autocracy, but the Russian people are already awaking from this apathy and are being heard from; popular institutions are yet to come. Vast and profound forces are at work which make for peace, and specially with the liberty-loving people of the United States.

There are those who raise their hands in fear

before the bogey of a "Yellow Terror." But sensible Americans, who have watched the growth of Japan with friendly sympathy since the days of Commodore Perry, will not be frightened because Japan has joined the "civilized powers." The leaders of Japan, many of them educated in American colleges, have never shown jealousy or hostility against the people of the United States. Neither nation wishes anything that justly belongs to the other. The Japanese, ever willing to adjust themselves to modern conditions, are too intelligent to retrace their steps to barbarism and to set forth on an insane crusade to conquer the world.

We have named every great power for fear of a war with which the apprehensive or pessimistic military faction advise us to build war ships and prepare for possible trouble. We have found good reasons in every case for expecting permanent peace, without the menace of mischief or insult from any of them. We have seen no little cloud in the international horizon which could give us decent reason for engaging in war with any of them. Neither, beyond the great powers named, is there a civilized nation in the world with which we have any business to think

of fighting. Not even Spain, though she might feel natural resentment against us, is dreaming of war. She is happily rid of perplexities and burdens in the West Indies and in the East of which we have relieved her. Is there left a government on the earth with which we do not and ought not to stand ready to adjudicate any possible grievance by the means now provided and sanctioned already by repeated use, through the Hague tribunal? A hasty act, it is said, may precipitate war. With whom? With Italy? With Austria? The United States, we reply, does not propose to accept the precipitate scratching of a match by a fool or a drunken man, as a reason to embroil the world in flames. We intend to put such a fire out before it can catch.

Let us sum up this chapter as follows: As no true man expects in our day to fight with another, and even when a grievance arises between them, each is willing to wait for the sense of justice and honor in the other man to assert itself, and at the worst each is ready to put his case out to fair arbitrament, and needs no compulsion to do whatever the arbiter or the court bids,— so no civilized nation ought to fight for its rights or honor with any other civilized peo-

ple; so each ought to be ready to wait for just arbitrament; so at the worst neither should need to be compelled to abide by the decision of a reasonable tribunal. The more completely the spirit of democracy underlies civilized governments, the more will this opinion tend to prevail.

Meanwhile already the United States doubtless holds this vantage ground among all nations, that, by reason of her vast strength, she does not need to go armed or to expect quarrels; she can afford to carry out her own ideals, since no one seriously wishes to molest her. She can afford to lead the world in the methods of peaceable conduct, inasmuch as her power and her dignity are above the reach of petty insult.

XX

DEMOCRACY AND IMPERIALISM

WE come to the most momentous question of modern times. It is the question of the relation of the progressive nations to the backward and barbarous races. Vast populations of the globe, as in Africa, Asia, and South America, are not half civilized. Around us also are nations styled "civilized" — some of them as civilized as we are, with gigantic armies and navies who are greedy for the territory of those whom they deem "inferior" peoples. Land hunger and the predatory instinct still sway their action. Must we Americans do as others are doing? Must we take a share in keeping the world in subjection to law and order, that is, our law and our order? More concretely, the United States holds the Philippine Islands by force and has a beginning of a hold in Central America. We have set up, under the name of the Monroe doctrine, a form of protectorate over the western hemisphere. It certainly fosters our national pride to believe that we are

called by "Providence" to keep the peace of the world, and at least for a time to tutor and educate feeble foreign peoples.

We have already raised the question of the admission of childish peoples to the exercise of the suffrage. We have discovered the impossibility of drawing any line to separate civilized men from the uncivilized. We have seen that men are generally only learners as yet in respect to true civilization. The safe leaders and voters are the men of good will, not necessarily the men of education and property. We have laid down the broad principle that men must treat each other as men. Any other course is anomalous and demonstrably leads straight to mischief. You can hardly afford to talk down, even to children. You cannot talk down to men, you cannot treat them as inferiors, you cannot force them to go your way. You cannot treat savages as inferiors and not stir their suspicion, their resentment, and their hostility. We have seen that even in the treatment of criminals you presuppose an appeal to men's innate sense of justice and assume at least, as in the case of the sick, that they must themselves in their hearts approve your course toward them. The most rigorous and summary

treatment, dictated on occasion by the necessities of life and death, must still be free of arrogance or contempt.

The same general principles serve to answer our questions about the relations of the more advanced with the backward nations. Strange and difficult anomalies certainly arise in the course of these relations. Pirates cannot be suffered to terrorize the seas. The United States long ago agreed with other nations in the international duty to suppress the slave trade. Indians and other barbarians cannot be allowed to go upon the war path. No mass of argument and no large force of armies and navies are necessary to enforce these simple assertions in behalf of the order of the world. Unfortunately, to a large extent savage depredations have notoriously been provoked by the greed and the oppression of the so-called superior peoples. The reasonable methods of John Eliot and William Penn, if supplemented by one quarter of the cost of Indian police, expended in such education as the Hampton school gives, would have made police and soldiery by this time almost needless. The methods of Livingstone and of Bishop Patteson in the South Seas, if uninterrupted by the white men's liquor and gun-

powder, would have left no necessity or excuse for the partition of Africa, or for the seizure of the islands in the Pacific,—even to protect them from seizure by other missionary nations! So far, at least, the experiment of taking over “native races” for the welfare of civilization has been one of the saddest blots upon the fame of the great powers concerned in the enterprise. The story of Spain and the people of the West Indies, the story of England and the Zulus, the story of Belgium and the Congo territory, the story of Holland and the people of Java, the story of the United States with its “century of dishonor”—all reiterate one solemn lesson.

The crucial point of hazard between the stronger and the weaker peoples is in the use of brute force to compel or to punish the “inferior” race. We do not claim that white men had no right to settle in Africa or to visit and trade in the Congo basin. We do not claim that they had no right, if attacked, to defend themselves. We insist that, whereas the habitual attitude of a truly superior people should have been the attitude of friendly and mature men, thus calling out the best side of the childish races,—on the contrary, the habitual attitude of white men, domineering and arrogant,

has generally reduced them to the moral level of the barbarian. Their show of force has challenged force and tempted the weaker people to treachery. In other words, the "superior" or civilized people in treating the weaker races have commonly dropped to their level and put aside their own civilization.

We have had more than one hundred years of a disguised form of imperialism in our relations with the American Indians. We have meant well toward them in general. But the trader and the spoilsman have always been on the ground as soon as the teacher and the missionary. The startling upshot of all our terrific cost in the experiment of ruling the Indians has been the lesson that they must now become citizens on equal terms with ourselves. To treat them as aliens or to treat them as subjects was to invite hostility and to degrade them and ourselves. Let the American people beware if anywhere on the earth they have to maintain forts and garrisons in order to control other people. This is to perpetuate the methods and the spirit of barbarism, and to tax honest business in favor of the protection of the adventurer and the spoilsman.

Here is the weakness of the claim made by the

champions of the imperial policy of the United States in the Philippine Islands. We have been obliged to conquer these islands. We hold them by military garrisons. We have been obliged to destroy directly and indirectly hundreds of thousands of people. What gave us a right to enter upon such a costly career of bloodshed? Not surely the mere legal purchase of the islands and their millions of people from Spain. For Spain, in the eyes of a democratic nation, had no right herself either to hold the Filipinos in subjection, or to sell them like slaves without as much as consulting them. Not one enlightened American in a hundred, prior to 1896, would have admitted such a right for a moment. The fact is, the United States holds the Philippine Islands by conquest, in a war which their people had never provoked with us. We provoked it ourselves by the assumption of the right of sovereignty, purchased or wrenched from the despotic hands of Spain. Defend this who can! Every precedent and presumption of democratic government is against what we have done.

We see now the nature of the only possible humane relations with a people of belated civilization like the Filipinos. What gives us any just

claim to intervene in their affairs? One purpose, namely, to serve their welfare, their liberties, their progress, in other words, to help them, as we should like to be helped if we were in their place. If we were sincere in this claim, it is inconceivable that we should ever have needed to destroy more of them than Spain had killed in a century.

The truth is that, quite like the Spaniards in Mexico, we entered upon the island war with mixed motives; with general unconcern, a fraction of missionary zeal, a moiety of national pride, and a considerable greed of gain. The vast cost of military operations and the colossal bloodshed truthfully represent the undemocratic substance of our relation to these islands; while the slight expense for schools represents the only just claim that we had as a democratic people to be in the Philippine Islands. We have the empty glory of putting down the "rebellion" of our subjects at the cost of an army more than double that with which Washington achieved our independence of Great Britain. We have acquired the responsibility of a colonial system, to be maintained by naval stations and fortresses. No one pretends that our position could be otherwise held for a day.

I have had no wish to speak in the tone of harsh-

ness of those who, in the vexed issue of an imperial policy toward the Philippine Islands, have taken the side of ancient precedents and traditions rather than the newer and less familiar principles of the coming democracy. The ordinary education has not yet trained men largely to trust in democratic methods. The military spirit is still powerful. We may be quite willing to credit President McKinley's administration with a benevolent intention toward the millions of wards whom it took under our charge. But its attitude, however benevolently intended, was that of those superior people who give charity to the poor, and are presently surprised to discover that the recipients of the charity show them no gratitude. Men do not want charity; they want justice, they wish to be treated as men, not as children. The mixture of the motives of business with philanthropy is like an explosive chemical compound. The managers of the mixed business take to themselves credit for their philanthropy, while others see only the mercenary motives of trade.

The most tragic events in history have been brought about by well-meaning men who have misunderstood their own self-will as the will of heaven, or have insisted upon forcing their benevo-

lence upon others, with whose feelings they were unable to sympathize. It begins to seem clear that the administration of President McKinley, in buying a sovereignty over men whose best people we had never consulted or taken into our confidence, and in proceeding to urge American rights and claims, without first conciliating the feelings of the people concerned, made the mistake natural to the aristocrat, but which constitutes the fatal sin against the spirit of democracy.

We trace the working of a general law. Every form of political or industrial management in which a group, a caste, or a race is made to take the place of superiors, by force of arms and incidental violence, over another group, or servile caste, or race of men, who must be looked down upon as inferior people, is inhuman and works evil accordingly. The more highly developed the stronger race is, the more subtly dangerous becomes the arrogance which is inevitable to such a relation. As slavery hurt men's character before they found out that it was wrong to hold slaves, so the relation of the "superior" and imperial nation involves a fatal pride. Assyrians, Romans, and Greeks could not endure the degradation incidental to playing the part of a ruling people.

A democracy can least endure this aristocratic relation without blunting the edge of its moral sensitiveness and deadening its own love of liberty. For the relation of superiors to inferiors is tainted with suspicion and breeds enmity. The only secure and permanent relation of the strong to the weak, or of the educated to the ignorant, is that of sympathy, helpfulness, humanity, and good will. The one relation works by force, the other by persuasion.

All this may seem too general. There are grand precedents, it is said, in favor of the actual success, at least for a while, of an imperial régime. Thus Americans are often reminded of the "success" of the British rule in India and in Egypt. Have not the English rulers been wise, firm, and, on the whole, just? Have they not made their subject peoples incomparably happier than they ever were before? Let us face this important, but dangerous, precedent of Anglo-Saxon imperialism with fair minds.

The fact is, the history of British rule in India or elsewhere is not completed, and no deductions can yet be drawn from the unfinished record. What we know is that the entrance of England upon Indian soil was not in the first instance by

claim of right. A great trading company built the foundations of the Indian empire. They hired armies and made conquests. The British government felt finally compelled to take over from the hands of a private corporation the anomalous business of ruling millions of foreign people. It would indeed be a shame if no compensation had fallen to the people of India. Courts of justice, law and order, Western ideals, modern methods, Bibles, railways, telegraphs, and the printing-press have doubtless gone with British arms, British liquors, and Birmingham fabrics and idols. But every one ought to know that there is a very seamy side of British rule in India. There is no love for the stranger rulers. There has been imposed above the native castes a new foreign caste, composed of a race who come to India mainly to make their fortunes. There can be no democratic co-operation between these rulers, with their ample salaries and European standards of life, and the poverty-stricken multitudes, the wealth of whose land is steadily drained away as a tribute to England. The Indian people are nowhere learning the lesson of liberty or the habits of self-government. English guns keep them safe, it is said, from some worse despotism; English soldiers pre-

vent Mohammedans and Brahmins from fighting each other. British fortresses prevent Russians from stealing the sovereignty. So, no doubt, Roman writers argued, when their legions held Britain and Germany. The situation now, as then, is a political and ethical anomaly, like any disease. No foundation of solid justice underlies it. No lover of mankind can be content with it.

Meanwhile, in the heart of England, "the submerged tenth" suffer grievous poverty, not incomparable with that of the famine sufferers in India. The imperial government, bent upon its foreign business, out of which only the few draw profit or renown, taxes its own people at home and squanders upon expeditions to South Africa and into the fastnesses of Thibet millions of pounds sterling which, wisely spent in England, might soon put an end to every hideous slum in her cities. What does British imperialism do for the people of East London? Except where Great Britain holds men in subjection, and they fear or hate her accordingly, except where, by foreign possessions, she stirs other nations to rivalry with her, she has no need to dread the enmity of a single nation, or to be obliged to build another war ship. For the uncertainty of distant gain, England threatens

the peace of the world and neglects her own children.

Moreover, England holds India and helps the Sultan of Turkey collect tribute in Egypt, not by virtue of her character as a democratic government, but rather as bearing her hereditary part in the aristocratic and monarchical system of Europe. She has received certain Old World traditions, as a man may take an estate encumbered with mortgages. England is not yet free of the "entangling alliances" which centuries of barbarism have bequeathed to her rulers. Her imperialism belongs to her past; we can hardly doubt that it is becoming a burden upon her future.

We may be also reminded that our American democracy, in the time of the Civil War, subjected unwilling populations and set up governments over them by force. Yes! For we had admitted a relic of barbarism, in the form of slavery, into our political system, and when the poison tainted the life of the nation we used a radical and perilous purgative. Slavery was an anomaly in a democracy, and we attempted to cure it by the abnormal and incongruous method of war. This was, strictly, to make a confession of national weakness. We were not wise or good enough in the days of our

fathers,—in other words, we had not developed true civilization enough,—to rule slavery out of our new republic. Neither were we wise or good enough, North or South, before the issue of civil war fairly came, to settle it, as friendly and humane men ought to have settled it. As we join hands, North and South, in a new loyalty to the democratic idea and to the confirmed Union of states, we look back and see our mistakes. We did not do our best, but only the best that we saw. Abraham Lincoln saw what the best would have been. The best would have been—since all were implicated in the existence of slavery, and the North had shared in its temporary profit—to put the shoulders of the whole nation together and lift the fatal load from our path. To have paid a billion of dollars in taxes together would have been better than to spend billions in fighting each other.

XXI

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE GOLDEN RULE

A RESPECTED statesman has coupled together the Monroe doctrine and the Golden Rule. This was to imply Mr. Hay's conviction that the Monroe doctrine is the expression of the spirit of democracy. It is a common opinion in the United States that this famous traditional doctrine is somehow involved with the peace and welfare of our institutions. It is probable that multitudes, who could not tell what the Monroe doctrine really is, or give any account of its justice, would rush to arms if told that the doctrine was controverted by a foreign power! Let us not be afraid to examine the Monroe doctrine and to try to discover how far righteous, and therefore important, it is. Let us see if it is the expression of the Golden Rule and whether it really makes for the peace of the world.

The history of the development of the Monroe doctrine is interesting and curious. In the period

following the Napoleonic wars, when American independence was still young, American statesmen were naturally sensitive about the conduct of the great monarchical European powers, which they associated with aristocratic and despotic tendencies. Meantime the peoples of South and Central America and Mexico, one after another, stirred by the American love of liberty, threw off the yoke of Spanish sovereignty and set up republican forms of government, modelled after the United States. Along with a jealousy of Old World political traditions and usages, Americans of that era felt a thrill of generous sentiment toward every government that bore the name of a republic. The organization of the famous Holy Alliance under the head of Russia, comprising the despotic powers of Prussia, Austria, and Spain, and threatening to unite the continent of Europe in a formidable league of monarchies, roused special apprehension concerning the possible invasion of the newly won liberties of this continent. Under these circumstances the Monroe doctrine was promulgated, with the active sympathy and consent of the government of Great Britain, which little dreamed that the doctrine would ever be invoked with the menace of war against herself!

The Monroe doctrine was substantially a firm and pacific protest against interference on the part of the aristocratic powers of Europe with the affairs of the Western continent. It was set forth as the dictate of apprehension, prudence, and national self-interest. Its purpose was the protection of republican institutions. The cautious Mr. Adams, President Monroe's secretary of state, never thought of calling the doctrine an illustration of the Golden Rule.

See now where the world has travelled in less than a century. Italy is free and united; France is a republic; Austria and Spain, now secondary powers, have established parliamentary governments, under which the people are well-nigh as free as we are in America. The spirit of democracy is abroad in all Europe. There is more democratic thinking among the German people, for example, than in all South America. The Spanish-American republics, however, still exist. They are republics in name, but despotisms or aristocracies in reality. They are still laboriously working out for themselves the costly problem of self-government. Some of them — Mexico, Chili, the Argentine Republic — appear to have risen above the immediate danger line of anarchy and

chronic revolution, and to be achieving settled political order. All these nations, though separated from us in language and customs, and for all practical purposes (except Mexico) as distant as Morocco or China, have the mild sympathy and good will of our people. We do not know them well enough to bestow more than this. Our trade with them is still relatively slight. We are more closely bound in various humane relations with nearly every kingdom of Europe than we are with the republics to the south of us.

What now has become of our Monroe doctrine under the totally new circumstances which meet us? Is there any need of it? Would any one think of promulgating it to-day, if it were not a time-honored tradition, which the nation has always kept in its armory against possible peril? In order to answer this question we may first see what all good Americans must agree in desiring for the South and Central American states. It is for our interests, and for their interests likewise, that they shall develop in wealth, education, and civilization, and that they shall learn the use of their democratic institutions, as we are learning them in the United States. We do not wish to see tyrannies prevail among them. Neither do we

wish to see any foreign power taking away their independence and forcing upon them an imperial or colonial rule. Curiously enough, we generally agree in deprecating for the South American people, politically undeveloped as they are, any scheme of compulsory foreign tutelage. We protest against any government doing to the South Americans, or to the Mexicans, what we are undertaking with the Filipinos. We generally believe that the people to the south of us are best off when left alone to work out their own political salvation!

In this large sense no one can have any objection to the Monroe doctrine. In this large sense, it is doubtful whether any European power could for a moment object to the theory of "America for the Americans." It is doubtful if any government would dream of forcing its authority upon an unwilling South American state, against the earnest and peaceable protest of the United States. The experience of Maximilian and the French in Mexico is a good warning for all time. There was no need of the United States fighting with France. Maximilian's invasion of Mexico was foredoomed from the start. Foreign tyranny everywhere rests in unstable equilibrium.

So far then as the Monroe doctrine serves as a protection for the liberties of Americans, either North or South, against even the mildest form of monarchical despotism from abroad, it seems to have already served its purpose. It is enough to say that, excepting only Russia, which has willingly withdrawn from our continent, no such monarchy as our fathers feared exists anywhere in Europe. It is beyond the flight of the imagination that real peril to the liberty of the people of the United States could come through the vantage ground of any territory or possessions which a European power might hold in South America.

There are two important points in which the Monroe doctrine is still involved in unfortunate misapprehension and uncertainty. The first point is, whether or not this doctrine, properly interpreted, requires the United States to protest, or even to make war, against the possible transfer of American territory, under any and all circumstances, to the control or the protection of any European state.

Suppose that millions of Italian immigrants poured into the Argentine Republic, where already a multitude of their countrymen have settled. The immigrants immediately lift the level

of the population in intelligence and political ability. They at last outnumber and outvote the Spaniards and Indians. The inevitable demand comes for more orderly and effective government. It is improbable that such a state, built up by peaceable immigration, would care in any way to part with its independence. Why should Italians, who cross the ocean to make homes and better their condition, wish to saddle upon themselves imperial obligations and taxes and military conscription? But let us suppose the improbable thing, that in a peaceable manner Argentina should choose to ally herself with the mother country from which her leading immigrants had come, just as Canada is allied with Great Britain.

Suppose, furthermore, that the southern provinces of Brazil should develop, through the large and peaceable immigrations of Germans, from the character of a Portuguese or Indian territory into a state substantially German in its traditions and sympathies. This would merely be what actually happened in the early half of the last century in the case of Texas, which by reason of emigration from the United States became American instead of Mexican. What if such a state, controlled by sturdy German people, should set up an indepen-

dent government with or without a struggle with Brazil?

The Monroe doctrine certainly admits the right of South American people to make endless revolutions. As in the recent case of Panama, it allows any part of a nation to secede and set up an independent government in what had heretofore been only a federal state. The Monroe doctrine could not, therefore, be held to forbid the establishment of a new German Brazil under whatever form of government the people might choose for themselves. We have seen Brazil under an emperor who was at least as good a friend to the people of the United States, and who governed as justly for the welfare of the Brazilians, as any of the South American dictators who have borne the nominal title of president. Secretary Seward, who may be supposed to have understood the Monroe doctrine, has assured us that the United States could have had no cause to complain of the presence of the Emperor Maximilian in Mexico, if it could have been shown that he was the honest choice of the Mexican people. The Monroe doctrine merely compels us to protest, but not necessarily to go to war, against the interference of European powers who might threaten to over-

turn an American government and take away the liberties of its people.

What, now, if we suppose that a German "Texas" in Brazil should honestly choose to do what our own Texas did, and to be annexed to the German empire? We cannot see by what principle of justice or reason the people of the United States could complain of such an arrangement, especially if it were brought about to the satisfaction of the population involved in the proposed change, and by regular treaty with the Portuguese part of Brazil. Does any one seriously suppose that the Monroe doctrine would compel the United States to enter into a bloody war with a great friendly power in Europe, and actually to thwart the will of an honest majority of the people of a South American state?

The second point upon which the Monroe doctrine is liable to a new and perilous reinterpretation, and indeed to a total change of meaning, concerns the serious financial entanglements in which our neighbors to the south of us are involved with their foreign creditors. Among the novel functions expected of modern governments is assistance in collecting debts owed to the citizens of the stronger nation from the citizens of ill-

governed countries, especially the debts contracted or guaranteed by weak and shifty governments, as well as the damages caused to foreigners in the course of revolutionary changes, too often promoted by foreigners. The story of the attack upon Venezuela by the combined forces of Great Britain, Germany, and Italy illustrates a kind of difficulty which no one in President Monroe's time could have contemplated. Italians, Germans, and Englishmen had ventured their money in the immense risks of business in a half-civilized state, whose revolutionary governments had also issued their dubious bonds to be speculated upon in foreign markets. In 1902 an armed demonstration was made by the three governments in the interest of the aggrieved foreign creditors of Venezuela. These grievances were later referred to the Hague tribunal, which rendered the rather ominous decision that, in the settlement of the claims against Venezuela, the citizens of the nations which had gone to war to enforce their demands should have the preference over similar claims of the citizens of other governments.

Meantime the United States held, in consistency with its usual policy in such issues, that the Monroe doctrine did not forbid the intervention of

European powers in attempting to protect their subjects from the loss of their property in South America, provided only that intervention did not go so far as to appropriate territory or to overturn the government of the country.

Grave questions arise at once, not merely touching the interpretation of the Monroe doctrine and our relation to the South American states, but also suggesting the need of new definitions of international law among all nations. Is it expedient or righteous to allow any power, or any league of powers, the license to make war upon a sovereign state, and to threaten to kill its people, for the sake of the collection of money claims in favor of the citizens of the aggressive governments? This is to trust the creditor nations with the double function of judge and sheriff. If the precedent established in the Venezuelan case is followed, this is to set a premium upon the method of coercion, and substantially to recommend at least the show of war, whenever the merchants and money-lenders of a strong nation are in peril of losing their money in an ill-governed country. This again is to urge creditors rather to trust in the strong arm of their governments for safeguarding their foreign

speculations, than to take their own risks, as all other investors must, whenever they speculate on the promises of impecunious and shifty debtors.

Worse yet, the course admitted with Venezuela means the punishment and oppression of the innocent and not the guilty. The poor people, who have in most cases reaped the least benefit from the foreign loans spent in their country, must be forced to pay taxes to bear the cost of the frequent collusion between their unprincipled and extravagant rulers with equally unscrupulous money-lenders abroad. The poor people in the creditor nations must also pay heavier taxes in order to support the armaments necessary for their own rulers to play the rôle of the powerful sheriff over the seas.

It is evident that the world is not yet organized to establish an international debt-collecting authority with force to levy on the public property of bankrupt nations. The Hague tribunal may indeed, if invoked, pronounce a judgment, but it has no fleet at its disposal. It would probably never be wise to give it the brute force of war ships to compel the execution of its decrees, least of all in the collection of

debts. The truth is that a bankrupt and spendthrift nation, like an individual, has already begun to suffer its natural penalty when the whole world knows that it cannot be trusted any longer. Why should any one wish to kill the people of a helpless and dishonored nation? Let the government of the United States, then, instead of acquiescing in the doctrine that nations may go to war to collect the debts of their subjects, take the opposite ground, namely, that no pecuniary considerations can constitute a sufficient justification for an aggressive war. The establishment of this definite and reasonable doctrine would be worth more than a hundred ironclads to the United States. In fact, this would be the practical culmination and fulfilment of the Monroe doctrine. All the traditions of our national policy seem to favor this conduct.

Grant, however, that the commercial prejudice in favor of going to war to collect the debts of the weak to the strong, may prevail for a considerable period. Two modes of interpretation of the Monroe doctrine lie before the government of the United States. One course is suggested by the arrangement proposed between the United States and Morales, the late dictator of Santo Domingo,

whereby the United States would agree substantially to manage the finances, collect the customs, and pay the foreign creditors of Santo Domingo. The new idea is that no foreign power or combination of powers can be trusted to intervene for any cause in the unstable politics of misgoverned American states. To collect debts by force involves more or less permanent occupation of the ports and the necessary disturbance of the government. To take possession of the custom-house of a state is itself an act of sovereignty, and naturally leads to responsibility for the good order of the country whose ports are held. Moreover, the agreement to allow a foreign government to administer the custom-houses must generally represent the concession of a faction or a despot, and not the free consent of the people of the country. It is thus the denial of real democratic government.

The extraordinary conclusion follows, that, if the United States may not suffer European powers to collect debts in America by force of arms, or even to take temporary possession of their customs ports, the United States should be prepared to undertake the business of administering the foreign finances of all states under the ægis of the Monroe doctrine, which get into trouble with European

creditors! San Domingo is only the beginning of this new policy. There is scarcely a state south of the Rio Grande which is so far above the danger line of national bankruptcy, or which gives such adequate protection to foreign merchants and creditors, as not to be liable sooner or later to demand the offices of the United States, as continental administrator and guarantor of foreign claims.

To this novel and startling development of the Monroe doctrine obvious objections occur immediately. One serious class of objections touches the policy of meddling in any way with the finances, and therefore necessarily with the government and the order of other states. It is clear that the people of the United States would never submit to the suggestion of such intermeddling in their own affairs. They ought not then to meddle with their neighbors. Even if it were easy and plausible to enter upon an enterprise of this sort, it is never easy to know how or when to withdraw. The first step of meddling always leads to more meddling. The assumption of responsibility involves new responsibility. Beyond all temporary occupation of other peoples' customs ports looms the spectre of the annexation of the territory for which finan-

cial responsibility has been incurred. The story of England in Egypt illustrates this. The story of the United States in the Philippines is too largely a story of blood and unwilling submission to tempt the people of the United States to risk a series of similar enterprises stretching over the continent.

Still more serious objections in the way of the United States managing the foreign finances of Hayti or of South American states arise on the side of the complications thus involved with the European powers themselves. The most approved policy of the United States, inherited from the beginning of the republic, has been the avoidance of entanglements with military nations. But now we are asked to serve at once as the armed judge and the sheriff, to pass upon and to collect the claims of the citizens of various nationalities. Here is an endless opportunity for complaint, for jealousy, and for friction with the governments of Europe. Who has made the government of the United States a judge and a divider over these rival claimants? Foreign speculators will hardly be satisfied when their extravagant or fraudulent claims are denied. What if the customs fail to bring in returns adequate to pay hungry foreign creditors? What pressure will not then be brought

to bear upon the United States to wring larger taxes out of the debtor peoples,—mostly left out of this scheme in behalf of the money-lenders?

Suppose now the United States adopts the alternative course, in line with all its precedents and with the action of its state department as late as the war upon Venezuela in 1902. The powers of Europe shall be free to do in America what they did in the case with China, and what they did in Venezuela. They shall only be expected to desist from the forcible and permanent occupation of territory in opposition to the will of the inhabitants. Grant that the United States ought to keep clear of the obnoxious function of compelling strangers to pay their debts. The question is, whether the United States is called upon for any righteous reason to forbid European powers from exercising this function on our continent.

In the first place, we are evidently under no obligation to interdict European powers from enforcing the claims of their subjects in America, so long as we make no effort to bring this sort of governmental enterprise under the ban of international law. Moreover, so far as ill-governed states do nothing to safeguard the lives and property of foreigners residing in them, though we may pity

their people and regard as futile the attempt to compel them at the point of the bayonet to be honest, and to elect public-spirited presidents, we can hardly justify ourselves in going to war and imperilling millions of lives of innocent and honest people, for the sake of shielding South Americans from the results of their own ignorance and misrule. There is no genuine sympathy on our part with South Americans deep enough to require us to fight against Germany or Italy to save Spanish Americans from the hands of the sheriff.

Again, we have already suggested that, even if we go so far as to contemplate a possible occupation of South American wildernesses by certain European powers as the outcome of an unsuccessful effort to collect bad debts in Venezuela or Guatemala, the United States has nothing to fear from such changes of sovereignty. A German Guatemala would be as harmless to us as a British or a French Guiana, or a British Honduras or Danish West Indies. If the interests of the citizens of Germany in Santo Domingo can be supposed to be improved through the administration of the Dominican custom-houses by the government of the United States, then the interests of the citizens of the United States would not be

likely to suffer from the possible administration of South American ports, for a longer or shorter time, by German officers. If trade is good between the United States and Germany, so trade would not suffer between a Germanized port in South America and the United States.

It cannot be too clearly understood that the conditions which once recommended the Monroe doctrine as a safeguard of American liberty and of democratic government have altogether altered. South America, which has suffered nearly a hundred years from native autocracy and faction, has to-day nothing to fear from European autocracy. No European government having dealings with a South American state threatens to injure or abridge the liberty of the people of this continent.

Finally, Americans ought to observe a strange tendency of the development of the Monroe doctrine in the direction of outright commercialism and national selfishness. The key to the original understanding of the Monroe doctrine was the word "liberty." The men of Monroe's time wished to protect the United States from the perils of militarism. The clew to understand the new purpose in pressing the Monroe doctrine

is "commercialism." The idea is beginning to unfold that the United States must keep control of the continent in the interest of trade and for the purpose of commercial "exploitation." There are vast forests, rich mines, and fat lands in South America. Capital is ready to rush in and seize its advantages. It is jealous of rival capital seeking investment from Europe. Whereas once the cry was to save South American liberty from the attacks of despotism, it is now whispered that we must keep South America as a field for the employment of American capital. Once the doctrine was political and stood roughly for a principle of democracy; the Monroe doctrine already promises to become an economical proposition. In its new meaning, under the guise of a powerful navy, its devotees clamor for a vast military expense. If ever the Golden Rule was in it, the rule of gold is taking its place. Let Americans everywhere upon the continent beware, lest the Monroe doctrine become a fetish and superstition and the enemy of real democracy.

XXII

THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER

IT is flattering to our national pride to be told that we have lately become a world power. It is agreeable to believe that men in every part of the world hold us in a new respect since the battle of Manila Bay. We are assured that our diplomacy has suddenly come to take rank with the greatest nations, and that even in Pekin imperial mandarins listen for our words. We are now at last to take our place in the lead of the world, peaceably, of course, if we can, but forcibly if we must. It appeals to our chivalry to learn what great things we are prepared to do, wherever oppression is, where a missionary station has been burned, or a Perdicaris kidnapped for ransom.

All Americans wish the expansion of the influence and the power of our country. The question before us concerns the nature or character of our national expansion. There is an ideal which many have conceived, of which we had better beware, for it has brought havoc to every people who have

conceived it. It is the ideal of a people who impress others with envy, jealousy, and fear. It is the ideal of a people who impose their authority and their civilization upon other peoples. It is the ideal of figures, gross numbers, and areas of square miles. There is at present a recrudescence of this notion of national grandeur. It is the more subtle, because it is mixed with an appeal to both mercenary and chivalrous motives ; ingenious and sophistical reasons are given in leading journals, and often in the name of religion and humanity, for the imaginary philanthropic results to be won on the grand track of "world power."

There is happily another and no less splendid ideal of national expansion, which, in more than one hundred years, we have hardly begun to realize. It concerns first the welfare of the forgotten multitudes of the American people. It touches the quality of their life. Millions of them are poorly housed, scantily clad, little educated. In the midst of modern wealth a host of them earn as yet small wages. Add to their skill and effectiveness, elevate their standards, increase the demands of their manhood, make them happier, lift the level of their pleasures, and you will presently multiply immensely the power and the life of the nation.

Raise the average welfare, and you will raise every one with it. We do not necessarily mean paternal or socialistic measures; we mean popular or democratic measures, — the release of the people from the control of monopolists, fair and just taxation, the more intelligent holding and use of the land (the foundation of all prosperity), and vastly better education for all children.

We desire to be a world power in advance of all the nations. There is nothing which we can do for the oppressed peoples of Europe and Asia, so beneficent and far-reaching, as to provide an object-lesson for the world of what a truly democratic government may be, to work out the nice relations between wise governmental action and the freedom of the individual initiative, to take friendly care of our vast new immigrant populations, to absorb and assimilate them into a happy nation.

We still lavish the larger part of our national income for the purpose of militarism, whereas we need nearly every million of this expense for the interests of the people, the means and appliances of civilization, for good roads, for the building and equipment of schools, for the redeeming of ugly cities to beauty and happiness. The expense of a war ship stirs the suspicion of foreign

peoples. The same expense in lifting the condition of the people tends to make all nations our friends. The need of the world to-day is to see one great and successful power marching in the way of peace and human progress, and teaching the methods and the principles of humanity.

Every nation stands ready to follow America in this ideal of national expansion, as every nation is ready to fear and hate her, if once she plays, though in the most delicate fashion, the part of the bully or the braggart. In short, the great nation is like the great man. He is not the greatest whom others obey, but he who persuades the others by effectual and friendly good will.

True, the world is full of difficult problems. Anomalies and barbarisms exist everywhere. Brigandage and outlawry are to be found on an almost national scale, as in the Barbary states and in Turkey. Great powers and small, led by the foolish, the arrogant, and the unscrupulous, furnish continual provocation. Little nations, like Denmark and Holland, are not beyond the peril of being swallowed by their greedy neighbors. The United States may be quite safe by herself. Has she no duty in the family of nations, except to stand apart in her strength and

work out the problems of a happy civilization within her own borders? Must it not concern her if her neighbors quarrel and do each other injustice?

The fact is, the world is coming into sight of certain great principles of international law and action. We are learning that the duties of justice and friendly conduct between individuals and between peoples are analogous, if not exactly the same. As we long ago found that no individual was good or wise enough to be plaintiff or defendant, and at the same time the judge over his own cause, so we are learning in the case of issues between nations. We know that no third party, however friendly or disinterested he thinks himself, may safely intervene, unasked, to settle a quarrel between individuals by force. We are finding that the same truth holds good among the nations. No single government is wise or good or disinterested enough to be able to meddle and to take sides in the quarrels of other peoples. Costly experience is urging the world of nations to that point where long ago the world of individuals agreed to stand. We may do together, or co-operatively, what we may not dare to do alone. We may establish settled courts, we may meet in

congresses, we may unite in joint agreements, we may and must make treaties. We may and must settle our international grievances, as decent and law-abiding individuals settle their difficulties, by rules, and with the help of counsel and by the arbitrament of the disinterested; and where one meddler alone would invite suspicion, we may proceed together by the earnest intervention of many, thus commanding respect.

We are aware of the objection urged by those who, in a world of change, always hold out for the *status quo*, and resist reform. They tell us that no international congress or court has the power to enforce its authority upon an independent recalcitrant sovereignty. They urge that the most serious questions, about which nations are plunged into war, touch their honor or their territory, and cannot be submitted to any arbitrament but that of battle..

The truth is, however, especially as the world grows in civilization, that it is not so much compulsion and force, as the pressure of an aroused public opinion of justice, that enforces all judicial decrees. It is the same with nations as with individuals.

The "wager of battle" is always a form of

lottery. It can never be depended upon to settle any question justly or permanently. An international tribunal, on the other hand, however fallible like any other court, yet being governed by canons of reason, is hardly likely to do gross injustice by its decisions. The appeal to it saves the honor of the nations who submit to it, while even an erroneous decision may always, if really important, obtain a final reversal of judgment.

The history of most modern wars affords striking proof of our point. The costly interference of England, France, and Italy in the Crimean war, for example, failed to have the least permanent use in settling the Eastern question. That question was never more feverish than it is to-day. Even the famous march to Pekin to put down the Boxer rebellion, necessary as it seemed, was itself the disastrous result of a long and aggravating policy of unfriendly and aggressive interference by Western powers in the affairs of China.

The time has come to demand new and effective international law. Congresses of the nations will sometime be called to make such law. The action of an international congress will sometime secure the reduction of the appalling armaments of the world. The civilized world will proclaim authori-

tatively a new international law forbidding the invasion of neutral territory by warring powers.

Grant that Japan and Russia had to fight. They had no right to be carrying on their work of destruction in either Korea or Manchuria. The common humanity of all nations ought to forbid such an outrage upon innocent peoples. In fact, an international agreement, safeguarding the plain rights of neutrals, would have rendered the war between Russia and Japan well-nigh impossible. Neither in the face of such a general law of nations would Russia have wasted her money in fortifications at Port Arthur.

Observe now a marked change of attitude among nations toward belligerents. Whereas once the presumption was in favor of letting nations fight at whatever cost and discomfort to noncombatants, the presumption now tends to be against fighting and in favor of noncombatants. The world no longer can afford to look on and see the immense interests of the peaceable powers hazarded by the chance of war. Floating mines become a common nuisance. Battle-ships firing on innocent fishermen are intolerable. International law has already begun to safeguard neutral ships. Why not safeguard and neutralize the ocean? If ever naval

power seemed necessary for defence against foreign aggression, modern war ships have become rather a means for aggression than defence. Neither are they needed to protect commerce. So far as there is the slightest danger of piracy, the ironclad is an awkward and futile instrument. There is no nation for whose interest it would not be to forbid the presence of war ships upon the ocean, exactly as the United States and Canada forbid them on the Great Lakes. Why should the sea, the natural barrier against war, be suffered to be made the means and the theatre of international carnage?

We do not urge that any scheme will altogether obviate human friction, or put an immediate end to national selfishness and its resultant injustice. We do not profess that a world without war will be a perfect world, or that many perplexing questions will not to the end of time tax men's patience and ingenuity. We do not deny that a union of civilized nations might wrong weaker and childish peoples, as single strong powers have done in the past. The question of safeguarding traders and missionaries in the heart of Africa, in Turkey, or in Morocco, is always fraught with perils of mischief. It might be better for all concerned to require travellers and visitors who venture into the

half-civilized corners of the earth, to take their own risk, to be on their good behavior, and thus to learn to conciliate the native peoples.

It is conceivable that a congress of nations might be tempted to take in hand, by joint control or by mutual division among them, the enormous, perilous problem of the tropical regions. The fact remains obvious to all who read history, that the key to the solution of human problems is not in conquest or force, but only in the slow, patient, costly, but infinitely more fruitful and civilizing methods of commerce, education, sympathy, and good will. A democratic family of nations will find no other means necessary to solve its problems. All the economical and industrial forces of the world work together to urge the use of such means. There is no modern world power worthy of the name which is not growing more civilized every day. And civilization is essentially the highest product of humanity.

Meanwhile the idea of the organization of the world into an orderly scheme of coöperation is everywhere coming to consciousness. Innumerable international conferences of scholars and men of science, of students and intercollegiate bodies, of parliamentarians, of lawyers, of reformers, of

business interests, of working-men and their unions, bring representatives of all peoples together with a most hopeful frequency. The world is already becoming organized into an intellectual, industrial, commercial, financial, and even religious unity, faster than most men are aware. Political unity is only a single form among many modes of organization. The more complete this organization of the world is, which proceeds upon the natural lines of travel, trade, science, thought, mutual interests, in short, of humanity, the more elastic will be the coming political unity among the nations, and the freer it will be of the peril and the cost of centralized authority supported by force. When we use the familiar phrase, "a family of nations," we imply an ideal of world unity in which every smallest nationality shall have full recognition and liberty.

XXIII

POPULAR TAXATION

We speak of popular government and popular sovereignty. Why should we hesitate to speak also of popular taxation? The truth is, the consideration of true democracy involves almost an entire change in the idea of the purpose or intent of taxation. Throughout the larger part of human history a tax has been generally thought to be a burden imposed, like a fine, upon one set of people, known as the governed, by and for another ruling group. Thus, subject peoples always paid a tribute or tax to their conquerors. The various peoples that made up the Assyrian, the Persian, the Macedonian, or the Roman empire, were forced to pay whatever was demanded for the support of the imperial armies and courts. The poor people of India to-day pay millions of pounds sterling at the behest of British rulers. England stands behind the tribute paid by poor Egypt and Cyprus to the tyrannical Sultan of Turkey.

Not only were conquered people required to pay

taxes to their rulers; the people of each independent nation had also to help support the king and his captains, their lords. The feudal system was an enormous scheme to maintain a centralized government over discordant populations. The ruling people must furnish soldiery and the supplies of war, while they in turn looked to their vassals for the tribute necessary to keep them in the field. It was only a step to commute service in kind for money payments. The point is that the taxation of the world has largely represented some form of exaction rendered by the many to the exalted few who carried on the government. For what popular service do the taxes go even now in Oriental countries or in Russia? Of what use to the people are the larger part of the national taxes of France or Germany or Italy? What makes revolutionary anarchists of educated Russians? It is the fact that the people pay tribute out of their poverty without receiving any compensatory advantage. The anarchist not unnaturally surmises that the national government does more harm than good.

The payment of tribute exacted from a subject people is rarely without plausible justification. The rulers may commonly urge, as the British

conquerors of India urge to-day, that they render a necessary service to their people by defending them from their enemies and exchanging rude tribal or village justice for a firmer hand. The taxes are simply enforced payment for services actually rendered. The few, according to this theory, merely set their own price and give such service in return as they please. As the rulers become more civilized, and their subjects more sensitive, as new standards of justice, humanity, and civilization prevail, the pressure increases to give the people something to show for the money payments required of them. Thus the conscience of England constrains the imperial government to expend in India certain moneys for irrigation, for education, for the relief of the people from famine and the plague.

The history and the traditions of taxation carry an almost invariable prejudice against both the fact and the name. Even with the American and English people, who have enjoyed several generations of representative government, the common association of ideas connects the thought of a tax with a burden imposed. Men who have had a share in ordering their own taxes show reluctance to pay them. Men, honest in other

particulars, are pleased to evade their dues to the very government of which they are members. So heavily do the ancient traditions still color the obnoxious word "taxation."

What is the meaning of taxation in a true democracy? It is a pity that we could not alter the word in order to cover a new and generous idea. A tax, rightly understood, is a contribution shared by all in exchange for common benefits received. Through coöperation the whole people are enabled to enjoy advantages which no one could otherwise have, or at best, only the few could obtain. A pure water supply, scientific hygienic arrangements, hospitals, libraries, public schools, are among the things, continually growing in number and importance, which we all combine to purchase for all. It is not essential that the individual citizen shall always personally enjoy the thing which his public contribution or tax helps to secure. The childless millionaire was quite right who said to his friend that there was no part of his tax which he more willingly paid than that which went to the support of schools for other people's children. He was satisfied that the welfare, the intelligence, and the wealth, out of which his own income

was drawn, depended upon the public school system. The same may be said of the individual who may have no occasion to use the water supply or the municipal sewerage system. His own health and the health of his family are inextricably bound up with the public health which his taxes serve to improve.

Whereas, in the old days, a subject was generally the poorer for having paid the tax exacted from him, and was often ruined by the tax collector, as men are ruined in Turkey to-day, every free citizen of a democracy is richer and happier for the payment of those public contributions which he still calls "the taxes." This is undoubtedly true in almost all American communities, despite undeniable waste and extravagance, and despite the heavy burdens which we pay as the cost of intemperance and crime. It is most nearly true in regard to our town and city administration, and it is least true for our national government, where we pay the larger part of the vast sum levied upon all the people on account of wars fought in the past, or for preparation against wars apprehended. Thus the national government of the United States, at first modestly administered with a view merely to public

necessities, has developed to a point of recklessness in expenditure where the people are able to see little profit by way of return for the moneys expended.

In other words, the further government is removed from direct responsibility to the people who must pay for it, the more costly it becomes, and the closer to the danger line of needless waste. Nevertheless, even the national government, once reduced to its legitimate functions and steered with an eye to the welfare of the American people, normally returns to the people in advantages all that they expend upon its support.

There are national services, as we have already seen, which the people of all the states can probably do together better than the people of the several states could do them alone. It is an open question, however, whether, in a peaceable and civilized world, the performance of these larger services, such as the post-office, or the building of lighthouses, would require a very strongly centralized national government. It is a grave problem whether the people of the United States are not laying too much stress and comparative expense upon their national system, and do not rather need to put their care, their thought, and

their contributions immensely more upon the strengthening and the perfecting of their local administrations. It may well be that the pathway of future democratic success, and therefore of outlay, lies in the direction of admirable and efficient home rule, touching closely the lives of the people, rather than in ambitious and costly schemes of national aggrandizement, wherein men are tempted blindly to follow those Old World and undemocratic traditions which favor the few at the expense of the many.

The idea of the public taxes as the joint and willing contributions of all the people for their common advantage at once carries with it certain natural inferences. For example, we used to be told that it was desirable that a tax should be indirect, and so laid that, if possible, no man might know how much he paid or when he paid it. This was obviously an excellent and shrewd plan for a tyranny or an oligarchy. It is easy to see how unwise this scheme is for a democracy. The free and intelligent citizen wants to know exactly what his fair share of the common burden is. No honest poor man thanks his government for hoodwinking or deceiving him. The fact is the poor really bear, and must bear, from the neces-

sity of the case, the bulk of the burdens of taxation. In other words, the multitude of the people combine in a democracy to secure common ends, and therefore the multitude must pay for what they get. In the ultimate analysis value of every kind is traced back to some form of human labor or activity. All economic values arise out of manual or mental labor. Money merely measures the various degrees and amounts of human activity.

Our national system of taxation, being almost wholly indirect, is therefore ill devised for a democracy. The citizen never knows what the government costs him. He pays his contribution without any consciousness that he is paying it, and without any sense of a common patriotic obligation in which he is a sharer. All national waste and extravagance is covered up in the items of his own personal expenditure. It is perhaps fitting that the cost of war should be largely concealed in the enormous drink bill of the people! Would the people, however, really sanction and willingly contribute more than half a billion dollars every year as appropriated by Congress, if each average household were obliged to furnish some \$30 to \$40 in actual money payment? If

each man's bill for national expense were directly presented to him, we should each scrutinize such tax bills, as we righteously ought to do; we should want to know what moneys served the public good; we should make wholesome protest against reckless appropriations and recall to private life congressmen who waste the people's money. The nation suffers to-day from a system of taxation which was never designed to serve intelligent and self-respecting people, and which is without any ethical value in training men to bear the burdens of good citizenship together.

Let us see what simple principles a good democratic system of taxation should follow. In the first place, every one who enjoys citizenship should help contribute to the support of the common government. No honorable man or woman wishes to be made a pauper by any rule of exemption. If it were possible to exempt the poor and to levy taxes upon the rich, no one would wish to do this. No recognition of a line of division between rich and poor is tolerable in a democracy. All the citizens should not only contribute together, but all should know that they contribute, and, so far as possible, what they contribute. Thus the thousands of voters in our great cities

who pay directly not as much as a poll tax, actually do help pay millions of dollars to carry on their municipal and state government. They pay a tax in every weekly or monthly rent bill, and in every street-car fare. It is unfortunate that they do not know they pay anything. They think that others pay, and that, in voting shiftless officials into power, other men must pay the bills.

The tax or contribution should also be levied in such a way as not to be oppressive to any one. It should be assessed in proportion to the relative means and ability of those who bear it. What wealthy members of the community are there so unjust as not to choose to pay larger taxes in accordance with their larger means? It is a valid ethical objection against the extreme form of the so-called "single tax," that it would seem to tax the humble cultivator of a cabbage patch as much as the richer factory owner who held the adjoining piece of land. Would the man who enjoys \$10,000 a year be content to pay only the same tax as the man who has \$1000? The element of relative ability certainly ought to enter into the tax system of a democracy.

The method of taxation should be so obviously just as not to tempt men to evasion, or much

worse, to downright falsehood. Here is the mischief of the schemes in vogue in most American states. The people in their corporate capacity, for example, in Massachusetts, attempt to tax the same property twice. They order a tax to be levied, not only on actual values, as on houses, railways, and lands, but also on the paper evidences of value, on bonds and certificates of stock. A Massachusetts millionaire who owns blocks of buildings in Chicago is taxed once,—in Chicago alone. A widow, with a few shares of stock in a corporation in Chicago, must pay two taxes, one there on the actual property, and another larger one at her home in Boston or Salem, on account of her bit of paper certificate of stock. Almost everywhere the people are guilty of such injustice to one another,—an injustice which almost never falls upon the rich, and not at all upon the unscrupulous, but generally upon honest people of moderate means.

A fair tax ought also to be made to encourage the people to use and to improve their houses and other property to the utmost. The ordinary system does not work in this way. The larger land-owners, for example, are apt to enjoy excessive and quite illegal exemptions, while the assessors

pounce upon every slight improvement made by poor and industrious people. The wealthy are enabled to hold lands which they do not use, while the farmer who builds a new poultry-house or a little stable must pay a tax immediately upon it.

The fair tax should also be apportioned to the convenience of the people who pay it. It is the one merit of indirect taxes that they are paid without needless burdensomeness. They ask for only a few cents at a time, as where a man smokes a cigar or drinks a glass of beer, or a woman buys an imported piece of gingham. We have seen that it is undesirable that men should not feel the cost of their own government at all. It is absurd to deny that the common government costs a great deal. It is wholesome and bracing to men to be conscious that they are sharing in their common burdens. But it is an oppression to most men, who receive only weekly wages, or a monthly salary, to be compelled at a single payment to bear the whole load of their annual taxes.

The average state and municipal tax for every man, woman, and child who lives in the city of Boston is little less than \$30. Fortunately this is higher than the tax of most other cities, but

there can be few heads of families in well-to-do towns, whose actual annual tax, however concealed, is not as much as \$25, a sum too large for the poorer man to pay at one time. Some such form of quarterly or monthly payment would seem to be called for in the collection of our public dues, as is provided in numerous insurance and fraternal societies and in the support of churches.

Another characteristic of a democratic system of taxation is that it makes appeal to the good will and the free consent of the people. It is their own tax for their own ends, and not a tribute forced upon them from without, or by a few designing fellow-citizens who have captured the government. Guarded indeed by needful rules, it is on the whole voluntary. The rules are for common convenience, and are intended to reënforce, not to menace, the prevailing sense of freedom. The challenge to the citizen who possibly questions his taxes is not the sight of the sheriff and the jail, but the frank and honest appeal to his justice and chivalry. Do you not wish to pay your share in the common burdens of your city, your state, or your country?

There doubtless needs to be some defined system of taxes. This is necessary for the sake of order, regularity, fairness, and efficiency. It would not

do for a modern community to depend upon merely voluntary contributions, as the old free city of Hamburg once did. We each need to be told as exactly as possible what our fair share of the taxes is. No man is a good judge of this question in his own case. We are glad to appoint impartial assessors who shall take the burden from our consciences, and determine for each what he ought to contribute. This fact does not prevent any one from taking the same honorable satisfaction in the payment of his taxes that he takes in paying for other useful service rendered, or even in offering his share of support to his lodge or his church.

I am reminded that there remains an element of force behind the tax-collector. So far as this is true, it is an anomaly in a democracy. It represents our failure to understand the nature of our own institutions, as different from, and a distinct advance upon, any former scheme of government. This displeasing element of compulsion also represents a certain prevailing resentment against the notorious wastefulness of public officials. The victim of a Tammany or a Quay régime can hardly take democratic pleasure in supporting a rule of “graft.” It is democratic government which we are considering, however, and not oligarchic or

despotic misrule. As fast as we the people secure an honest administration which truly represents us, we shall need little force to urge us to pay our share for carrying it on. Already there is almost as little need of the presence of the sheriff to collect the taxes in a well-conditioned New England town, as there is need of his help in compelling the ordinary citizen to pay his bills at the provision store.

The question may here be raised, whether the good democracy might not wisely appeal for certain public luxuries, like new buildings or the adornment of streets and squares, to the pure generosity of its people. As long as considerable differences continue between the extremes of wealth and poverty, there would seem to be subjects of expense upon the wisdom of which there might not be general agreement at the polls, for which the humbler incomes should not be taxed, and which might therefore be left to the liberality of the abler and more fortunate men and women. Might it not be fair to require the people who think the nation needs a larger supply of battleships, to provide the means for building them?

XXIV

DEMOCRATIC FORMS OF TAXATION

CERTAIN forms of taxation specially commend themselves as suitable to a democracy. The most obvious of these touches the land. It is an extraordinary assumption on the part of a man, that he should claim the right to own the land which he did not create, that he should presume to withhold it from use for as long a time as he chooses, that he should stand like "a dog in the manger" in the way of its improvement, and that even at the moment of death he should venture to prescribe what must be done with his land as long as the world endures!

Theoretically, at least, it would seem clear that no man should hold rights over the land any more than over the common air, the sunshine, and the water, beyond his own necessities. Theoretically, no man ought to be able to take profit out of the labor of his fellows in consideration for their being permitted to use the land. Men seize lands to which no original owner could ever have given a valid title ; they lay hands on corner lots in cities,

beautiful sites on the hills or along the shores of the sea, on mines and forests in the wilderness; they write their private names over these properties, and at last reap an increment which they may have never done an hour's work to increase, but which simply arises out of the growing needs, the demands, and the aggregate toil of a nation! This is not just. How can private property be justly created without social service?

From every point of view, the land affords a direct and natural subject of taxation. Grant, what is not true, that every present owner of land has actually paid for it in honest money. Grant, what is hard to prove, that it is on the whole for the public convenience and welfare, that is, for the most profitable use of the earth, to permit the present system of private ownership of the land. Yet land is everywhere the basis of the expenditure of pretty nearly all labor, skill, and intelligence. Nearly every one must use the land in some way in order to live. Assess a tax on the values of the land, and every one must help pay the tax. It is the kind of tax that can be most definitely known, and that cannot be evaded. It is least likely to do injustice, for whoever cares not to use land can and ought to relinquish it.

We do not necessarily advocate "the single tax," that is, the tax upon merely that part of the value of land which comes by the gifts of nature, or by virtue of its situation, as on a harbor front or a city avenue. This part of land value, however, surely ought to bear, as it does not now generally bear, the full weight of its burden. In other words, the whole community, and not merely exceptional individuals, ought in justice to enjoy the advantages which the growth and the wealth of all have created. The natural increase of rental value of land which comes from the public ought to go to the public. This is not because there is in the land a magic source of wealth aside from the labor of man, but it is because the new values represent the sum of the common labor and skill, and ought never to be absorbed by the few. The assessors should be required honestly to mark these unearned increments of land value to their full limit, and keep marking them up, as fast as they advance. The tax on this kind of property ought in justice to be very much higher than upon the kinds of property which the labor of man actually creates.

Why should the whole people suffer a continual injustice for fear of doing a slighter and merely

temporary incidental injustice to a class of the people who have already reaped immense private advantage by a privileged abuse of the tenure of land? We wonder what is to become of inordinate aggregations of property. We can at least order that they shall be honestly taxed. Nearly all the great trusts which alarm us rest upon enormous holdings of valuable land, which every one ought to know, as in the notorious case of the United States Steel Company, are allowed unfair exemptions by timid or dishonest methods of assessment.

Honest taxes upon land of which its owners are not as yet prepared to make profitable use might lead to its abandonment to the public. This would be only right. All forests and mines, for example, should be brought under the hands of the people, who ought never to have parted with them.

Another form of popular taxation touches all kinds of houses, shops, and buildings. These represent human industry and saving. They are subject to constant deterioration and risk of loss by fire. They ought to be taxed at a lower rate than the land on which they stand. The tax upon homes at a moderate rate is specially suited to be

borne by all the people who enjoy citizenship, inasmuch as all must generally use homes. Most people, unfortunately, rent their houses and do not own them. The tax which they all really pay should then be paid as a tax, and not concealed in the rent. Or, if it were paid with the rent and in small sums at a time, its exact amount should be required to be shown in the bills and receipts for the rent.

Nearly all property worth using as a basis for taxation is to be found under the head of lands and buildings, and does not need to be hunted for in people's stockings or in bank vaults. But, as long as the public grants franchises to various corporations, and especially to railways and telegraph companies, the people have the choice between the levying of equitable franchise taxes upon this subtle form of property, conveyed by act of the people, or of enjoying cheaper rates of service. It is ridiculous that such franchises should be exploited by the few at the cost of the many who grant them. It is sheer robbery, to be corrected by plain restitution, like other acts of robbery, when such franchises, made to run for a hundred years or in perpetuity, have been bought from pliant legislatures and corrupt city councils.

It must always seem reasonable to levy a tax upon luxuries. There is no time when it is more easy or fitting to give one's contribution for the public good than when one is laying out money in personal indulgences. It would be wholesome if dealers in liquors and tobacco were required to placard the amount of the government tax involved in the purchase of each cigar or glass of beer. The bill rendered for imported silks and other goods might also be required to indicate what proportion of the cost pays the duty to the government. Surely no good citizen would enjoy his luxuries the less for knowing what per cent of his money went to the public purse!

The chief requirement of a good luxury tax is that it should bear justly upon the rich, and not be levied unduly upon the extravagances or even the vices of the poor. A recent Massachusetts tax commission has made a suggestion which ought to commend itself as righteous and simple. It proposes a special tax to be assessed upon the value of residences, above a certain modest amount of exempted value. This tax would represent the scale of living, the furniture, the appointments, and the luxuries which almost invariably go with the houses of well-to-do and

wealthy people. These furnishings are in some cases almost, if not quite, as expensive as the residence itself. They now largely escape taxation to the amount of hundreds of millions of dollars.

A tax upon house furnishings in detail, upon watches, diamonds, and bric-a-brac, would be inquisitorial and offensive. But a general tax, based upon the value of the house, upon its spaciousness and elegance—would cover all this enormous and increasing volume of more or less luxurious personal property. This is the kind of tax which the more favored class in a democracy might be fairly expected to choose to contribute out of their surplus. It could nowhere work injustice. For no one is obliged to live in a house so expensive as to induce a great tax of this kind. If it tended to discourage the building of private palaces, so much the better. Palaces for private citizens are incongruous in a democracy. Such a tax might also justly be so graded as to bear gently on moderate homes, and more heavily in proportion to the higher scale of expense lavished upon the various residences, apartment houses, or hotels in which wealthy people live. It would thus practically take the place of a graduated income tax, as being simpler to assess and collect,

and less liable to abuse by way of dishonest evasion.

The principle of this kind of tax would rightly touch certain special forms of personal indulgence, such as yachts and automobiles. Why should not a steam yacht worth a hundred thousand dollars pay a tax at least twice as high as the same property invested in a dozen fishing schooners? The owner of the yacht ought strictly to take an honest pride in paying more for his pleasure than his neighbor pays for the bare chance of earning his living!

The democracy is certain to look with growing disfavor upon the dubious claim of a right to bequeath unlimited property by will. There can evidently be no natural right to lay "the dead hand" upon generations of men unborn. The Astors, Carnegies, and Rockefellers already possess an exaggerated title to set their own terms and to tax the public in every dollar's worth of transportation or coal or oil which we buy. It is preposterous that they should be allowed to go on taxing the public forever and for the benefit of heirs to whom the world owes nothing.

While the people may well deem it expedient to allow the free bestowal of modest estates, nothing

can be more just and wise than to require at the death of wealthy persons, by some graduated system of inheritance tax, the division of their estates with the whole community, by whose coöperation in every case such properties must have arisen. It is no oppression to oblige the legatee to share his pure good fortune with the public. The oppression is on the other side, when a new generation finds itself bound to pay, out of the labor of all the people, to support a class of inheritors whose sole claim is that their grandparents were long ago paid quite too liberally for services rendered. That heirs should enjoy the heirlooms and wear the diamonds and divide the choice personal furnishings of their fortunate ancestors may be proper enough. That they should be given a permanent lien on the lands, the minerals, the mechanical powers, and the industrial tools of the working world, by the use of which men live, is a totally different and insufferable claim.

A word is pertinent here, touching the subject of public indebtedness. The past century has been signalized by an extraordinary and colossal aggregation of national, state, and municipal debts. The people have been in a hurry to get things faster than they were willing to pay for

them. Mayors and aldermen who could not live within their own personal incomes have been too ready to advise the public to spend beyond their means. Men in haste to be rich have disliked to part with their gains to pay for necessary public improvements. They have been thoughtless enough to bequeath a load of public debt to their children. "Give us time to make money," they have urged, "and let others clear up our debts after us." The money-lending class have been more than willing to engage the public in the floating of loans, often bearing high rates of interest, or extending beyond the lifetime of the generation who borrowed the money.

It is time to call a halt upon this extravagant, reckless, and undemocratic habit of public debt. The state is made to set a foolish example to its own children. A class of public creditors is raised up, over against the multitude, who are merely debtors to pay both principal and interest. A habit of debt leads to more debt. Presently the people are actually paying more money on account of the debt than they would need to be paying for all the purposes for which new debts are annually incurred, if at the beginning they had exercised some slight self-control, had faced some-

what larger taxes manfully together, had required the rich to pay their honorable share with the others, and had followed the good private and democratic rule, to "pay as you go."

A prosperous democracy, whether a town or a nation, ought never, unless in quite exceptional circumstances, and then for a very short term of years, to incur any debt. There are always, as a general rule, labor, skill, means, and material of every kind, to be had at the public need, sufficient to carry on the greatest public improvements, free of indebtedness, provided only that the people actually coöperate in their effort. We hardly yet realize how vast, under civilized conditions, the coöperative forces of a community are. A nation which, with perhaps one million hands constantly idle, still lives with a total income of ten or twelve billion dollars a year, needs to put forth no great strain in order to spend an extra billion, if need be, out of the combined efforts of all, to effect needful public improvements, to provide good roads, to secure excellent education for its children, and to take the best of care for all its wards.

XXV

LOCAL DEMOCRACY

WE have seen that the beginnings of modern democracy were in the towns and other local schemes of communal coöperation. It may be held that democracy is a natural method of government wherever men who know one another meet as neighbors. Even in Russia, under the most autocratic system of imperial rule, the local machinery still preserves the forms of democracy.

While, however, village and country people have long been accustomed to certain kinds of common activity and have learned to manage their local affairs better than any outside authority could manage for them, the range of this communal action has generally been very limited. Take, for example, the case of a New England town in the colonial period. There was little public property in such a town. The roads were bad. Even toll-roads between important centres of population were built and maintained by private enterprise. Bridges over any considerable rivers were a means of private gain. Schoolhouses, where they existed at all, were of little cost and poorly equipped.

The isolation of the homes of the country population of America, noticeable to this day, is in itself a mark of the singular individuality and independence of the people. It is as if the common motto was: Let each man mind his own business. Thus on an old-fashioned farm almost every kind of work went on. The farmer was his own carpenter and builder. His wife spun and wove the family clothing from the wool of her own sheep. With the least possible subdivision of industries there could only be the slightest use of coöperative enterprise.

Meantime, the conditions of urban life have taken a rapid extension into the country and promise irrevocably to change farm life from its old isolation into close forms of association. A progressive town must now have as good roads as a city. Costly macadamized highways have been proved to be economical. Their cost is a communal investment which adds immediately to the productive power and the selling value of the farms. The modern town often owns a common water supply and lights its roads at night. Its school organization is meant to give the children of its people hardly less complete educational advantages than their city cousins enjoy. In many

cases adjoining towns combine to employ a common superintendent of schools. Hundreds of towns maintain public libraries free to all the people. It is becoming evident that it was an error ever to let the forests go out of the hands of the people to become private property. Thus in various ways the communal activities have become, and are still becoming, far larger, more elaborate, and more expensive than country people ever before dreamed of operating together. Moreover, the more people accomplish together, the more they learn of the astonishing possibilities of the productiveness of coöperative enterprises.

The country towns are in danger of following at least one bad example which the cities have set them. This is the effort to procure whatever they desire by borrowing money. The fact is, that in a country town there is a great deal of unused or idle energy of men and horses, especially at certain seasons of the year. The people have yet to learn to employ and direct this power, that now goes largely to waste, into the channels of public utility. Thus, there is no town which might not build and maintain excellent highways and bridges, and even erect suitable schoolhouses, without incurring any new permanent debt.

There seems to be everywhere some kind of natural limit to the desirability of public and communal enterprise. It may not be easy to draw a line and say: At such a point communal action ceases to be profitable. But it looks as if this elusive and possibly shifting point were always present; and it is the business of society by patient experiments to find where it is. There are coöperative enterprises which from their nature call upon all the people to bear the burden and undertake them together in their coöperative capacity. There are other enterprises which seem to depend upon individual initiative and personal leadership, and which are apt to languish and lose their vitality as soon as the hand of officialism touches them. We do not want an official or communal religion, or system of medicine, or a state board of control of art and music. In all the higher range of human effort it is probable that the breath of freedom and individualism is essential to progress and excellence. The country towns, with this proper freedom of local option, have an excellent opportunity to try useful experiments — both in communal and voluntary action.

Mankind is only beginning to learn how vastly

the production, and the quality also, in almost every department of thought and activity, may be increased by skilful direction and quite voluntary coöperative effort. The best individualism is to-day learning to be social. The story of the advance of science illustrates this. The coöperation of scientific men with one another has been quite free of external dictation, but it has been none the less real and important. It is precisely this free type of industrial coöperation which we need to see in the country towns. The cities have carried it to its extreme limit. The country has never had enough of it.

In other words, we look to see among the farmers and in the country a movement of growth in industrial democracy,—that is, in acting and working together,—quite as great as has already been made in managing communal interests together. We look, moreover, to see this development on a perfectly free basis. It will follow lines which already appear, and upon which encouraging movement has been made in many quarters. Industrial democracy or coöperation will do for the country people what the close organization of urban life has already done for the cities. If civilization is the art of living together, the coming

coöperative movement in the industrial life of the country will be a distinct uplift in civilization. It will also promise to be more thoroughly democratic than urban civilization as yet is.

The misfortune of the countryman hitherto has been that he has had to be largely a lonely worker. Meantime a new science of agriculture is coming in, which changes everything and compels farmers to come out of their isolation and to join hands with one another. The farmer can no longer live on his own products ; he must specialize ; he must enter into the world of relations where he will be bound up with the interests of people in Cuba and Manchuria. He must get his goods, cotton, wheat, or apples to market, perhaps across the sea. He must know the most approved methods of using his soil and not waste his efforts ; he must have the best seed and stock. He must often have the use of costly machinery, like the cotton-gin, or the reaping-machine, which the individual himself may not be able to procure.

These new conditions require combination and coöperation. The farmers' granges are a means of getting and sharing new knowledge. The extension of the meteorological bureau and agricultural experiment stations are means for putting the

resources of the nation at the disposal of the farmer. The free rural delivery and the telephone service bring the latest results of expert study, along with warnings against sudden storms or frost, within every man's reach. They also bring neighbors into close touch with each other and add indefinitely to the possibilities of neighborly activity.

Even in the long-abused and rack-rented country districts of Ireland we hear of promising enterprises brought about through the coöperation of the hitherto poor and isolated farmers. They are learning to make excellent butter and cheese in coöperative dairies; where before their products were hardly worth sending to market, they are establishing societies for raising and marketing eggs and poultry; they are introducing the admirable German system of farmers' banks, enabling poor men successfully to borrow money at reasonable interest for their necessary tools, stock, and improvements, by the use of the common credit for honesty and character which the entire group of men combined in the bank contribute together. Here is genuine democracy at work to alter the face of the most poverty-stricken districts. It will be a shame if American farmers cannot adopt such measures for mutual help. Are they too

prosperous, or too individualistic, not to see that in union is strength?

Meanwhile there is a revival of interest in many old towns in the trades which ought always to go alongside of agricultural enterprise. Arts and crafts societies are fostering these characteristic country trades,—beautiful needlework, rug making, fine cabinet making, decorative ironwork, and such other trades as can be advantageously carried on by skilled hands and without the use of great power. The purpose is that the country people shall find pleasurable and intelligent use for otherwise idle time, shall increase their resources and income, and shall develop skill and artistic enjoyment. The key to all this is in a kind of coöperative effort which happily brings townspeople and city people closer together.¹

The village improvement societies serve as another illustration of the new movement through which people are feeling their way together in

¹ In the city of Boston a "Town Room," consisting of a library and museum, has been provided by the generosity of Joseph Lee, in coöperation with the Twentieth Century Club, where all manner of information, with photographs and illustrations, may be found, bearing upon the betterment, the beautifying, and the enrichment of country life.

various voluntary efforts to bring beauty and gladness into their lives.

Moreover, every coöperative effort, whatever its motive may be at the start, presently works to socialize, moralize, and civilize men. Working together, they learn to trust one another and they become more trustworthy. They learn to find, to value, and to develop those moral qualities of fidelity, truth, patience, and good will which are at the same time the qualities that bind men together in political society. Working together, meeting and discussing in their granges, in their dairy companies, in their banks, without distinction of party, race, or religion, but simply for their common benefit, they learn to get rid of factions, prejudices, and jealousies, and they are sure to become more effective fellow-citizens.

Town and local government will everywhere improve as fast as the country people widen the range of the common enterprises. The more things which they learn to do together by quite voluntary association, the better they will be able to perform those public functions in which it is the manifest duty of every one to participate, and from the obligation of which no one ought really to wish to escape.

Thus there is a constant natural and voluntary discipline on the side of man's social or collective life, by which he becomes fitted for doing his willing part as a citizen in the communal or public life. The farmers have a specially good field for working out this admirable discipline. It is doubtful if men ever make really good citizens without having learned the lessons of public spirit and coöperative action in the free school, the neighborhood, the church, the grange, the dairy or poultry association, the village improvement society, and other simple forms of free mutual union, where their loyalty and good sense are constantly called for in behalf of the common good.

From time immemorial the life of cities has been refreshed from the country. The cities still need new blood more than they are able to make for themselves. They will always look to the country for men and women of enterprise, courage, resourcefulness, skill, and moral integrity. It may be that the cities will look again to the country towns to be taught the art of good government. Why should not country life, with its new advantages, its increasing wealth, its improved education, continue to be the best possible school for a happy democracy?

XXVI

THE NEW IMMIGRATION

MANY people are frightened at the rapid and enormous immigration into the United States. We are told that within forty years, that is, hardly more than a single generation, sixteen millions of new people have come to live in our country, and mostly in the Northern and Western states. As many as one million have come in a single year. This is equivalent to a form of invasion. We are reminded of those mysterious movements of tribes and peoples which at various times in the past have changed the course of history, as, for example, when the Roman Empire waked up to find itself in the hands of new rulers,—Franks and Germans and Goths.

The earliest immigration to the United States was mostly of English stock. Up to the time of the American Revolution the population of the colonies was fairly homogeneous and generally Protestant in religion. Presently the Irish Catholics came, but they had a common language with

the previous settlers. Then came the Germans with a foreign tongue, but with instincts and traditions akin to the Anglo-Saxon peoples. Now at last the new populations are from the most distant provinces of Europe and even from Armenia and Syria. They are people who have never been used to acting together even in their native lands, and much less to the exercise of self-government. Many of them have been subject to grievous oppression, and have become accustomed to look upon all government and authority sometimes with blind fear, and again with suspicion and hate.

The newest immigrants are the poorest of all. They frequently land without bringing any property or money beyond their immediate necessities. They have little education or skill or aptitude for a strange environment. They settle in the first great city which they reach and add at once to the stress of competition in the most overcrowded trades, like garment making. There is no question but that the problem of fair wages would be far nearer to a solution, were it not complicated at every step by a throng of new applicants for employment at every centre of labor. The new immigrants from Canada, from Hungary, from Italy, from Finland, from Poland, press into mines and

new influx in gulf

factories and practically underbid and displace their predecessors in the march, such as Irish and Welsh and native Americans, and thus indirectly increase the pressure in other kinds of work. No industrial or political scheme can take over one million hungry people in a year without untold suffering, both to those who come and to those who were on the ground before them.

Moreover, upon the Pacific coast of the United States, already the vanguard of a Chinese and a Japanese invasion is visible. Contrary to the general traditions and principles of the American people, the gates have been violently closed in the face of the incoming Chinamen, and the new cry begins to be heard, despite our admiration of the intelligence and the courage of the Japanese, to shut the doors against their coming also. We are fairly afraid of a people who know how to work, to fight, to be artistic, to live "the simple life" on less than a quarter of a dollar a day. How preposterous it is, men begin to say, to raise a high tariff wall to protect the manufactures of a few of the people from the competition of underpaid foreign nations, while all the time these very peoples pour into our country and crowd and jostle our own citizens in every labor market!

The problem of immigration is still more complicated by the situation in the South, where nine millions of negroes, mostly illiterate and unskilled, with the cruel brand of slavery yet on their souls, multiplying in every decade, threaten eventually to spread northward and bring squalor with them wherever cheap labor is wanted. Let no one dream that the assimilation of all races and religions into a harmonious and happy people is a light task to contemplate.

It should be observed that the apprehensions about the coming of new people is a very old cry even in America. It was raised almost as early as the founding of the town of Boston, when Governor Winthrop was alarmed at the ship-loads of his own English countrymen who threatened soon quite to outnumber the sober church-members, the elect citizens of the young commonwealth.

The cry of fear was raised again when the Irish came, and presently took possession of the old houses of "first families" in New York and Boston. The fear of the stranger is as old as history. It runs with jealousy, selfishness, and all inhumanity. There are always men who want to raise an issue on sectarian, puritan, jingo, or racial lines, and so to keep men apart. And some profound

irresistible law, like a vast plough, forever goes its way, breaking through men's little divisions, blurring their lines of color and nation and class, and compelling them to learn to live together humanely.

It may be conceded that the flow of new population into the United States involves discomfort and pain. All changes usually involve discomfort. The immigration has doubtless been too rapid. The most that can be said for a tariff system is that it acts for a time like an artificial stimulus. It has not only fostered certain favored industries ; it has also stimulated competition for work and hurried multitudes of people to America who under more normal conditions would have remained at home.

It does not follow, because we are perplexed for the present to know how to distribute our new populations happily, that they will not prove in the end just as valuable as any other element in our complex nationality. It is marvellous, even now, to see how well, upon the whole, the men of diverse creeds and races are learning to get on together. Catholics and Protestants, Christians and Jews, do not fight with each other. It is almost impossible to imagine, so long as we maintain an atmosphere

of liberty, that they can ever wish to oppress one another. They are daily learning lessons of mutual respect; they are compelled to work, to act, to consult, and to vote together. The use of a common tongue, the common traditions and teachings of the public schools, the slow but natural process of intermarriage, are all working to reduce the Old World jealousies, and the dialects that expressed them, to the terms of a single and growingly homogeneous nationality. What native stock or race can any one prove to be disadvantageous to this coming unity!

Those who know their new neighbors least are most apt to speak ill of them. They who barely hear of Poles and Finns and Greeks are afraid of them. But those who best know each of the races who are seen in our streets,—the teachers, the settlement workers, even the policemen, assure us that they are extremely human and essentially like the rest of us. Do they tell falsehoods and cheat in a trade? So do certain lords of finance who hold their heads up in fashionable churches. Do they vote in a crowd? So do all partisans following their particular bell-wethers. Do they live squalidly? So not many generations ago did the ancestors of all of us. Are there mean and selfish

persons among them? So, by universal testimony, there are generous, true-hearted, and kindly persons. Are they averse to work and too much inclined to live by their wits? This is a common complaint among all kinds and conditions of men. We pass laws to exclude the Chinese, but every Chinaman who is here appears to be wanted. We regret the blunder and greed that brought slaves here from Africa, but every Southern white man wants the negro to work for him. There is no objection to his labor, because his wages are low. The South would not agree to return the negro to Africa, if the task were possible. Who would raise and pick ten million bales of cotton, if there were no black hands to labor?

Men sometimes foolishly talk as if there were so much work to be done, no more and no less, and so much money to be divided in the form of wages. In this view the newcomer seems to take the bread out of the mouth of the natives. But a moment's reflection shows that every able-bodied man is a natural producer. In the long run he will find employment. He is an exceptional or bad man if he is not worth all that he costs. Is there the slightest doubt that the multitudes of our new population are adding to the general

yes, by extracting it!

wealth of the country? Do they not mine coal and iron, and manufacture steel and cotton cloth and garments and shoes? It is already a matter of general misgiving whether they are paid enough for what they do! Meanwhile, they create on every hand a fresh economic demand for everything which the country can supply. New houses, new railroads and cars, new furniture, new clothing, are called for. New loans are actually put on the market to build schoolhouses to educate their children. Where indeed do the colossal fortunes come from and the princely salaries, except out of the immense growth of all human enterprise, which ministers to the housing, transporting, and feeding of new populations, and which this new population in turn actually pays for? What rich man, who, after having helped to make the demand for Italians and Poles to work for him, and then presently apprehends ruin to the country from their presence here, is not a richer man for that very fact?

It is said that the newcomers have pushed out the native stock. It is possible that by the subtle working of the conditions that rule the birth-rate, their coming has checked the increase of the earlier stock. No one can be sure of this.

But what has become of the men of this much-wanted native stock? No one has been massacred in the course of this peaceful invasion. You will find the native Americans to a very large extent at the head of all manner of lucrative businesses. You will often find them living in luxury out of the proceeds of their fathers' houses and gardens and farms, which they have sold or rented to the newcomers. You will find also the children of the earlier tides of immigration, whose coming the timid ones apprehended, educated in our schools, and climbing up into the places of responsibility and leadership in business and politics. Do they not behave as well as their "Yankee" brothers behave under similar conditions? Let us not be afraid of the human nature which we all share.

*the unthanked
or unwanted
or unwanted*

Who now are we, whose own fathers came to America, some driven by religious persecution, some urged by their love of liberty, and others simply to better their condition, that we should put up barriers to forbid other men coming here for the same reasons that brought us? Or, on what lines shall we exclude "the unfit" and allow the fit to enter? Americans cannot bar men out because they are poor, as if poverty were a crime.

*what we
u had
whether
worse!*

We, among whom many languages are spoken, cannot shut our doors against those who cannot speak English. We cannot decently put up a color line, when millions of our legal citizens are black. It has been our continual boast that we could feed hundreds of millions of people on our ample domain. Does a mere dim sense of fear warrant us in discountenancing men who wish to come to the United States? And is this in any sense to be called a "Christian" country, if its people make laws against others, which they would deem it unfriendly in another nation to make against themselves? Why an "open door" in the East, and a closed door to the United States?

Besides candor and intelligence, the great requisite in the study of the problems of immigration is plenty of sympathy. We may commit blunders in any case, but the worst blunders will arise from the want of humanity.

Let us grant, in general, that we cannot reverse the generous and humane policy which we have always exercised in admitting the poor and the oppressed of all nations to America. Let us confess that it is extremely difficult to make restrictive laws against immigration that would not be un-

friendly to the nations with whose governments we wish to live in peace, as well as an insult and reproach to people who are already living among us. There are no peoples to whom we can afford to say, "We are afraid of you." There is no nation to whose government we can permanently afford to say, "We do not dare to let your people live with us."

We are reminded that we confront a grave situation. There are points where the inflow of population causes real distress, congestion, and even disease. We cannot be content to see the streets of our great cities converted into slums and ghettos, and wretched people either idle or subject to sweatshops, while we do nothing to ameliorate the evil. Admit, as we must, that we are made to suffer this evil by the fault of others,—of a despot in Constantinople, of autocracy in Russia, of ages of misrule in Italy, of a system of military conscription in Germany. We will not be so mean as to deny the bond of the common humanity which compels us to share the sorrow of the world and to try to cure it.

Not in use

There are certain conditions which simple intelligence and good will urge upon us. So far as excessive immigration is fostered by the ex-

aggerated advertisements and inducements of steamship companies and real estate speculators, who picture America as a species of El Dorado, we are bound to offset these efforts of corporate greed by some comprehensive system of public information in the countries from which emigrants come. When general business is dull in the United States and employment is difficult to find, why should not the facts be published as a warning wherever advertisements of American prosperity are exhibited? Why should not our new Department of Commerce see to it that intending emigrants from Poland or Hungary are kindly advised and directed? They ought to know the fact, if Philadelphia and New York have no work for them to do. They ought to have guidance, if they are really wanted in Iowa. The companies use agents to promote immigration. Why should not the people employ agents to caution immigrants against bitter disappointment? What work at our numerous foreign consulates is more important than this? Whenever a million workmen are out of employment in the United States, the fact ought to be published in all the ports of the world.

It may also be presumed that the various

governments are open to friendly remonstrance and to just coöperation with us to prevent the sick, the crippled, the insane, the helpless, from coming to suffer in a strange land and to become charges on our people. Reasonable regulations in this direction, while they affect no large numbers, are obviously fair on both sides. We probably have laws enough on this point at present. The difficulty to be overcome is in the application of such laws so that they may be effective, while working no hardship or cruelty. It will be the general instinct of our people to prefer to use and interpret the regulations upon immigration generously and in no stingy or harsh form. We mainly wish not to be imposed upon and made a dumping ground for certain classes of unfortunate people for whom their own neighbors and their government are properly responsible. We desire to be honestly hospitable, but we want our hospitality to be of actual use to those to whom we extend it.

Another reasonable check against too rapid immigration is suggested by the fact of the terrible and unhygienic overcrowding to which our great cities are now subjected. For every humane reason men and women ought not to be suffered

to be housed as hundreds of thousands are now housed in New York tenements. There should be some reasonable limit beyond which the crowding of families or boarders into a house cannot be permitted. No city can afford to let men live and die, much less to permit children to suffer in damp, dark, and foul quarters, the perennial breeding place of consumption and other diseases. So long as human greed and selfishness are suffered to maintain these shameful conditions, no one is safe from physical, moral, and political contamination.

It is impossible, however, to overcome the evils of our overcrowded cities merely by domestic or local legislation. Greed and selfishness begin their work beyond the seas. Thoughtless steamship managers hurry their freightage of poor immigrants ashore at Ellis Island without asking the question where these ignorant people will find lodging, shelter, or employment. A fair and rational rule ought to arise naturally out of the facts of this situation. It is this: that the steamship companies should be obliged for a reasonable time to share the responsibility with the public for the suitable reception, with decent lodging or housing, of the steerage passengers whom they bring

to our ports, and especially those who have wives and children.

Thus, if immigrants come here without money to keep them, and with no friends to welcome them and help them to be placed and to get work, the transportation companies should be required to bear a liberal share of the cost necessary for finding homes and employment. If within a year after their arrival any of these unfortunate people are discovered to be living in squalor and breaking the sanitary rules which forbid the overcrowding of tenements, the companies should be called upon to share in whatever expense is required to render the condition of the newcomers tolerable.

It might well be that such legislation should urge upon the great companies increased care at both ends : in learning that the passengers were fit persons to be brought to this country, and that they were fully informed as to the difficult economic conditions to which they would be subject here; and again, in maintaining friendly agencies in our ports so as to look after the comfort and welfare of the people whom they have assisted in bringing over.

It might well be that the companies should be obliged to help to provide for the distribution of

immigrants in country districts considerable distances from the usual ports of entry or through new ports. The chief difficulty in the problem of immigration is not that numerous immigrants come to America, but that the stream of immigration is blocked and congested in a few centres of population.

It might come to pass, as it has already been proposed to Congress, that communities in the West and South needing new population should be encouraged by law to keep their trained agents at the great ports, with the purpose of directing and assisting immigrants to the point where lands are cheap and labor is in demand.

Up to the present time, in our treatment of the new immigration, we seem almost literally to have done those things which we ought not to have done and to have failed to do those things which we ought to have done. We have actually enacted restrictive legislation to prevent those immigrants from being landed for whom employers are ready to provide regular employment, and only to allow those to come who have no employment in advance! This extraordinary law surely works cruelty. It would be fairer altogether to forbid the landing of people, for the lodging or housing

of whom it is necessary to break the tenement-house laws and to turn the homes into slums. Better yet, make it against the interest of the companies to take steerage fares from any wretched people for the humane reception of whom on our shores they have not as much ground of expectation as they would have in the case of shipwrecked mariners.

The steerage passengers indeed are not brought here as men, the equals with others in democratic society, but rather as peasants or peons, on whom, herded together like sheep, the favored classes look down from the upper deck. It has been suggested that an effectual mode of limiting emigration would consist in the requirement that steamship companies should provide distinctly more humane and therefore more expensive steerage accommodations. This might be defended in the interest of humanity.

The truth is, our treatment of immigrants is not that of men who welcome their fellows in the spirit of humanity. Neither do the immigrants come of their own free will, but because of harsh and abnormal economic or political conditions. It is even doubtful whether their removal here helps permanently to relieve the crowded and distressed conditions of their native lands.

While, then, we shrink from the harshness of forcibly returning any class of immigrants to the wretchedness from which they may have fled, we must set up our guard against the pitiless working of the forces which urge them to come here in ignorance of almost every condition requisite for their ready assimilation into our body politic. It is idle to talk vaguely of our free country and the natural rights of men to go wherever they please. The fact remains that it is an enormous task to receive a million immigrants in a year in a manner worthy of a free and humane people.

What shall we say, finally, as regards the tremendous possibilities of Oriental immigration? The danger in this direction is not from individual Japanese or Chinese who may wish to come to America as bona fide settlers or colonists. The danger is from the capitalists who are seeking to bring ship-loads of coolies and peons, as men once imported slaves. The conditions of this immigration are commercial rather than human. While it is hard to see how the democracy can consistently put up restrictions against the free immigration of men of whatever race, we may justly be forced to interfere with a form of traffic that handles men as merchandise. It follows that whatever laws

must be passed to meet an anomalous and artificial situation, the interpretation of such laws should be broad, generous, and humane, not narrow, harsh, and cruel, as in the case of the operation of the present Chinese exclusion acts.

Grant even the utmost that any one can fear, that natural physiological laws forbid the blending of the distinct races of mankind ; grant therefore — what has never yet been proved — the fact of a natural decree that the separate races had better live apart, each under its own form of political organization, and not too closely together under one rule. The great human bond still obviously holds and binds all races together ; it is the more necessary that they know each other, that they shall travel and trade and visit each other freely, and that their relations shall be governed by the principles of mutual faith and good will, not by suspicion, fear, contempt, or arrogance. But who knows that the grand experiment of different races living together under equal laws, an experiment which the world is now trying on a vast scale, will not prove under favorable conditions to work for the advantage of all ?

The presumption is surely not in the direction of men's fears and their divisions, but rather in

favor of their common hopes and their essential unity. For the differences among the races of men are on the surface, while their likenesses lie deep in their nature. These likenesses, moreover, become more evident the more men grow toward complete humanity.

is, in this order, because
more important to the learner,
and greater pupil interest.

XXVII

THE LABOR UNIONS

IT is not strange that the labor unions have incurred both praise and blame. Some of the keenest criticism of their methods has come from the side of good democracy.

It is true that, in the long run and viewed profoundly, the interests of all who are associated in industry, employers and employed, are identical, and that neither party can suffer or prosper without the loss or the advantage of the other. But this is not the immediate and superficial view of the relation of the two parties. They doubtless seem at first to have opposing interests. People of slender intelligence surmise that the gain of one party in a bargain must somehow come out of the loss of the other. They imagine a limited fund out of which wages and profits are drawn. The more the wages the less they think the profits must be. As if business were a bare and simple mechanical process, and not a vastly complicated scheme of vital relations!

It is conceivable that under the conditions of a

truly civilized world the working of the principle of "competition" might set prices, values, wages, and salaries, without injustice or oppression on the one hand, or without waste and extravagance on the other. No one has ever invented any other principle by which even rudely to assess values. We can conceive that the competition of civilized people would thus be a species of emulation or effort, to do thorough, skilful, and efficient work, and to render admirable service. We are very far from such a degree of civilization. There is quite too much competition to get returns, whether by profit or wages, without giving an honest equivalent. Indeed, the word "competition" in many minds has almost been spoiled by this use, as if it had no other meaning.

It is not so much the law of competition, crudely as it is as yet applied, that brings the necessity of unions among working-men, as it is the peculiar and perhaps transient conditions of modern industrial life. We see enormous aggregations of capital and businesses that each employ thousands of men. Armies of workmen can be transported to order from point to point. While custom-house officers keep guard against foreign products, the cheapest labor can be imported in

any quantity. We see industrial enterprises, coal mines and factories, launched and new towns built to house the workers, and then suddenly we behold enormous wreckage and waste, and the workers are scattered. The access to work for millions of men means not merely the possession of adequate strength or of skill, but the use of costly tools and mechanical power. At the same time the miners and the factory or railway workers have become differentiated, each group by themselves, and have no skill except for their one kind of toil. If they wished to quit the towns and live upon the land, there is no land free to take up. If there were free land, they have no tools or stock or shelter to begin a new form of work.

Meanwhile for multitudes of workers there is no longer any immediateness of relation with the people who employ them. The men never see their employers, who may live hundreds of miles away from the scene of work. The employers are not men, but corporations of men. While probably there never was an age of greater humanity than ours, while there were never so many persons of wealth with a sense of responsibility and the desire to do justice to their fellows, yet busi-

ness and industry have taken on a marvellously impersonal aspect. Employers and employed feel as if they were enmeshed in the coils of a huge system. The kindest of employers is not quite free, but he is bound by the will of others; he is even a sort of servant of a directorate; he is one in a combination of great concerns, under agreement to go with a certain common movement, to fix prices, to dictate terms, to set or alter wages.

The abler workmen, the skilful, the industrious, the progressive, and intelligent, might even yet have no need of protecting themselves by a union. There are never enough of this more capable class. They might be able always to take care of themselves. But this class was never so near the line of dependence as it is to-day. In earlier times these masters of their several trades usually had their own kits of tools; they had to knock at the doors of no colossal factories to obtain leave to use the mechanical power necessary for performing their work.

Unfortunately the majority of the men in any trade, as in any profession, are not highly skilled and capable and ready to adjust themselves to new conditions. As mere individuals they are more or less helpless. In a mining town, or at

the stock-yards in Chicago, they may not be able to read or understand the language of their employers. Their natural means of protection is in union. Organize them together, let them choose leaders, committees, spokesmen; let them do for their common interests, as workmen, precisely what their employers do by their great combinations of capital. Can any one see objection to this course? "In union is strength." This is especially true for those who work and live close to the danger line of hunger. Hundreds of thousands of families in America are always living without as much as a week's wages in advance.

No opponent of the labor unions can deny that they have incidentally done much good. They constitute a great insurance society, thus safeguarding their members against the too frequent periods of sickness, accident, or unemployment. They have afforded a remarkably successful means of learning some of the great lessons of democracy and coöperation, for people who had enjoyed little, if any, training in this direction. Men and women of different nationalities and creeds have learned to deliberate and to act together. They have discovered for perhaps the first time what the value of a vote is. They have learned to practise self-

control, to make sacrifices, and to forego the indulgence of their individual wills in obedience to their regard for the common welfare. The unions have also been indispensable means in securing for large groups of people increased wages, shorter hours of work, and more decent and humane conditions. They have brought pressure directly upon their employers, and indirectly upon public opinion. They have had a considerable share also in making necessary laws.

Grant, if one pleases, that under quite free competition the general tendency is toward industrial justice. The truth is, that there is no such theoretical freedom in our present world. As long as the representatives of capital go unblushingly to all legislatures and to Congress to ask favors and to obtain protection for themselves, the men who have only their labor or their skill to sell, must also exert themselves and secure needful legislation, in order to adjust the balance, which, so far in human history, has always tended to stay on the side of the holders of property.

Moreover, whereas the laws proposed in the interest of capitalists have always been apt to inure only to the advantage of the few, the labor laws have tended to be for the public welfare.

Thus it is for the public health that work shall not be suffered to go on in the squalid conditions of the sweat-shop. It is for the broad public good that children shall not be allowed to waste their lives in mines and factories. It is for the public safety that railroads shall not work men to exhaustion. It is really more to the public advantage and the general wealth that wages shall be as large as possible, than that profits and dividends and the interest rate shall be high. However hopeless it may be to fix wages by law, no country can prosper where such conditions are tolerated as to degrade any considerable population below that level of decency, roughly styled "the living wage."

So much by way of suggestion as to the actual usefulness of the labor unions. It is hard to see how any one can be so thoughtless and unfair as to be willing to see unions of every other kind, including great corporations and trusts, and not to encourage the federations of labor.

On the other hand, the labor unions have doubtless hitherto mainly followed the exclusive and militant, rather than the coöperative and humane type of democracy. The prevalent idea unfortunately is that society is composed of two antago-

nistic classes. There is too frequent appeal to class consciousness and class jealousy. They do not yet know the alphabet of American democracy who divide men on the basis of the "haves" and the "have-nots." The only valid distinction is between those who wish to get more than they give, and those who desire to render at least an honest equivalent for whatever they receive.

The typical labor union has in fact suffered from the current methods that still infest business and politics. The men in charge of the unions have "played their game" exactly as others were playing a similar game in railroad directors' meetings, in stock exchanges, in the lobbies of state-houses, in the chambers of legislation. There is no fault on account of which we complain of the unions which we may not trace to the group of men who have opposed the unions,—the very men who, if they had been good and wise enough, should have met the unions cordially and coöperated with them for the advantage of all.

The unions have suffered from unscrupulous leaders, from "grafters" like Parks, who have extorted and taken bribes at the hands of employers unscrupulous enough to offer to buy them. The unions have sometimes been guilty of restrict-

ing production, thus lessening the common prosperity which all share. They have simply followed the lead of employers, who have always been first in the field to give plausible reasons for this policy. The unions have been inconsiderate of the public and have waged industrial war in the public streets. They have involved whole cities in sympathetic strikes. The militarists have always done the same. Small thought have they ever had for the rights of neutrals!

It is not surprising that the unions have not been altogether democratic within themselves. They have shown the dangerous Old World tendency to play the part of the tyrant. Their officers have sometimes been trusted with too much authority. Uncommon opportunity has been offered for demagogues as against more modest and reasonable members. Their majorities have too often abused their power and overridden or suppressed reputable minorities. It is an open secret that their most thoughtful men are not brought to the front, or represented in their councils, and are, in fact, far from cordial in their membership. This is exactly the description, with a little change of words, of both of the great American political parties. The vices of the unions are only com-

mon vices of men at a certain stage of development.

The militant character of the unions is nowhere so obvious as in their attitude toward non-union men. Not only the common laws, but the principles of justice and humanity, have to suffer strain in order to afford justification for the policy of the unions toward the men who for various reasons refuse to join them. The ultimate democratic idea of voluntary coöperation is here set aside. The union now ceases to be a friendly association ; it becomes an army with the assumed right of intimidation and impressment.

It must not be forgotten that there are always men (and they are good democrats and Americans) who would not and could not conscientiously join any organization which would require them to stand out in an unjust or foolish strike or lockout.

Moreover, it is unbearable that any body of men in the state should be pledged (especially by a form of secret promise or oath) to allegiance to their own officers and in their own interest, to the neglect of the paramount duties which they owe in behalf of the general welfare. This is to prefer the service of a part to the good of the whole, to set up a new sovereignty within the nation, and so

to deny the principles of democratic government. Sympathize then as we may with the objects which the militant union has in view, suspect the "scab" if we must of being a rather mean fellow, nevertheless the theory, the methods, and the spirit of militarism have always proved to be, and always must naturally be, a menace to true and permanent democracy. If war, whether political or industrial, ever seems to further the development of civilization, it is at best always like the fever, through the pain and cost of which the need of cleanliness is forced home upon the ignorant. We pity them that they do not know and obey the laws which would forbid the fever. So when men wage industrial war upon one another, we deplore the slowness with which they learn the simple laws of humanity.

It will sometime be found out that the unions make no lasting gain by the outworn methods of strife and compulsion. Every injustice that the unions commit, whether to the public or the employers, or to the non-union men, immediately reacts in the form of aggrieved public opinion. Injustice is divisive, and tends to break up the unions. Oppressive trusts and monopolies belong to a régime that already is doomed. Let them do

injustice if they dare; the sooner they come to an end. But the unions, springing out of the heart of the people, are bound to be democratic; they cannot afford to permit the semblance of inhumanity. Their natural atmosphere is freedom. Let this fail and men cease to have use for them.

The labor unions have instinctively followed the tendency of the times in attempting enormous and even continental aggregations of membership. There is involved in this movement a peril of over-centralization. So far as great combinations, whether of states or corporations or unions, are freely held together by the bond of good will and of common interests, they can evidently promote efficiency throughout the whole body of associates. Their danger lies in the fact that too great authority is apt to be delegated to distant centres of control, and lodged in the hands of men whose characters are unequal to their burden of responsibility. The heads of a colossal organization, a republic or a federation of labor, being lifted above the shafts of criticism, are tempted to put on the airs and pride of kings. There is a curious and subtle disposition in men who are trusted with power, to play the lord over others and to coerce the unwilling. It is the instinct of democracy

to resist the approach of every sort of close, inelastic, and military organization of society.

It must never be forgotten that the unions only embrace a moiety of the people of any country. Their scope is naturally somewhat limited to those trades and occupations, such as mines, railroads, and wholesale manufactories, which require and mass together large numbers of workmen. It is hardly conceivable that the whole body of the workers of a nation could be bound and held together in unions. Or, if this came about, it would seem to involve a scheme of state socialism.

The number of small businesses, even in these days of the growth of vast corporations, is said steadily to increase. An immense portion of the work of the world does not concern itself with the production of staples and bare necessities,—steel rails and cotton cloth,—but with all varieties of things of comfort and art, befitting a complex civilized life. Multitudes of men are engaged in raising or making specialties. Multitudes are, and must be, scattered in villages and through agricultural regions,—market gardeners, florists, the makers of “fancy goods.” The natural humane and neighborly relations of man with man, and the possibilities of profit sharing and democratic coöperation,

hold good through all these numerous branches of industry. There is little need of militant organization of labor when employers and employed know one another well enough to become friends and partners.

On the other hand, it has proved extremely difficult to organize the unskilled into permanent unions. While the grievances of the very poor are frequently cited as a justification of the unions, it is the poor against whom, from the selfish point of view, the unions seek protection. Men and women are ever ready to press from the ranks of the very poor to offer their labor at starvation wages. The poor and the unskilled furnish recruits to break strikes. As long as emigration is free, or as population has its normal increase without far better education than has yet been devised, the problem of the poor and the unskilled remains. The unions evidently cannot take all men who labor into their membership. The unions, in fact, represent a sort of caste or aristocracy among the workers. They often point with pride to the fact that their members are abler and more trustworthy than those outside.

People are not accurately divided by any sharp lines into employers and employed. We are all

employers and we are all employees. The same people are producers and consumers. On one side it is for a man's advantage that wages — his own wages — shall be as high as possible. On many other sides it is for the same man's advantage that general wages shall be reasonably low. Else the cost of his living will be too great. The one thing for the advantage of all is, not that wages be high or low, but that the total product of all desirable things shall be large and excellent. This means that every one shall have the opportunity to exercise his labor or his skill, and every one shall receive his share of the product.

The industrial health of a community rises with the number of its consumers, and with the largeness and efficiency of their demands. In this sense every rise in wages, however brought about, quickens the circulation of the whole industrial body. This is especially true when the rise in the wages means a new adjustment, by which a class of workers, hitherto inadequately provided for, are given opportunity to make larger demands as consumers. Give the "submerged" millions of the poor, for example, a rise in wages, and business of every sort feels the stimulus of a fresh demand; the gross product of the nation shows an increase.

On the other hand, the new prosperity cannot last unless the work for which the increased wages are paid proves to be honestly worth paying for. There is no supernatural fund from which men can draw wages or incomes. The fund is simply the total of all the values created by human labor, intelligence, and skill.

Thus, suppose that the labor unions succeeded indefinitely in cutting down their hours of work and raising their wages, the point must come at last when they would fail to render an equivalent value to industrial society for what they consumed. It is conceivable that a trade union, for example, the bricklayers or the plumbers, might for a time establish a monopoly in a great city and extort more than their labor was really worth. In this case the loss to the general body of society might be even greater than that caused by individual monopolists like the owners of the Astor estate.

Much is said of the use of methods of arbitration to settle labor disputes. It would seem fundamental that the parties in a disagreement should meet face to face, or through good-tempered representatives, and come to a common understanding upon the basis of their mutual interest. When, as in the conduct of a railroad, the public are also

concerned in the controversy, the public ought manifestly to have representation in the proceedings and a voice in giving counsel. By common consent, this arrangement is often made informally, as well as by state boards of conciliation. Ought the state to go farther and, following the example of New Zealand, require and enforce the arbitration of labor questions?

It is doubtful public policy in a democracy to recognize, and thus to exaggerate, either social, partisan, or industrial divisions. We wish as little as possible to admit class distinctions, as between capitalists and workingmen. Neither do we wish, if we can help it, to call in the authority of the state to fix either wages or the rate of profit. We cannot really force men to work against their will. Neither can we require employers to carry on business unwillingly. The whole fabric of business rests upon a basis of voluntarism. Moreover, the ordinary courts are open to consider cases of actual injury.

If, then, we must ever set up special courts of arbitration, their use ought to be carefully confined to those quasi-public businesses, the stopping of which would involve general suffering. Even in such cases it is not clearly necessary or expedient

to try to enforce the decision of the arbiters. The decision of a trusted commission, once awarded, tends to enforce itself by its simple appeal to justice and humanity. Public opinion reenforces it. The presence or the threat of police or soldiers becomes an insult to the intelligence of the people for whose sake arbitration is invoked. It is not the compulsory feature in the New Zealand method of arbitration that is important. It is rather the fact that a regular and peaceable means is provided to which every one habitually looks, when the clouds of a labor trouble appear in the sky.

Our conclusion finally is that labor unions, at least in their militant form, are only a phase or stage in the coming of true democracy. Men of a common interest, whether a trade or an art, will always flock together. But the more civilized a nation becomes, the less will be the need for men to associate themselves for attack or defence.

Men are slowly coming to see that the Golden Rule is actually at the foundation of industry. Translated into concrete terms it means: Give the best possible service to every one. Give the highest wages that you can afford. Choose the best quality in things and expect to pay the honest prices that excellence deserves. The people who

have caught the secret of this rule will never need to suffer from labor disputes. There are such individuals already in business. The worst peril of the militant unionism is that it works to repress and overawe, and even to injure, these natural friends of the people.

XXVIII

DEMOCRACY AND THE FAMILY

UNUSUAL concern is felt in many quarters for the institution of the family. It is recognized that society is passing through a dangerous transition period. The astonishing increase in the number of divorces excites alarm. Thus, in a certain meeting of the Episcopal convention in Boston, in the face of the expenditure of more than \$200,000,000 a year for militarism against which the convention had no decisive word to utter, at a time when the nation is spending a billion dollars a year for its drink bill,—a fact which caused the convention no special anxiety,—when the most unscrupulous selfishness is allowed to bleed the people without any really earnest protest on the part of religious bodies, the question of divorce occupied a considerable part of the time of this distinguished convention.

There is no doubt that there is a light-mindedness about marriage which deserves serious study. There are, however, various possible interpretations

of the facts and figures that cause alarm. These phenomena do not necessarily prove that the average happiness in married life in the nineteenth century is less than in the fourteenth century; that married life is less pure and faithful in New England, with its too high rate of divorce, than in Scotland where divorces are less frequent; or even that the purity of married life is lower in the state of Maine, with one divorce to six or seven marriages, than in South Carolina, with its old-time strictness of divorce legislation. The frequency of divorce, however deeply we regret it, is probably to be interpreted as a symptom rather than as an original social malady. It is doubtless due in part to a new sensitiveness touching the relations of married life. Men, and especially women, have become conscious of evils and injustices which they once suffered hopelessly as a matter of course.

The truth is that all human society is on the march upward from an aristocratic scheme of organization to the democratic régime. This great secular movement demands a readjustment of the relations of the family. For the institution of the family has naturally tended to follow the general aristocratic theory of society, of which the family itself was the unit.

Humanity has tried all sorts of experiments in marriage, but the prevailing usage in the line of the traditions which our Western civilization has followed, has vested the power and authority with the father of the family. The familiar word "obey," dictated to the woman in the marriage service, stands for this prevalent usage. Pretty nearly all legislation up to a recent time confirmed the same idea. The Bible and especially the authority of St. Paul were used to confirm this thought. The family was a little kingdom, of which the man was sovereign and the wife and children the subjects.

The incoming spirit of democracy has changed all this. Democracy emphasizes the importance of each individual life. It cuts off the heads of kings and princes and abrogates hereditary privileges. In democratic society each person stands on his own merits and is respected for what he is worth, that is, for his genuine manhood or womanhood.

Such is the theory, however far men fail to realize it. This then becomes the new theory of the family. The relation throughout is one of mutual service and regard. The binding power is not authority, but love. There are doubtless provinces

in the family life where the experience, wisdom, and actual authority of the father ought to prevail. There are other provinces in which the wife fairly commands.

There is a bad and mistaken democracy as well as a good democracy. The bad democracy splits society into units. It is essentially selfish. It is the democracy which lets people enter into relations with others for the sake of what they can get and enjoy. It is the democracy of those who evade responsibility and shirk their honest duties. Of course selfishness is the same divisive and suicidal quality in democratic society that it has always proved to be in feudal and aristocratic régimes. Selfishness and egotism were the roots out of which, in earliest times, under cover of the conventional marriage law, cruelty, brutality, and oppression were the natural issue. Out of the same roots to-day proceed looseness and frivolity in the family life and the frequency of appeal to the divorce courts. We can never cure or repress the symptoms of a malady. We must reach the mischief at its roots. There is only one method that has ever succeeded in this. It is the ancient rule, to "overcome evil with good." We shall cure a bad and mistaken democracy by the over-

flowing life of a good democracy. We shall set before our children, as diligently as ever the Japanese Samurai class have done, the one grand obligation to be loyal and true.

See now how the democratic principle, properly understood, works in the family relation, both to establish it in security and at the same time to protect the individual. We set love or good will as the bond of the family. It presses equally on every member. Its simple rule is: "To each according to his need; from each according to his ability." This is the rule of love; no force or legislation could ever enact it. Wherever love works it seeks the welfare of its objects. The one intent of the honorable husband and father is the happiness of the home. This is the intent of every other member of the household. This intent involves the closest coöperation and the utmost happiness.

Some one asks if it may not be a danger that the parents in the modern home will deny themselves too much for the sake of the happiness of their children? The household will therefore be made up of one group who sacrifice themselves, and another group who merely accept the sacrifice of the others and enjoy themselves. If this is

a peril, it is because parents themselves have not yet learned what the welfare of their children is. Happiness is in giving and expressing love. If the parents contrive merely that the children shall enjoy being waited upon by others, without enjoying the highest beatitude, namely, the rendering of hearty, loyal, and helpful service, they so far fail to secure the welfare of their children. It is unfortunate that many otherwise good parents do not see this fact.

It ought to be clear by this time that the truly democratic home is the most stable social organization that ever was seen. Its own life secures its permanence. It really requires no provision of legislation to defend it. There is in it at one and the same time freedom of spirit and effective and harmonious coöperation. No one of its members can be conceived as wishing to be faithless to it. The principle extends to the conditions of domestic service in the household. In multitudes of homes to-day, the good will prevalent in the home possesses also those who come from without to serve in it. These kindly, faithful men and women, who in many cases stand willing to lay down their lives for the children of the people who employ them, are not mere mercenaries.

Must the democratic family, some one asks, have no protection by law against the demoralizing influences which still everywhere hold over from the days of primitive barbarism? The need is certainly less than many people suppose, who exaggerate the use of legislation. It must not be forgotten that the monogamic family made its way as a higher type in the first instance, simply because it was stronger and fitter to survive; it prevailed without legislation to defend it and in the face of looser usages.

Nevertheless, it is clearly reasonable that society should have something to say by way of good order and method to those who propose to enter matrimony. It is necessary for every reason that the relation should be brought out of the dark and the clandestine into the light of frank publicity. It is necessary that the public should know, especially as long as private property exists, who are responsible for children's lives.

This is not because the civil contract establishes the marriage; nothing but the sacrament of true love can do that. But on the social side, the public fairly asks of the married pair that they shall register the fact of their union, and inform their neighbors how to consider them henceforth.

The married people will later be likely to ask the help of society in behalf of their children and in the disposition of their property. The least that they can do, on every ground of public convenience and private self-respect, is to obey such rational marriage laws as society everywhere establishes.

What now shall we say of the question of divorce? It is a grave evil, when married people wish to break the tie that binds the home, and especially if they wish this with selfish, frivolous, or vulgar intent. But the real evil is not so much that they desire to be separated from one another, as that they have married without love or respect. It is another form of this evil, that large numbers of people have never learned what it is to be faithful. In other words, they have not education or religion. Men often quote the familiar Scripture, "Whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder," as if it meant, Whom man hath joined together man can never put asunder. The question to be asked is, whether marriage exists in the absence of love. Is not a loveless marriage essentially bestial?

There are surely also just causes for separation, even more serious than marital infidelity. What

shall we say to those cases of abnormality, which sometimes happen, where brutal men have no respect for womanhood? What shall we say of cases of outrageous cruelty?

The fact is, society does not decree separation. As in the case of marriage, it can only register the separation which has already taken place. Here is a delicate and highly important subject. For evident reasons, as people ought not lightly to enter into the marriage relation, much less ought they lightly to be encouraged and aided to break it up. The social pressure, on the contrary, ought to be firmly and deliberately the other way, namely to bear and forbear and be patient, and to learn the eternal lesson of love. It is too true that, with lax divorce laws, many people break the marriage bond who might easily with a little effort live very comfortably together and develop lasting happiness.

Only two general considerations need to be urged as regards the amendment of the divorce laws. One is that such courts should be very few and somewhat august in their character. There is no reason why they should be composed of lawyers or exclusively of men. Good women ought to have a place upon them. They ought

not so much to represent legal acumen as the highest public spirit of the state. Moreover, in many cases, not necessarily in all, according to the judgment and advice of the court, a considerable time ought to elapse between a first decree of separation and the final public notice, if then necessary, of absolute divorce. By this limit of time the temptation to divorce on the side of mere selfish passion would largely be obviated.

A good deal is said of the necessity for national marriage and divorce legislation. Those who make this demand probably exaggerate the amount of mischief which arises from the lack of uniformity in the statutes of different states. They expect also to accomplish too much by making laws. Possibly they are somewhat zealous to enforce their own ideals of marriage upon other people. There are considerable advantages in maintaining the present freedom of each state to set the example to other states in the making of wise laws on this most delicate of subjects. Meanwhile unwise legislation, always tested by the result, is easily corrected, if a single state only, and not the nation, is made responsible for it. The ideal system of marriage laws would seem to grow naturally out of the progressive action of many enlightened commonwealths, each

copying the best work of its neighbors. Let us be wary of any scheme of legislation foisted upon the states by a majority of congressional votes. Fortunately the Constitution of the United States is still interpreted so as to put some limits upon an arbitrary centralization of government.

Finally, the great need everywhere is for a higher idealism. If all the girls in the country could see how beautiful the true home may be, if girls cared enough for the kind of love which alone constitutes the real bond of marriage, we should hear little demand for new statutes. The statutes at best only formulate the life that is deeper than rules. Every real home, where love is, already sets the standard for the making of other homes like it, and each happy husband or wife is a missionary of the democracy of the family.

XXIX

THE EDUCATION FOR A DEMOCRACY

THE education needed to fit youth for the life of a thorough democracy must evidently be a different education in various important respects from that which is suited to any other régime. Under an aristocratic system, for example, as in the Middle Ages, men are divided into classes. A few must be trained to command and the rest to obey. A few must have a high grade of education; the rest need comparatively little. In a despotic and unprogressive state, like Turkey, it is not wise to train men to ask questions and to think. In a free and progressive democracy there cannot possibly be too much thinking. In states with a servile population it is enough to give the workers bare manual training. This is argued by many people in the Southern states in regard to the education of the negroes and the poor whites. But a bare manual training will never fit men to be the citizens of a democracy. Neither, as we have already seen, can we ever have a good

democracy on the basis of a large servile and disfranchised population. If for any sufficient reason there is a disfranchised class in a nation, all the more need exists to fit this anomalous class as speedily as possible for complete citizenship. The aim of the good democracy is always the making of all-round manhood.

There are certain common elements of knowledge, — the tools of civilization, — which we are bound to put into the hands of every child. This does not really constitute a very formidable amount of "book learning." The modern man must know how to read and write; he must be able to use figures and measures; he must know something about the world in which he lives and the peoples who inhabit it; he ought to know a modicum of the history, at least of his own nation and the course of events through which his own costly institutions and liberties have been established; he should have introduction to the masterpieces of his own language; he should have stored in his memory a few of the great verses and sentences which help to make men noble. He should thus have the open door into the larger world of science, travel, literature, and achievement. There would seem to be no harshness in a rule that would make voting

citizenship depend upon a certain minimum of pass-work such as we have outlined, and which any boy or girl of sane mind and will could easily cover within the grammar school grade of the public school.

There have been states in which one part of the people had to be useful and to work, in order that another smaller part might enjoy themselves. The ideal of a democracy is that every one shall be useful. Every one must contribute his share to the common wealth. We mean this in no narrow way. One may do his part not only by muscular effort or mechanical skill, but also by the exercise of all those intellectual, artistic, and spiritual gifts through which a household, a neighborhood, or a nation is enriched in its vigor and happiness.

This ideal involves the necessity that every one shall be trained to do something well. No one who fails to give an equivalent for what he draws out and spends can live an honest life anywhere. That a man's grandfather was useful can be no excuse to let the man off from maintaining the honorable record of his family name. The good democracy must, therefore, do more and not less than we do now, to put every child on the track

of some useful occupation or employment,—a trade, art, music, domestic service, gardening, floriculture, farming,—some one of the innumerable offices by which modern society lives.

Once the father taught his son what he knew himself, or the mother the daughter. The conditions of modern life seem to make it impossible to rely any longer upon this form of teaching. The schools must supplement the discipline of the best homes. There is much discussion over the question whether the state does not owe every one an opportunity for employment. The good democracy certainly cannot sit quiet and see its own members starve. Even less can we be content to see children growing up idle and useless, almost certain to starve for the want of knowing how to do anything well.

Ought the state to go farther and carry its youth into the higher grades of academic and university education? Ought we to give every child what is known as a liberal education? This is probably to make costly things too cheap. Up to a certain point education is a necessity for the individual and for the safety of society. The appeal to every pupil is to fit himself to play his part in the life of the state. This appeal is to his sense

of duty and his social feeling. Beyond a certain point, however, education becomes a privilege. It costs human labor and comes in every case out of the common store of wealth which all create. Too many boys and girls enter upon the priceless opportunities of college education, and groan over their work as if they were slaves, or again, they turn their time, bought with others' labor, into all manner of self-indulgence. It is mischievous to character to make light of a privilege. Why should the democracy give its higher education, even so far as the high school, to those who are not eager to earn their special advantage, as every prize of life ought to be earned, by hard work, fidelity, and worthy character?

The democracy will not give every one who wishes it a college education. It will do better. It will seek to give the opportunity of this splendid privilege to every child who deserves it. No line of race or creed or poverty shall stand in the way of the promising pupil. If the parents of the deserving youth are able to coöperate and bear, or share, the extra expense, let them do so. If they are helpless to do anything, the state can never afford to let real ability go to waste. The democracy needs leadership of every sort. Its educators

will be on the watch to discover and to develop, at whatever cost, this necessary and truly popular aristocracy of skill, learning, character, and genius.

Two kinds of schools are working side by side in America — the public and the private schools. So far as private schools, like hospitals, take special care of the weak and anæmic, they may perform a needful function. They may provide for peculiar children who require exceptional treatment. Parochial schools may venture for a limited period to offer denominational teaching. So far also as private schools represent originality of discipline and new experiments in education, or unusual standards of pedagogic excellence, they may wisely supplement the public system. Public schools may at times be so inferior as to become impossible in the eyes of intelligent parents. We note, however, a dangerous and undemocratic tendency in the private schools. They are too often intended to be the schools of a class or a caste. They tend to unfit boys and girls for the life of a democracy. A single pupil costs more than the whole household of a skilled workman. These schools become luxurious and wasteful of human service; they are only possible for the children of

the wealthy. They estrange their pupils from sympathy with the very people out of whose ranks the parents themselves have risen.

In the long run it can never be good to divide the children of the democracy into different schools upon the line of culture or wealth, or much less, of diversities of creed. The children of all need to be educated together. True culture will never rub off by human contact. The children of the virtuous must indeed be poorly trained if they lose their good character or their good manners by mixing with the children of humbler moral opportunities. The children of the poor have as much to teach the children of the rich as to learn from them! It is surely a bad symptom in a democracy if any considerable number of its children must be educated in private schools. In the ideal democracy the public schools will generally be the best for every one. Already no appropriation for public purposes is so cheerfully voted as that which goes for education.

The schools in a democracy are obviously not for the mere learning of things, or to fit children to earn a living. They are mainly for the discipline in character, and character of a special stamp. The virtue of the people under a des-

potism is to obey. This is also the virtue of a democracy. But while in a primitive government the many had to obey the few or the one out of fear and by force, in a democracy the many obey by choice and good will. Whereas once the many were taught to obey the authority of a man, the many are now taught to obey law, that is, the authority of all men, and for the sake of the welfare of all.

This involves a new teaching in obedience. In the hands of the old-fashioned teacher was the rod. The teacher and the pupils were often at war with each other. Undemocratic antagonism and suspicion began and had object-lessons in the school-room. The best modern teacher and the pupils are friends. The good teacher is armed only with persuasion and good will. The teacher takes the pupils into his confidence. The rules of the schools are common rules, not the teacher's law, but the pupils' will also.

The spirit of the good school is essentially the spirit of democracy. Its methods are easy object-lessons in the way of voluntary or free government. Natural issues arise every day in school over questions of truthfulness or falsehood, accuracy or slovenliness, justice, honesty, and fair play,

or cheating and shiftiness, generosity or meanness, magnanimity or pettiness. The discipline of the good school consists in discussing and settling these simple but profound issues in an atmosphere of confidence, respect, and mutual kindness. The good teacher does not so much impart ethical instruction as set forth and make plain the royal distinctions between good and evil. The good is seen to be beautiful; it is social conduct. The evil is ugly because it is always unsocial. The best teacher is the best democrat. He is himself that which he wishes his pupils to be,—fair, considerate to all, and impartial, helpful, public-spirited, a lover of humanity. The best discipline goes by the contagion of sympathy and enthusiasm. Give us plenty of good teachers who believe in democracy, and we shall have good schools. Give us the right kind of schools, and we shall establish the good democracy.

The democracy is founded in the idea of co-operation. This is also in the nature of the good schools. Its organization is coöperative from top to bottom. Here, for example, is a great city grammar school. There is a master in command, but he is not therefore a dictator; he superintends in order to help. He is not doing personal or

selfish work, or exercising egotism and self-will. His work is like that of the leader of an orchestra, who directs in order that all may play in harmony. There are boys in the school who will by and by be foremen and superintendents in machine shops, or mayors of cities. They see what kind of man their schoolmaster is. They know whether or not he loses his temper ; they see it if he is always respectful to his teachers ; they catch the humane and democratic tone of an excellent master, as they are equally quick to detect the pompous and egotistic autocrat. The spirit of coöperation which possesses a good master is certain to be felt as the law of the school in every room. For we are all so made as to love to coöperate better even than to quarrel.

A special need of the democracy is always for brave men and women. There are those who are shy of the name of goodness for fear that it may mean lack of courage ; as if courage were not in the essence of genuine goodness ! For goodness is social virtue, that is, loyalty, chivalry, and necessarily courage. How then shall we train our boys and girls to be brave ? By the best pages of history, by English and American history first of all, by noble verses, and bits of the biography

of our heroes,—the men of peace, pioneers, inventors, discoverers, not less than the men of war,—better yet, by that atmosphere in a school-room which calls out independence, thoughtfulness, the courage of one's opinion, the will to vote in a minority.

The schools may be degraded to promote a vulgar mediocrity. The teacher, timid herself, may repress individuality and snub the original boy; she may fear criticism for herself; she may not dare to admit and confess her mistakes or even to ask apology for doing wrong. This is the teaching of cowardice. The good teacher will want, as Emerson says, to thank the pupil who can show her how to do better; she will be almost glad, when the occasion arises, to be obliged to do herself what she asks her children every day to do, namely, to correct an error or apologize for an injustice. She will call for frankness and accept free speech. Frank and honest speech, learned in the kindly atmosphere of the public school, will at last triumph in the nation. We cannot repress it in the school and save it for use in the town-meeting.

The nation need never suffer for the lack of physical courage. Well men with sound bodies

always tend to be brave in the face of material perils. In a thousand shops and factories, in a thousand ships, on endless railway systems, men are daily practised in skill, patience, hardihood, fearlessness. No active people will ever need to enter the prize ring of war to preserve the iron in its blood. But the peril of a democracy is in the want of moral courage, the courage to stand alone, to say one's honest thought and bear up against popular or party pressure for a truth, a principle, a common good which the many do not see, or own. There has never been enough of this form of courage in the world. The good schools must indeed develop deference, courtesy, and politeness, but we shall test their success by the men of moral and civic courage whom they graduate—men like Burke, like John Quincy Adams, like Charles Sumner.

An interesting and serious issue appears in the field of education, concerning the organization of the great bodies of teachers in cities and the faculties of universities. A commercial or military conception prevails, tending toward excessive centralization of power in the hands of superintendents, trustees, committees, and presidents. A sharp differentiation is made between the few who command and the many who take orders. It is

ominous when the teachers of Chicago feel obliged to form a "labor union" in order to enforce their rights against their own city. It is ominous when the president of a college assumes a dictatorial authority over his own colleagues in the faculty. The success of the teaching force especially depends upon freedom of individual initiative, upon the generous sympathy and appreciation of its leaders toward their fellows, upon a continual demand for the use of skill and intelligence, rendered possible only in the genial atmosphere of democratic liberty.

A difficult question touching the schools of a democracy remains. It concerns the teaching of religion. There are those who say that public schools are and must be irreligious. They surely cannot teach any peculiar kind of religion. Must they therefore be without religion? And must those who hold religion, in its best sense, to be the most profound fact in human life and truly essential to every good school, either be obliged to establish schools of their own, each to teach some single form of religion,—Jewish, Catholic, or sectarian Protestant,—or else altogether give up the magnificent ideal of a public school system, maintained by the people and for the people?

The truth is, there is a kind of religion that lies deeper than any form. Take the case of a man like the late William H. Baldwin, Jr., of New York, who believes in justice and who would give his life for it, who would starve rather than forswear a truth, who loves men and loves children, who holds all that he possesses in trust to do good service for the common humanity. Such a man may be a teacher in a public school. Is such a man not religious? And does he not teach religion in every action and word? In him and through him shines the life of God, which is goodness. The justice and truth of God are in him. He persuades us to love the good life and to go in the company of the pure-hearted and the humane. This man may go to any church or synagogue which he chooses. Who cares very much whether his creed is long or short, whether it agrees with our creed or not? Wherever such a teacher is, the life of religion is also. His school is, no "godless school." The deep religion of humanity, the religion which underlies the good democracy, is in his school. Put teachers of this religion in every school and the world would presently see a revival of religion such as never was known in history.

XXX

ANARCHY AND SOCIALISM

DIFFERENT groups of men offer two apparently opposite social ideals,—socialism and anarchy. These ideals are opposite, as seen from the level of men's selfishness; they involve a strife. But develop them both, set them to work, mix plenty of humanity with them, and they presently grow at the top strangely alike. They represent different elements or strands in the common human nature. The two elements are generally mixed in more or less measure in each individual. They are both needful in the personal and in the social life. The resultant of the two forces (call them by what names you please) is social health or welfare.

The one tendency in human nature is toward the forming of habits, toward fixed order, toward organization, discipline, and regular institutions. It is this element in life which always tends to establish and maintain the type and the species; it works toward uniformity and perpetuity; it reproduces the parent in the child; it binds each

new generation into a likeness with the old; it keeps ancient customs, holds familiar usages as sacred, and dreads change, reform, or novelty. This is the conservative element in nature which goes to the maintenance of the fabric. The conservative habitually desires to keep things as they are, "the same yesterday, to-day, and forever." The conservative wishes for social rest and quiet. He aims to establish his system; he wishes to see his city or state finished; he is weary of incessant repairing, readjustment, rebuilding, and reform.

It is commonly thought that the aristocratic habit of mind is essentially conservative. The fact is, that probably for good reasons the majority of mankind is conservative. All popular governments tend to be very shy of change. The people generally prefer even the institutions which somewhat oppress them, to the cost, the thought, the effort required for instituting a new and better system. Habit is vastly more operative upon men than are ideals.

It may at first thought seem paradoxical to say that socialism specially appeals to the conservative side of human nature. Not that socialism appeals to all conservatives, or even to the majority of this great popular class. But the appeal of socialism

is to men of a methodical mind, who are discontented and disappointed with the strenuous modern life. The promise of socialism is to establish a new order, to fix everything by rule, to administer industry and government on a vast scale, to give every one his place, to determine a regular scale of wages or salaries, to constitute what Mr. Bellamy has called an "industrial army."

The order, the uniformity, the discipline of an army make appeal to the indolent part of a man. No one will have to think too much, or to bear stress of responsibility, or to work extra hours. No one will be suffered to meddle with any one else. Establish the system, men imagine, and life will become smooth and easy. In a socialistic régime mankind will have attained its happiness. For the conservative always supposes that social happiness consists in attainment, in rest, in plenty, in security. Let us admit that the conservative element, which aims to secure order and to fix its ideals in institutions and to bind men over to keep the peace, has its just place in human life. No man ought to be without sympathy with the conservative mind.

The biologists tell us that, besides the element in life which acts to keep the type good, there is

also a force forever at work to produce variations from the type. This is illustrated in the growth of a tree. One part of the nutriment goes into keeping the solid old wood, but another part goes into the very tips of the branches to make the new growth. Thus in every growing species and individual there is the same natural division between the forces that preserve the form and keep the old life in being, and the forces that go to make the forms of fresh life. Much of this new life, as in the blossoms of springtime and the spawn in the sea, never comes to anything. Many variations of the species prove to be only "sports" and perish. But progress, development, genius, and life itself are involved in the forces which burst forth from the old lines and forms. When these forces cease, life ebbs away. The course of the life of mankind in society is here in accord with the deep and universal laws of growth.

What is known as "philosophical anarchism" is only an extreme form of that tendency in human society which aims to vary and to grow. The anarchist, or better, the individualist, seeks perfect freedom, and has utter faith in freedom. Take off the bondage of constraint and compulsion, give all men a free chance to live, appeal to their energy,

their intelligence, their natural social morality, and all will enjoy the maximum of happiness. The anarchist or individualist sees that happiness is at least largely in activity, and only incidentally in rest and ease. Happiness to him consists in putting forth effort, solving problems, overcoming obstacles, taking ventures and risks. There is no satisfaction in mere attainment; there is joy in going on, in movement. His social ideal is not static, but dynamic.

The individualist's habit of mind is constitutionally wary of over-much organization, of too much regularity, of centralized institutions in religion or government, of fixed moral codes and their legal enforcement by the will of majorities. His ethics, even while he may be sensitive to a fault, high-minded, and possessed with the spirit of sympathy, are the ethics of evolution; they are an effort toward an ideal, not an infallible standard.

Must we not agree that the individualist or anarchist element is as important in human society as is the conservative instinct? Must we not deprecate any proposed organization of the industrial or the political system which would harass or oppress the very precious minority of mankind

whose lives seem to be consecrated by nature to march and act in the vanguard, to try experiments, to set forth new ideals, to stir the mass of men to move on and never long to rest at their ease? The most conservative of us need to see life on occasion from the anarchist's or individualist's point of view; we need to understand his mode of thought; we are never whole men till we embrace in ourselves something of both the conservative and the anarchic temper. The most stolid of conservatives could not afford to vote the independents out of existence.

There is an element of the wild nature in most of us. It revolts at oppression; it is stirred into flame by the touch of arrogance and enmity; it rebels against compulsion by another's will. You see it not alone in a half-crazy Guiteau and a Czolgosz. You see it in highly respectable directors of railways and coal mines, when the laws interfere with their corporate methods and gains. You see the same in the most orthodox of ministers, when the custom-house officers of their own party choice compel them to pay duties on their baggage. Anarchism grows straight out of the old roots of egotism and wilfulness. On its worst side, it is one with the animalism in men that burns negroes

at the stake. Let no man be too sure that he has no anarchic stuff in his blood.

Men sway from one side to the other, as the march of mankind goes on. The swing of the movement seems now to be to the side of constituted governmental authority, to the exaltation of the idea of nationality and sovereignty, to a recrudescence of the belief in force, to the desire for uniformity. The hitherto liberty-loving Anglo-Saxon peoples have caught the idea that the world needs to be ordered from London and Washington.

We have suggested that the anarchist may be right in questioning the importance which most men at present attach to the authority of the central national government. Most Americans would be disposed to question the usefulness of the central government of Turkey, or China, or Russia. Can we not also imagine a union of states in which, through the growing civilization of mankind, there should be no necessity of any force or compulsion, beyond the agreement of the peoples composing them, and a general public opinion sufficient to enforce every act of the common agreement? We in the United States are in effect very close to such an arrangement as we

have just imagined. When does the supreme court need to send troops to compel assent to its decisions? When does Congress need to levy an army to invade a state? The anomaly of the civil war rather emphasizes than contradicts this position. Nothing but the contentment of the people of the Southern states make it possible to hold them under the bond of the Union.

Two perils doubtless menace our country. The first is the peril of a selfish or uncivilized socialism. There is a socialism that seems to represent the combined effort of a class or a caste, a multitude or a majority of men, all of them selfish, in order to get power and means, to make a living for themselves and their class. Men imagine that the state, or some industrial system, may be made to do the miracle of turning out a larger product of welfare and happiness than the individuals who make up the state are willing to expend in effort, labor, wisdom, social service, and public spirit. Men are apt to forget that they themselves constitute the government, which cannot therefore be better than they are. If they expect the government to do more for them than they are ready to do for themselves or for one another, they will be as bitterly disappointed as if all the members of

the body waited for the body to move and feed them.

The second peril is not from the kind of anarchism which certain newspapers and politicians like to set forth in lurid colors. Few people care to brave public opinion and to be treated as "cranks" or fanatics in the name of an extreme social theory. But the dangerous anarchism is that which uses the forms of law and order to express greed or self-will. The dangerous anarchist is the man who employs expensive counsel to manipulate the laws and promote his own interests, to evade his proper public burdens and taxes, and make all the money he can by whatever methods a forceful nature can command. The story of railway rebates reveals the conduct of anarchists as perilous to the nation as those who plot to assassinate despots. We have discovered that the anarchistic spirit may show itself in high office to set aside constitution and laws and to carry out one man's eager purpose, whether of ambition or of imagined benevolence. Selfishness, as well as human egotism, forever runs off into this kind of anarchism. But we shall never get rid of it by examining immigrants and deporting men to Europe. Actual anarchists are being

educated in every home and school, wherever parents or teachers set object-lessons in wilfulness, or wish to get more than belongs to them.

We may see now the golden mean of political welfare. It is not in a combat between two great human instincts. It is not in the attempt to divide men between the two varying tendencies, and to keep two permanent parties always in the field. A series of alternate revolutions between the conservative and the individualist parties is not a hopeful prospect for mankind. Our hope is rather in the closer social combination of both these wholesome tendencies. We do not wish forcibly to check either of them. We propose to encourage the action of both. The extreme wing of each movement needs nothing so much as to understand the best thought of the men who represent the other side from themselves.

Why distrust and fear the progress of socialism ? Let us confess that we are all socialists to a greater or less extent. That is, we all believe in doing many things together which we could never do separately. We are all socialists in desiring stability and order.

The ideal democracy is a vast and complex organization, comprehending all human interests

and unifying them ever more closely as the expression of a common purpose. The modern city will learn to do more things for its people, not less. The state, in the interests of freedom, must go on and establish necessary provisions to safeguard the common humanity. We cannot bear to have men worked like machines, housed like cattle, or living like brutes; we cannot endure conditions that perpetuate vice, idiocy, and pauperism. We will not put up with common nuisances, with darkened streets, with needless smoke and soot, with disfiguring advertisements. Civilization means the construction of innumerable roads, and men must keep to the roads. Civilization means numberless rules, and men must observe the rules whereby all enjoy increased freedom of action. We have already limited the right of the individual to amass and hand down political power. Will it not be good socialism, in other words, the larger freedom for the many, when we shall distinctly limit the excessive aggrandizement of the individual in the right of getting and keeping property?

This closer organization, however, may and should come by the methods which the good individualist or anarchist would himself commend.

All rules are for the public convenience. The good individualist needs no compulsion to obey the common rules. They come into being by the practical agreement of the people who have to keep them. Even the needful conditions of a progressive socialism will mostly come about by the simple abrogation of obnoxious, partial, and unsocial laws. Thus the laws and precedents governing property and land have mostly been made and interpreted by a class for a class, and not by the people for the people. The common law of contract, which has been deemed almost sacred, has been continually turned to the advantage of the few against the many. Good socialism will deny the right of the men of any generation to bind the men of a thousand years after them to pay interest upon monopolies! Good socialism, like good anarchism, will urge, "Take off needless restraints from men's shoulders."

The issue between the socialist and the individualist temper is specially illustrated in "the labor question." No fair and humane man can take only one side here. Reason and sympathy are on both sides. The need is to combine the two tendencies in common counsel and action. We sympathize profoundly with the aim of multitudes of men

who are acting together for common interests. The law of the industrial world is combination, coöperation. It is this very law which the individualistic masters of trade and industry have been working out in the form of gigantic corporations and trusts. This is the tendency of the time—perhaps excessive, too often surely, wilful and anarchical in method. No wonder if the working people, in proportion to the degree of their intelligence, are following the lead of their teachers.

Our reason and our sympathy go with every effort for closer union between men and classes of men. We deprecate every struggle of the individual selfishness to stand out against the movement of the forces which work to combine men in a common effort. We deprecate the monopolistic spirit, wherever we see it, which aims to get and keep everything possible for itself or for its group. We deprecate the antagonism which keeps groups of men apart. But our reason and our sympathy cease to cross the line where majorities, possibly even mere strong-willed factions, whether employers or the employed, begin to tyrannize over their fellows, to make industrial war upon them, to use the ugly names and methods of battle to club them into line. As long as there are men in any

kind of combination who are members by compulsion or fear, who chafe at the restraints put upon them, and are no longer free men, here is unstable industrial equilibrium. Nothing social can last that is not voluntary in its spirit and based at last on good will. No combination can last, or be long effective, which wars on the men outside of it.

The world is large enough to admit all kinds of social experiments. If there are kinds of work which all must do together, for example, in turning out certain great wholesale products like iron, yet the most precious kinds of work, the artistic, the highly skilled, the scientific, the directive and thoughtful, are those where the bond of coöperation, though always generally operative, must not be suffered to weigh upon the free and originating mind. If it be demonstrated that great aggregations of capitalistic plant may be most safely and effectively turned over to public control, with possible uniformity of hours and wages, it is unlikely that society will not equally need to reserve considerable free areas of its industrial territory in which genius, skill, and originality shall have constant training, and in which willing workers will not count their hours, or quarrel over

their pay, for the joy of their work. Till the end of time, while life continues to be worth living, there will be the challenge to experimentation and invention. It is perhaps the exceptional man who answers to this kind of challenge. The average man will not be interested enough to do anything about it,—hardly to vote to give an opportunity to the new venture. All the more need is there that the individual shall be free to do his best, with such willing help as he can command, without waiting for the permission of a conservative and sceptical majority of his fellows. We in America may therefore look with great hesitancy upon the tendency toward social tyranny exemplified by the labor laws of New Zealand.

Man's normal life is social; it is also a life of freedom. This is the basis of all philosophical anarchism. Anarchism at its best is an ideal of liberty. I want to do what I do freely and not of compulsion. I also wish nothing so much as the welfare of other men who shall likewise do what they are persuaded is just. There is no conflict between this ideal and the other. My will is to keep within the limits beyond which my action would hurt or annoy others. It is my will also to pay my full share of the taxes and burdens which

all must bear together. In a reasonable anarchistic state we should each want to know what our share of these common burdens is. My will is not to monopolize special privileges of any sort. My will is, if I live in a town, to burn my smoke and keep no nuisances. It is easy to be a good anarchist or a good socialist. The anarchistic spirit at its best is in the noblest conception of religion. The good God does not rule or compel our wills; but good will in us as in God is free will.

Observe how largely socialistic modern life has already become. Observe how many the things are for which we are all, perhaps unwisely, seeking to secure legislation, that is, to get the aid of all to carry out our cherished plans of reform, to aid our charity, even to help our business. It is only other men's socialism that we fear, as it is the anarchism of men whose language we cannot speak that alarms us.

Meanwhile every movement of trust in one another, every effort to coöperate better, where before we had failed, helps to weld us into a stronger and freer society. Mutual trust is both strength and freedom. The very effort toward a more complete democracy helps make men of those who struggle for it. No one ever joined

hands with his fellows to help win liberty or justice or happiness without becoming a freer and happier man himself.

Finally, the need for freedom grows as men become civilized. If it be conceded that compulsory authority is ever good for men, coercion surely ceases to be good for them with the first breath of real personality. The more truly they become men the more thoroughly does freedom become their necessity. The very men who will not brook dictation will do anything you ask for the sake of their humanity.

XXXI

THE RELIGION IN DEMOCRACY

LET us put out of our mind the kinds of religion that divide men, and think of that deeper religion which binds men together. In this view religion is man's sense of something larger and higher to which he belongs, and to which he owes allegiance. Take the simplest illustration of this kind of religion. Here is the dust in the streets, blowing in the wind, every particle separate from the others. Beyond the street, in the fields, the same material is being drawn up and incorporated, by the subtle alchemy of plant life, into the structure of leaves and blossoms and fruit. So religion, the inner vital force, takes men out of their individualism and separateness into the structural social unity.

There is thus a religion of the family or the home. The mere boarder, who comes and goes and only pays for a room in the house, is without this family religion. But the parent or child belongs to the family group; he owes his loyalty

to it. His religion consists in his truth, his devotion, his service. There is no real home life or happiness where this devotion is wanting. The foundation of the state rests upon the social structure that children are learning to build in millions of homes. How can they ever be patriots unless they have learned to be faithful to one another and to act together? There are those who imagine a form of socialism without the continuance of the family. Can they not see that in all history the most solid material out of which citizenship has been developed has taken its quality in the atmosphere of the homes?

There is a religion of the town or the village. The tramp misses this religion. He passes through the town, but he does not belong to it. He only uses it for his own convenience. But he owns no obligation; he feels no responsibility. The true townsman, on the other hand, like the citizen of ancient Athens, is ready to give his money, or to spend his life, for the welfare of the town. He belongs to the structural unity of the town. To be generous, disinterested, and loyal is the religion that holds men together in towns.

The greatest evil in our cities is that a large number of their inhabitants have no civic religion.

They have no sense of belonging to the city, as a soldier belongs to an army. Too often they have no house of their own and no valid interest in the communal life. They evade the payment of their taxes; they vote or not as they please. To do as each one pleases, without regard for the welfare of the whole, is the essence of irreligion. The need is of a revival of the sense of common ownership and responsibility; the need is of a new will to act together for the good of all. As the wise emperor said, "We are made for coöperation." This is civic religion. Where there is plenty of it, no limit can be set to the growth and richness of the public life. It is the development of this religion which makes men in Maine and Florida sharers and fellow-sufferers with people whom an earthquake has rendered homeless in San Francisco. Here is the sense that we all belong to a common structure and owe each other good will and assistance. Who does not believe in this kind of religion?

A bad democracy naturally allies itself with, and is the expression of, a materialistic view of life and the world. In the eyes of the egotistic and brutal, might is right; and there is no other permanent right. It may be the might of one or

of many, of the victorious sword, or of majorities and ballots. It may even be forwarded on occasion by an enlightened self-interest ; or it may be limited by the apprehension of consequences and perhaps by a survival of superstitious terror. But all selfishness, even when it is dominated by the forms of religion, is essentially irreligious. In other words, the man who thinks of himself as the unit and centre of the world, as the egotist characteristically does, is thereby out of gear with the universe. To be out of normal relationship and sympathy with the lives of one's fellows is to be irreligious.

As the bad democracy allies itself with the most shallow materialism, so the good democracy instinctively allies itself with and expresses idealism and religion. This may or may not be in the consciousness of men ; it is nevertheless important. Democracy advances as fast as religion and no faster. We reach now the largest and most undogmatic thought of religion. Religion is that view of the world which regards it as the parable or expression of an overruling moral order, which finds a spiritual unity behind its shifting phenomena, which interprets the movements of history as the progressive discipline of mankind toward

righteous and noble character. In this larger sense the child who has learned to enter into the organic structure of the home, the public school, the town or the city, the state, and the nation, as a loyal member of each new social unity, who has thus become possessed of the ruling spirit of duty, truth, justice, fidelity, patriotism, now at last finds himself the citizen of the universe. He belongs to the universal order; he shares its principles and ideals, almost as if he had helped to create them.

In this view, and in this view only, is there any real solidarity or unity of the human race. Men are brothers, not because of any superficial or physiological resemblance, but by virtue of intellectual, moral, spiritual, and indeed wholly ideal and inward, but none the less actual, qualities, aspirations, possibilities shared by all. Men are one, not because they are animals, but because they are men, and this, too, when they have only really begun to show themselves men, and while complete manhood is yet far beyond their attainment. Thus white men are one with those brave black boys who brought Livingstone's body from the heart of Africa down to the sea, not because all happen to stand erect, but because the black men

in common with the best white men are capable of an infinite devotion and goodness. We must frankly grant that this is a religious conception, for he who says that black and red and white men are only so many animals, each seeking to push the others to the wall, will probably not perceive how superficial color is, and how profound and universal humanity is.

Again, democracy is at one with religion in its conception of what the full-grown and civilized man ought to be. Churches have taught that nineteen hundred years ago there was one such complete man, brave, just, kind, reverent, unselfish, disinterested. How strange that aristocratic and priestly pretensions should ever have been set up in the name of this most democratic of men ! The doctrine of democracy is that the good or humane life is simply the normal fruitage of humanity. A whole harvest of noble lives is already on record. Democracy seeks nothing less than the development of just such upright, friendly, normal lives. The poor man to-day, at his best, wants nothing so much for his children as that they shall become men and women of this character—precisely what men have liked to call “sons and daughters of God.” There is no

mightier motive impelling him to improve his conditions and achieve freedom and opportunity, than the knowledge that only in decent and humane conditions can his children expect to achieve their just inheritance as complete men.

This involves a very extraordinary conception of human progress. If we chose to be sceptical or pessimistic, why should we expect progress at all—especially moral and spiritual progress? Why expect it to be continuous? Why should we not have a mere insignificant wave motion, up and then down, the rise of one empire with the fall of others—a new civilization to-day and its death threatened to-morrow? The idea of progress—amelioration, a law of uplift and growth, a coming commonwealth of nations, a parliament of the world—is essentially religious. At our worst, in our animal and selfish moods, we do not see it. We see it only at our best, we see it in the hours of our fullest humanity, when we are most truly ourselves as men. And it goes along with all those subtle invisible things which constitute our religion.

The very life-blood of democracy is in this wonderful common ideal of human progress. If the spirit of democracy is more vital and buoyant

in America than anywhere else, it is because this faith in progress is general among our people. It is a part of the religion of our people. Who of us, if we did not share this quite unprovable and yet almost intuitive faith in progress, would have the heart to struggle very hard for empty forms of democracy from which the life was absent? We might indeed still calculate that democracy was the least of evils, or we might with the usual selfish instinct of the favored classes resist its coming, but all our enthusiasm about it, our courage, our chivalry, our sense of its justice, enter into the warp and woof of our religion.

We speak too glibly of progress; we think of wealth, inventions, appliances of comfort and luxury. We possibly dream of a period when the world will have attained the object of its dreams and everything desirable will have been obtained. But progress is really the motion of life itself, destined to cease only when life ceases. There is something infinite and spiritual in the idea. Always something better waits to be done. The city is always needing repairs and improvements, new buildings and more perfect conditions. The man moves on from the acquisition of material good to intellectual and spiritual advancement.

If he were ever satisfied, he would begin to die at the top. This is the nature of man; there is an element of infinite idealism in him. This is the basis of fact upon which all real religion rests.

The law of the normal man is the law of society. The time may come when the material growth of the world will have ceased, as the growth of the man's body ceases. The lessening birth-rate in civilized communities may point to a period when the increase of the population of the world will undergo a natural and even wholesome check. Mere millions of men will not make happiness. No successful democracy will ever grow out of the struggle of myriads of people, seeking each to get as much as possible and to give the least. But the signs of the times herald a development of mankind in the characteristic human qualities. We want men and women who shall express power, skill, beauty, intelligence, justice, good will, not caring whether any one ever pays them enough for their service or not. This is religion. Give us plenty of people who have caught this idea, and we will establish democracy everywhere. Give us its missionaries, and we will convert the Dark Con-

tinent. Possess the humblest of people with this idea, and they become fit to govern themselves.

The bearing of this ideal of democratic religion upon ecclesiastical institutions and machinery already appears. The harshness and bitterness of sectarian divisions tend everywhere to vanish. Men of different denominations meeting one another in their numerous civic and good government clubs, upon the committees of associated charities, and all kinds of humane societies and fraternal orders and granges, presently discover the bond of a common purpose, the same sympathies, the same idealism. It becomes impossible for these men, who love and respect each other as men, to suspect or hate each other's religion. The heresy cannot be very dangerous, which leaves a man sound in his honor and in his devotion to the public good.

The religion of a people is another name for their idealism, their civic spirit, their disinterestedness, their reverence for moral and spiritual values. It is often charged against our nation that it is irreligious. This is to say that the nation is without ideals. We cannot for a moment believe that this is true. Was there ever a time

when more men cherished splendid visions of social welfare than are cherished to-day in America? We look through the record of history in vain to find such a period.

Men have had a dream of the union of the state and the church. They have felt that the state represents the unity of the political activities of a people, their coöperation in practical measures for the common welfare. They have thought of the church as representing the spiritual unity of a people, the means of their coöperation for ideal ends. Long and costly experience goes to show that the unity of which men have dreamed cannot be brought about by compulsion. It grows as men grow worthy of it. It comes like the ripening of fruit. We have found out in America that it depends upon an atmosphere of liberty. Let men seek to help one another in a common cause, and political unity takes the place of faction. Let men's minds be free to think, let all kinds and conditions of men meet freely, let them know one another and work together, and this innate spiritual unity presently discloses itself. Already we are able to distinguish the lines of the ideal "Free Church in a Free State." The characteristic of a government is that it

provides certain social machinery; the characteristic of a church is that it develops a certain spirit. The church and the state will be one, only when the men who administer the government are possessed with the noble good will which the church is set to foster.

XXXII

THE PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRACY

WHAT shall we say are the actual prospects of our good democracy? The ideal has come into the world of a scheme of society, both industrial and political, in which men shall constitute a sort of family. They are already social beings. They shall think, feel, and act as social beings. They shall realize in a large way that the welfare of each makes the welfare of all. They shall be individuals still, but their individuality shall be dominated by a generous good will. The forms of society and the state will then adapt themselves to and express the ruling democratic spirit. The education of the youth will be directed to the supreme end of social welfare, not to mere bread-winning or egotistic ambition. All this is fair and beautiful. Is it more than a wonderful dream?

It is strange to how great an extent men are still under the bondage of the primitive thought of a golden age in the past. They judge the present by their fancy of what the past once was.

Men who believe in evolution are bad evolutionists as soon as they come to make an estimate of their own times. They compare their own present conditions, not with what actually was in past times, but with what they imagine ought to have been. They complain of the failure of popular institutions, the decay of virtue and public spirit, the practical heathenism of cities, and the decadence of the country populations. Either they do not read history, or else they fail to interpret their history in the light of their own doctrine of evolution. The truth is, that we look upon a world in the process of growing. The analogy of a vital organism, if not pressed too far, helps us to see what we mean. Everything is in a state of flux and movement. Cells are building and other cells passing on to dissolution. Even in the body of the healthiest and most promising child there is a certain decadence of worn-out tissue. The child passes through critical periods. And yet he is all the time on his way to a maturity of thought, of skill, of intelligence, and specially of moral and spiritual vision and conduct, with which the brightest days of childhood were not to be compared.

We have nowhere denied the facts of childishness and barbarism which survive everywhere in

modern society. We have nowhere ventured to call our own nation or any section of it civilized or "Christian." We deprecate the assumption that we yet know, except in imagination, and by virtue of exceptional examples, what real civilization is. We are in the midst of a work, like a great feat of engineering, which challenges all the genius, the chivalry, and the patience of mankind.

Too many men are still living in the predatory period, — not only in Berlin, or St. Petersburg, or Pekin, but in Chicago, in Washington, in Boston. But even predatory men and their forces have to combine in continually larger aggregations. They learn to act together. They all form "unions" as if by a law of the world. No wonder men catch the idea of a crude democracy of force, before they come to see what real democracy is. The strike, the boycott, the "closed shop," the "black-list," the deportation of men from a state, as in Colorado in 1904, every infringement upon liberty, all undemocratic attempts to force men's wills, are but phases, or processes, in the great and hopeful economic and social movement of our age. These things, like the yellow fever or the cholera, are not here to last. Every strike indeed is a new demand for the democratic idea and the democratic

man, who will not endure the waste and the ugly spirit of industrial war.

See now what great things we have already achieved in the direction of the good democracy. We have put an end to human slavery. In every modern nation equitable courts have more and more taken the place of barbarous private quarrels and disputes. We have seen the rapid disuse of duelling. We have seen the Hague tribunal set up, and international issues peaceably settled by arbitration. The world is growingly interlinked in bonds of trade and of friendly immigration and travel. Big as modern armaments are, the idea prevails that war is a preposterous anachronism. What is more impressive is that even in war hate and malice are falling to the rear. An Asiatic people has set the world an example of humanity in war. The hearts of the plain people are doubtless nearer together than they ever were.

Meanwhile in America we have actually performed the miracle of binding together more than forty states in one solid and happy Union, dominated, on the whole, by the sense of the common good. In the industrial domain, we are daily coming into closer forms of coöperation. Men are learning that their interests are mutual. Com-

petition itself becomes nine strands coöperation to every strand of mere selfishness. The slow, salutary pressure of the universe urges its inevitable demand for mutual trust, for consideration, for respect, for kindness. In a thousand factories, shops, and railroads, managers and men are coming to the consciousness of this common urgency. Who cannot trace, on the lines of such innumerable great and beautiful precedents, the coming of a real democracy which shall certainly fuse all the states of the world into a common unity?

It should be observed that modern democracy is an exceedingly complex form of life. While in the old days the barbarous man belonged to but one or two social organisms, the family or the tribe, to which it was his religion to be loyal, the civilized man's duty and pleasure is to belong at one and the same time to a considerable number of societies, like wheels within wheels, to each of which he must contribute his share of effort and fidelity. It is not strange that it takes time for men to learn to adjust themselves to this multi-form membership in the family, the church, the lodge or labor-union, the coöperative bank or shop, as well as the city and the nation.

The standing wonder of the common humanity

probably is that men on the whole behave so well. Millions of the poor live in the sight of wealth and luxury, but only the few steal. Except at rare intervals and under immense provocation, the quiet forces of order are always stronger than the forces that make for chaos. The daily papers rake together a thousand stories of crime, excess, and inhumanity. This is because humanity is the rule and inhumanity is the exception. They tell us of a few hundreds of cruel lynchings in the South. We are bound never to rest while such brutality overrides the laws, but the great fact in the South is that many millions of black and white men live, trade, and work peaceably together. There are said to be many counties of the Southern states as free from brutal crime as are the country districts of New England. In the greatest labor troubles, likewise, where new immigrants cannot as yet speak the English tongue, the growing instinct of democracy is toward the persuasive rule of order. Where do our fellow-Americans, though idle by thousands, lift up their hands to burn and rob? The crime is the work of the few. The many do not believe in it.

Meanwhile, ideals not only appear, but, being adopted, at last are fixed forever as standards.

A good Colonel Waring cleans the streets of New York City so well that the people will never again let them be utterly filthy. An American board of health in Havana teaches Cubans how to put an end to the ancient pest of their port. A good mayor may die or be turned out of office, but people will never quite forget the man who actually puts the Golden Rule so unselfishly into practice in behalf of their city as to get the name of "Golden Rule Jones." Every experiment of good democracy, every act of trust in the people, goes over into the mass of the evidence which at last rapidly accumulates and, like a coral island, appears above the surface, to the effect that justice, fidelity, unselfishness, good will, are the victorious forces in the world. You cannot destroy them; you need not fear for them; they belong to the enduring structure. They win every day. By and by no man will dream of getting on without them.

Moreover, the very immensity of the material gains of the world creates fresh moral demands and gives promise of new and higher methods of progress. Wealth is nothing but a means. The control of infinite natural forces is only a means. The end is human welfare and happiness,—not

the happiness of the few, but of the many. The few cannot really be happy alone. The rule of development is first bigness and force, but next, quality, flavor, and fragrance, beauty and goodness.

The rule is that the few climb in advance of the rest, but the others must follow. The law of the world seems to ordain the democratization of material means, of power, of education, of art, of truth, and, not least of all, of the ideals and visions of goodness. For the welfare and happiness of men, as individuals, are based on the growth of their humanity. Thus the most complete individual is found to be the man of the largest social spirit. This is the ideal life of the Christ! The "Christ" is the type of that which every man should be.

We do not leave out of account the supreme law of effort,—"Nothing without cost,"—which dominates the world and educates men toward manhood. The first difficulty with political and social schemes is that men fondly think that they can bring in a perfect state or society or industrial order by some short cut,—by a law, by a method, by the single tax, by proportional representation, by some external device. It may be a good de-

vice, but it is like the stent which they give in gymnastics. The best that it ever does for us is that it involves an effort in political growth and power to reach it.

The good institution is simply the form with which the good democracy clothes itself. The best clothing in the world is nothing if the democracy has not grown to fit it. The framework of our democratic constitution, never yet fairly put to use, is itself a challenge to the nation to grow worthy and good enough to build upon it. Perhaps it was too good for us. We do not deserve it. Thus many people want more socialism at once, but the question is whether we are worthy of owning and managing more public wealth. The common ownership of lands, mines, and forests, righteous as it seems, is too good for a selfish people. We must grow in order to redeem it to ourselves. A land full of Quays, Platts, and Rockefellers, and the whole nation trying to be like them, does not yet deserve so grand a scheme of common justice.

As we look on at the social and political world in the process of growing, we are at once spectators and participants. It is given to us to see ideals for the individual and for society, while at

the same time we are in the thick of the struggle and effort. This duality belongs to human nature. To see, beyond the dust and the noise, the lines of the coming structure is a new incitement to work with intelligent courage.

Men are apt to forget what the struggle is for. They imagine that we are engaged in the effort to secure some fixed state of comfort and ease. They dream of the completed city, the state where nothing ever happens, the world where people can finally sit down and enjoy themselves. Whereas, life is in effort more than in rest ; it must always cost struggle ; its joy is in pouring itself out. Men may well cease to struggle with other men ; the time may come when they will not need to struggle barely to exist ; but men must still continue to struggle to get on, to better themselves, to win nobler happiness for their own generation and for those who come after them. This is to live. This is the hope of the democracy. We have no enthusiasm merely to produce plenty to eat and to wear, — a merely comfortable world ; our enthusiasm is to produce men worthy to live. The democracy is not an easy wholesale scheme to get rid of effort ; its test is in the making of all-round and mature men. Growth means effort ;

effort means movement and friction. We are content to bear the cost and the friction, provided we help one another to attain a larger manhood. Our success is not therefore in the abatement of taxes, or the saving of trouble for ourselves. We propose to expend money and take trouble for the sake of a better humanity. We work, not for things or machines, but for men.

The practical question confronts us at the close: What shall we, who happen to believe in such a doctrine of democracy as this, do in view of present conditions? We are idealists, they tell us, yet we live in an unideal world. The worst danger of the idealists is that they refuse their own principles. The life of democracy is in sympathy, persuasion, humanity. The reformers and the prophets have too often taken over the traditions of the brute world. They have separated themselves from others. They have admitted and exaggerated differences and antagonisms. They have actually loved to fight. They have even thought of themselves as a class or a caste, and grown arrogant and contemptuous of other men. It is as if the village boy who chanced to have been given an education, drew apart from his less fortunate fellows, or looked down upon them — he

who, only a little before, thought and acted like the rest of them! Ibsen's strenuous doctor in his "Enemy of the People" is an admirable caricature of this type of reformer and idealist.

The truth is that the cardinal use of education and enlightenment is in fostering modesty, wisdom, tactfulness, patience, and invincible good temper, as well as power or moral zeal. Do you despair of the democracy, do you complain of men's slowness, their materialism, their bigotry, their prejudices? The saving truth is that we are all of one common nature, bad, when it is bad, in high or low alike,—noble and generous also, whenever it awakens in the dullest savage or child. Below us all creeps the animal. Above us all march the mighty geniuses and poets; they are our kinsmen. Their nature is our nature.


Let us vow, as we love our ideals, that we will never endure to forsake the company of our fellows, the rank and file of mankind. We will never despise the common toil. We will not antagonize men if we can help it. We will keep together and act together, whenever we can. We would not drive men, if we could, as we would not be driven ourselves. We will persuade them. We will never forget that the worst men

are yet men. We will not turn any out of the temple of our humanity. Our faith in democracy is our faith in humanity; that is, that justice and friendliness are in all men. If we believe this, we can afford to be endlessly patient.

Finally, the great need of our time is intelligent good will. This is more costly than idealism is. Plenty of people see ideals, as they might see the engineer's plan. Many will also hold their ideals. The need is of those who see the ideals, while also they see the men with whom they live and work. This is almost a new rule of conduct. It is hardly in the Bible, except by inference and in a few great passages; for the old way was, to curse your opponents, as the Psalms too often do. The Bible mostly divided men into kinds or parties, Jews and Gentiles, imperialists and anti-imperialists, saints and sinners. But the new thought is at the heart of all the Bibles, for it is at the common heart of humanity. It forbids us to hate or curse any one. When we seem farthest apart, we still fully expect to meet higher up.


Let the poet of democracy close our discourse: —

Have the elder races halted ?
Do they droop and end their lesson,
Wearied over there beyond the sea ?
We take up the task eternal
And the burden and the lesson —
Pioneers, oh, Pioneers !











This book should be returned to
the Library on or before the last date
stamped below.

A fine of five cents a day is incurred
by retaining it beyond the specified
time.

Please return promptly.

DUE DEC 11 1916

DUE SEP 14 1920

DUE JULY 26 1923

DUE OCT 14 1925

DUE JUN 9 1930

The spirit of democracy,
Widener Library

003621630



3 2044 080 033 186